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Abstract
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS TEST 




Benchmark models o f optimization, in the spirit o f the Rational Expectation 
Permanent Income Hypothesis, present a strong theoretical case for a smooth 
consumption regime in which households do not let consumption fluctuate 
with anticipated variations in explanatory variables. However, numerous 
studies in the past have empirically rejected the primary underpinning of the 
theory in aggregate level. This study attempts to provide substantial insight 
into the nature o f household consumption dynamics over a life cycle with 
relation to subjective data derived from the British Household Panel Survey 
and examines the cause for the failure of the baseline theory. These subjective 
data are used to test the rationality of consumer expectations and to assess 
their usefulness in forecasting expenditure. The results can also be interpreted 
as characterizing the shocks that have hit different types of households over 
time. Individuals’ expectations are found to be biased, at least ex post, in that 
forecast errors did not average out over a sample period lasting 12 years. 
Forecasts are also inefficient, in that people’s forecast errors are correlated 
with their demographic characteristics and/or aggregate shocks did not hit all 
people uniformly. Further, financial situation variables are found to be useful 
in forecasting future consumption, even controlling for demographic 
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The relationship between aggregate consumer’s expenditure and their 
aggregate disposable wealth is one of the most thoroughly researched topics 
in quantitative economics. From around the 1940's, after Keynes (1936) 
emphasized the role of the consumption function in his general theory1, 
economists started to pay more attention to the consumption function. The 
traditional view o f consumption over the business cycle suggests that 
consumption decreases in output but is expected to recover after that. In 
other words, there exist predictable movements in consumption. Modem 
economists examine consumption in terms o f an optimizing problem 
whereby economic agents allocate their lifetime wealth to maximize their 
lifetime welfare, both at the micro and at the aggregate level. The Permanent 
Income Hypothesis (M. Friedman 1957) and the Life Cycle Hypothesis 
(Franco Modigliani, R.E.Brumberg 1954) have played an important role in the 
evolution of the consumption theory, which is referred jointly to as 
PIH /LC H  in this thesis hereafter. The PIH /LC H  suggests consumers set 
their current and future consumption to an appropriate fraction o f their 
income on the basis o f a forecast o f their expected future stream of income. 
The fraction o f estimated income to be consumed in each period would take 
the form of the annuity value of wealth (Franco Modigliani, R.E.Brumberg 
1954) or o f permanent income (M. Friedman 1957). In sum, the theory 
proposes that consumption should follow a smooth pattern over a life cycle, 
depending only on the permanent component of the individual’s income, and 
should not fluctuate along with any transitory components. The PIH/LCH  
has dominated as the benchmark model o f consumption-saving behaviour for 
over half a century. The only significant change over this period is the
1 Keynes (1936) claimed that "it is also obvious that a higher absolute level o f income ... 
will lead, as a rule, to a greater proportion o f income being saved".
1
assumption of rational expectations as the mechanism driving agents’ 
forecasts. In turn, this has led to a more rigorous treatment o f uncertainty.
In general, in the last couple of decades economists have used large 
macroeconomic models to forecast economic behaviour associated with the 
assumptions of the rational expectations framework. The rational expectation 
extension o f the PIH /LCH , first presented by Hall (1978), suggests that 
change in consumption behaviour ought to be unpredictable under certain 
conditions. This is because changes in consumption will reflect the new 
information that becomes available to a consumer. By introducing a quadratic 
utility function, Hall shows that consumption changes are inherently 
unpredictable because this new information is both unknowable by nature 
and immediately processed by the consumer. In other words, Hall’s random- 
walk hypothesis clearly states that if agents are forward looking and have 
rational expectations, current consumption should only be related to the most 
recent period’s consumption while all other lagged variables should be 
irrelevant in predicting present consumption. However, while substantial 
theoretical and empirical researches, based on the PIH /LC H  and the rational 
expectations extension of it (REPIH), have been conducted, this has not been 
able to establish sufficient common ground with respect to explaining the 
consumption profiles over the life cycle. The majority o f the theoretical, as 
well as the empirical literature, indicates non-smooth patterns of consumption 
over the life cycle, counter to what has been proposed by the 
PIH /  LCH /  REPIH .
2
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
It is perhaps unfair to reject the REPIH based on the evidence from 
aggregate data. Hall’s framework is appealing because economists continue to 
seek an explanation for consumption behaviour as the result of an 
intertemporal maximi2ation problem where agents are assumed to be rational. 
It can be argued that the reported failure o f the REPIH is mainly due to the 
strong assumptions that have to be made in order to obtain an expression for 
consumption in levels from the (first order condition) Euler equation in 
which expected marginal utilities are required to remain the same over time. 
As a result, many economists are trying to understand what happens to 
consumption behaviour when we move away from the assumptions made by 
Hall and Flavin (1981). For instance, Zeldes (1989), Caballero (1990), Kimball 
(1990), Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1991;1992) find that it is very difficult to 
solve the first order condition to obtain an expression for consumption. But 
this does not mean that we cannot test the Euler equation. Attanasio (1998) 
discusses this point at length and concludes:
‘Even if it is not possible to obtain a closedform solution for consumption, it is possible 
to consider equilibrium relationships that can be used to estimate structural parameters. 
While these [. . .] are not sufficient to answer many important policy questions, they 
constitute a basic ingredient of any answer. ’ (pp. 20-22)
But Hansen and Singleton (1982;1983) state that the principal weaknesses 
associated with if estimating equilibrium relationships are that instrumental 
variables are often required. Also the tests involved are not very powerful, 
while those that are used to determine the truth o f the behavioral relationship 
tend to be then orthogonality tests.
Economists have tried to explain why consumption does not follow a 
random-walk in aggregate data in theoretical and applied econometrics. There 
is much empirical evidence that consumption reacts too strongly to current 
income and too little to permanent income. Those two findings are 
commonly referred to in the literature as the excess sensitivity and excess
smoothness puzzles of consumption respectively. Attanasio (1998) presents 
the explanation for the failure of the REPIH. He argues that aggregation 
issues make it very difficult to be able to predict or explain consumption 
behaviour accurately based on a representative agent framework. If it were, 
then we would be left with nothing to say about most of macroeconomics, let 
alone consumption.
4
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The general objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the consumption behaviour based on household-level cross-sectional time 
series data using the REPIH as its theoretical foundation. This is to establish 
whether agents attempt to smooth their consumption through their lifetimes 
at the micro level. Thus this research has two main objectives: to quantify the 
failure of the random-walk hypothesis using direct household-level data on 
expectations; and to explain what factors or behaviours account for this.
It is vital that economists discover what drives individuals to be optimistic or 
pessimistic and hence, what motives behaviour such as spending, saving and 
investment. As a result, another objective o f this thesis is to exploit more 
subjective data to explore its usefulness in forecasting households’ 
consumption behaviour. This is because subjective data on respondents’ 
intentions plays an important role in many fields like psychology, sociology, 
and political science, while in economics, its role has changed from being 
viewed as the negative in history2 to a more positive assessment in the recent 
literature 3 . For example, life-cycle models exploring intertemporal 
consumption behaviour are driven by expectations o f future income. Deaton 
(1992) states that consumers’ behaviour not only depends on current 
variables, but also on the subjective distribution o f future variables. Whilst 
economic theory is based on utility maximising behaviour, revealed 
preferences are often used to test the validity o f competing theories in 
empirical economics. Hence subjective data can provide a direct proxy for 
utility in empirical work.
In the majority of empirical life cycle models, there are three common 
assumptions derived from the theoretical literature on how agents form their 
expectations: rational expectations; adaptive expectations; and naive
2 Tobin (1959); Keane and Runkle (1990). They found data collected in the Michigan
surveys to be o f little or no predictive value in microeconomic analyses.
3 Dominitz and Manski (1996;1997); Das and van Soest (1996;1997); Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese (1992;1996); Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990)
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expectations. However, while the rational expectation revolution o f the 1970s 
is the basis for most o f today’s macro models, there has not been much 
empirical work done to test if this theory provides a realistic description of 
actual behaviour using actual empirical data on expectations. By using micro 
data, this thesis also exploits its panel aspect to test more cleanly than usual 
whether expectations are unbiased and efficient.
In sum, this thesis sets out to examine two inter-related propositions, the 
rationality of consumer expectations and their usefulness in forecasting 
expenditure. The specific objectives of this thesis include:
•  To test the rational expectations hypothesis with micro data sets from the 
UK over a relatively long time period (12 years).
•  To explore the determinants o f individuals’ financial expectations.
•  To investigate if expectation errors contain systematic components and 
particular groups prone to be financially over-optimistic or over- 
pessimistic.
•  To carry out excess sensitivity tests on a benchmark model to evaluate 
the validity of the random-walk hypothesis by exploring whether 
individuals’ expectations can help to predict their consumption 
behaviour.
•  To test for the existence of myopic, liquidity constraint, and asymmetric 
preference behaviour in household consumption decisions as an attempt 
to find possible explanations for the excess sensitivity puzzle.
•  To explore whether systematic heterogeneity is another possible source 
o f excess sensitivity o f consumption.
6
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an 
introduction and background to the thesis. Thus it outlines the main features 
of the problem under consumption, and describes the objectives of this 
thesis. Chapter 2 provides a review of the most important developments in 
the theoretical consumption literature. As a result it describes the literature on 
the random-walk hypothesis (REPIH), introduces some key empirical 
evaluations o f it, and presents the main theoretical and empirical explanations 
of the likely causes of its failure. Thus the literature review seeks to establish 
an understanding o f the development in the consumption theory and in 
estimation techniques. The first and second parts of the literature review deal 
with the empirical and practical issue concerning rational expectations and 
excess sensitivity tests respectively, and are carried out by a review o f some of 
the relevant empirical work. Chapter 3 describes the data employed in this 
thesis while Chapter 4 introduces the panel data models used in this applied 
work. Chapters 5-8 form the substantive empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 5 tests the rationality of expectations, explores the determinants of 
individuals’ financial expectations, and more generally characterizes the 
properties of forecast errors. Chapter 6 tests whether households’ 
expectations help to forecast their expenditure, and if so, whether this is due 
to myopic, liquidity constraints, or asymmetric preference. Chapter 7 provides 
further analysis by investigating weather systematic demographic components 
in expectation errors can explain the failure o f the Rational Expectations 
Permanent Income Hypothesis. The results o f empirical analysis are drawn 





The basic aim o f this chapter is to provide a background to the theoretical 
and empirical literature pertaining to consumption theories. The background 
is presented in two parts. The first part describes the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis (REH) in terms of the developments in the modem consumption 
theories; with in the second part presents the Rational Expectations 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (REPIH). Both of hypotheses are discussed 
based on theoretical and empirical aspects. As a result, this review 
concentrates upon the approaches derived from REH, and REPIH within the 
context o f a non-durable consumption decision-making process.
2.2 REVIEW OF CONSUMPTION LITERATURES
By the early 1970s the utility maximizing assumption had dominated the 
profession’s thinking about consumption behaviour for a long time. This has 
been due to their theoretical desirability and their econometric performance.
However, in the 1970s, three important factors combined to draw a reviewed 
interest in the consumption literature and to make it one of the most 
abundant areas o f recent economic research. Firsdy, the theories started to 
encounter difficulties in empirically predicting the behaviour o f consumption 
accurately when the underlying economic environment became more volatile 
in the 1970s. Empirical economists found that the previous stable relationship 
between current consumption and current income no longer existed. Because 
the impacts o f the cyclical components, usually approximated by fluctuations 
in variables, were held to promote these empirical failures, it was believed that 
the inclusion of extra arguments that would capture the increased volatility in 
the cyclical components could significantly enhance the performance of these 
models in empirical research. For example, Hendry and von Ungem- 
Stemberg (1981) used liquid assets as proxies for wealth while Deaton (1977) 
used an inflation variable to portray possible price illusion on behalf of 
consumers. Subsequently, most leading macroeconomic models were 
modified to include these and other variables in their consumption functions.
Secondly, the development and understanding o f more complicated 
econometric techniques provided more space to improve the performance of 
existing models. As a result o f these, Deaton (1992) presents that ‘It is a 
sobering undertaking to look back at many of the macroeconomic models of 
the time, and note the (now) obvious time-series problems: spurious 
correlations between integrated regressors, high coefficients of determination 
coupled with low Durbin-Waston statistics, and an almost complete lack of 
diagnostic testing.’ [pp. 79]
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For Hendry et al (1981), econometric techniques are vehicles to obtain 
information from raw data about the behaviour o f economic variables4, while 
economic theory serves to provide a first approximation to empirical testing. 
Davidson et al?s (1978) paper on consumption is revolutionary by involving 
such a method. They developed a conventional methodology for empirical 
modelling to formalize the standard procedures o f co-integration analysis, 
dynamic models of error correction and others. Meanwhile, theoretical 
economists have censured the application of using econometric techniques 
for the purpose o f developing empirical formulations that may perform well 
empirically but lack the support o f any fit theoretical base. Despite this, the 
further understanding of econometrics has helped theorists in an important 
manner. Engle and Granger (1987) presented the co-integration and error 
correction analysis to establish a clear distinction between long-term and 
short-term dynamic statistical relationships between economic variables.
The third factor was a purely theoretical one. It evolved from the rational 
expectations revolution that was promoted by Lucas’s (1976) critique 
concerning the structural relationships between variables. According to Lucas, 
the consumption function is one of those structural relationships that do not 
exist in the face of rational expectations. Under the theory o f rational 
expectations, expectations are derived from all the available information 
relating to the true or actual governing behaviour o f the variable to be 
predicted. Agents in the economy only perceive a structural relationship 
between permanent income and consumption, but the consumption 
functions developed above also assert that a structural relation between 
observed income and permanent income exists so that consumption would 
eventually be determined by observed current income. Consumption depends 
on current and expected future incomes. Instead Lucas argued that the 
relationship between past and expected future incomes cannot be properly 
treated as an invariant feature of the economic environment and is likely to 
change whenever changes in policy or other events cause rational agents to
4 Hendry’s econometric principles are summarized in pages 29-31 o f T he Demand for 
Ml in the U.S.A., 1960-1988’, Review o f Economic Studies (1992)
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change the way in which their past incomes affect their forecasts of future 
incomes. However, what does not change is the structural relationship 
between consumption and permanent income.
2.2.1 The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH)
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) has marked a “revolution in 
economic thinking that is comparable in the magnitude o f its impact on the 
economics profession to the Keynesian revolution of a half century ago” 
(Schiller, p228) and forms a major part o f the Rational Expectations 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (REPIH). But the REH is only one of a 
variety o f strategies that have been used by researchers in modelling 
expectations. This part outlines the theory, and reviews both theoretical and 
empirical criticisms. After reviewing the model and the evidence, I want to see 
if the REH is the best available methods of modelling expectations at the 
micro level in the following chapter.
The premise of the REH is that economic variables are generated by 
systematic process. Over time, individuals will use all the information 
available5 to them including previous expectation errors. Although individuals 
are not required to be always correct in expectation formation, they will 
recognize the inadequacies of their mechanism for expectation formation if it 
is systematically wrong and update the mechanism until correct on average. 
As a result, individuals should not make systematic errors.
To describe how the hypothesis works, we can imagine an economic variable 
Y, whose value is determined by its own lagged value, by the lagged value of 
other variables, X, and by an unexpected (random) shocks £ at time t. This 
provides us with the simple linear process:
Yt =ci + j5(Yt_x + P 2X t-\ + s t (2.1)
5 Information is used in the most optimal way and may change over time.
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The expected values of Yt is found by finding the mathematical expectation 
of Yt . Since Yt_x and X t_x are lagged, their values are known at the end of 
period t-1. However, the value of £t only becomes known at the end of
period /, so the rational forecaster must form some expectations o f its value at 
the end o f period t-1. This means that:
Et_x(Yt ) = a + p xYt_x + P 2X t_x + E t_x(s t ) (2.2)
Where the random variable £t is assumed to be IID(0, cr2) . The best 
estimate is made if the expected value of £t equal to zero. This leaves us with 
a formula for the expected value of Y  as:
Et-\ {Yt ) = a + P\Yt_x + P 2X t_x (2.3)
Thus, the rational expectation o f the variable Y  in period t  is its mathematical 
expectation given the available information.
It is noted that the REH does not claim that agents are always right in their 
expectations o f future variables. In fact, the forecast error is exactly equal to 
the random variable that determines Yt :
£ ,- i  ( Y , ) - Y , = s ,  (2.4)
This random variable, £t , is uncorrelated with Et_x (Yt ) , the predictions, and
the other variables in the process and with the information set available to the 
agent. Otherwise it would logically be included in the initial expectations. 
Therefore, it must be correlated with Yt , the actual realizations. Forecast
12
errors should have a mean value of zero and have the property of minimum 
variance6.
There are two types of rationality conditions, weak rationality and strong 
rationality. In the first condition, the expectation errors must be uncorrelated 
with historical information on prior realizations o f the variable being forecast:
E . ^ - Y ^ p j ^ + e ,  (2.5)
Where TM is lagged values of Yt . The coefficient /?, in the regression should
not differ significandy from zero. Meanwhile, it is called strong rationality or 
full rationality if any other variables known to the economic agents must also 
be uncorrelated with the expectation errors.
Theoretical Analysis
One o f the main criticisms of the REH argues it is ambiguous that economic 
agents use the exact model used by economists who are capable of analysing 
the future general equilibrium of the economy. However, the fact of the 
matter is that the REH argues that economists and economic agents produce 
the same expectations but it does not argue that they come to that conclusion 
by using the exact same method. It is possible for economic agents to make 
reasonable predictions in the light o f past observation and experience.
Another closely related criticism is the one that argues it is impossible to 
assume all decision-makers are intelligent enough to use and fully understand 
all the available information. But the hypothesis does not apply to every 
individual in the economy. Rather, it claims that on the average expectations 
are rational. The expectation in the market, on average, can possible be 
rational even there are some agents may irrationally over-estimate or under­
estimate. In fact, individuals can let other people form their expectations for
6 They have a variance less than that associated with any other model o f forecasting. It 
also means that they are the most efficient means o f forming expectations in a 
statistical sense.
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them. These expectations are based on full information and are rational. One 
of example is the expectations of inflation constructed by the Central Bank or 
the Department of Finance. Thus, the expectations of the market as a whole 
can be rational without making the highly unlikely assumption that every 
single individual forms rational expectations.
A third criticism o f the REH is that the necessary information is not available 
or very costly to use. But the REH does not claim individuals should know 
which variables are important in the generating process or know what the size 
of the coefficients in that process. Instead, it argues that, on average, 
economic agents will learn from past experience what the process is after a 
period o f time. It is why the REH is best seen as a long-term argument. In 
fact, Friedman (1979, p.24) points out that a clear outline of economic agents’ 
learning process to formulate expectations meeting the requirement is a 
missing part in the REH. But the absence of it does not take away from the 
hypothesis itself.
The fourth criticism of the hypothesis is that it has limited applicability. 
Rational expectations may not be possible to form because it is not easy to 
determine the variable generating process. However, Attfield, Demery and 
Duck (1985, p.28) present that a rational expectation can still be formed 
without knowing the exact process.
Em pirical Analysis
Numerous empirical studies have been done to support or refute the rational 
expectations hypothesis since Muth published his seminal article (Muth, 
1961). Much empirical work, such as Mishkin (1983), in the financial market 
and commodity exchanges has supported the REH. Although the results for 
these specialized markets are robust, it does not mean the hypothesis can hold 
truth across the economy. On the other side, if no major favourable insights 
of rational expectations in other markets have abounded, those empirical 
studies that have claimed to disprove the hypothesis have not been technically
14
strong. For example, Chow Test7 has been used to test the REH by many 
economists but often their data fail to be consistent8. Also, Mullineaux (1978) 
found that results from Chow Test were always opposite to those from 
alternative testing methods.
Maddala, Fishe, and Lahiri (1981), Gramlich (1983) and Batchelor (1986) 
tested the rationality of surveyed inflation expectations using the aggregated 
Michigan data. While these studies analysed quantitative questions about the 
future path of inflation (up/dow n/no change), the aggregation bias implies 
these individual rationality tests are not straightforward. Batchelor and Jonung 
(1989) examined micro-level data on respondents’ subjective expectations 
using small Swedish panel data and over a short time period (twelve months) 
and found evidence of bias and inefficiency. Using latent variable models, 
Ivaldi (1992) rejected the hypothesis of rational expectation for the French 
manufacturing industry, while, Nerlove and Schuermann (1995;1997) used a 
similar model along with micro data from a sample of Swiss and UK firms, to 
reject the rational expectations hypothesis. The alternative hypotheses of 
adaptive and naive expectations are also rejected as well in these studies. Das 
et al (1999) tested the rationality of income expectations using a relatively 
short Dutch dataset (1984-1988) and found that income expectations were on 
average too low relative to subsequent outcomes. However as has already 
noted, rationality may not to be required to average out over the course of 
only a single year. Indeed, Souleles (2001) argues that even five years might be 
too short a period to allow expectation errors to average out.
Furthermore, an interest in data derived from various household surveys and 
modelling the expectations of private households or individuals is increasing 
as economists consider decisions on consumption, savings, portfolio choice, 
investments in durable goods, labour supply, job search and fertility in many 
life cycle models. Guiso et al. (1992) and Domintz and Manski (1997) analyse 
Italian cross-sectional survey data on subjective income distributions and
7 This uses the F-test to test for structural stability in an econometric model.
8 For the Chow Test to be accurate the consistency criterion must be met.
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found that income uncertainty had a negative impact on the proportion of a 
households portfolio held in risky assets. Hochguertel (1998) found a similar 
result for the Netherlands. Alessie and Lusardi (1996) also used Netherlands 
panel data and found that while expected changes in income were significandy 
correlated with actual income changes, they did not find the expected negative 
relationship between savings and the predicted income change. Finally Das 
and Van Soest (1996) also used Dutch survey data to explain the relationship 
between expected income changes and previous income changes and the 
differences between income expectations and outcomes over the same time 
period. This found that many people are pessimistic about their future income 
prospects.
In short, there are many problems that arise in empirical work concerned with 
expectations. No overall conclusion about whether expectations in the market 
are rational can be obtained from empirical work as it is so imperfect. There is 
no sufficiendy strong evidence to completely disprove this hypothesis until it 
has been empirically falsified. By now, rational expectations are the best 
available models for economists to use model economic expectations. They 
are efficient at a statistical level because they have an error term with a 
minimum variance and zero mean. Also the REH coincides perfecdy with the 
concept of homo economicus9 and of the utiHty-maximising individual. The 
main point o f this section to be made is that the REH is not perfect but it is 
the best available method that we have for modelling expectations if these 
expectations need to be incorporated into economic models. At least, it fits 
the loose economic criterion of rationality.
Consequendy, an unresolved methodological issue raised in the tests of the 
validity of the REH is if it is appropriate to test it at the micro level. Edward 
Prescott (1977) has argued that expectations are not observed direcdy, and 
economists cannot use survey data to test the REH. Instead, only some
9 It is a term used for an approximation or model o f homo sapiens that acts to obtain the 
highest possible wellbeing for himself given available information about opportunities 
and other constraints, both natural and institutional, on his ability to achieve his 
predetermined goals.
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theory incorporating the REH can be test if it is consistent with observations. 
On the contrary, a number of economists10 have found that survey data on 
prediction variables can be of assistance in the empirical modelling of 
economic behaviour and econometric forecasting. Arnold Zellner (1985) 
supports the use of micro and industry data in examining relationships 
suggested by macroeconomic research, while Herbert Simon (1979) and 
James Tobin (1980) support direct empirical testing o f the REH. My own 
view is that if the survey evidence supports the REH, results derived under 
this assumption will be both more interesting and more demanding of serious 
attention. As a result, it is an appropriate and worthwhile activity to direct test 
the REH at the micro level in this thesis.
2.2.2 Rational Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis (REPIH)
Hall (1978) considers the consumption function in terms o f the Lucas’ 
critique and attempts to formulate a simple empirical test of the idea that 
consumers maximize the expected value of their lifetime utility subject to an 
unchanging real interest rate. He argues that the possible structural 
relationship for consumption might not be based on the assumed relationship 
between current consumption and current income because this would not 
response to policy interventions and other shocks in the economy. Instead, 
the ordering o f intertemporal preferences plays an important role. In other 
words, what does not change in the face o f expectations is the agent’s overall 
aim to maximize lifetime utility.
The foundations of Hall’s work derive from the principles of utility 
maximization associated with the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis 
that are then regarded as the most accurate applications o f the theory of the 
consumer to the problem of dividing consumption between the present and 
the future. Thus consumers arrange their consumption on the basis of their 
expected lifetime income instead of their current income. His view is that the 
measurement o f expectations and wealth play a central part in the permanent
10 Owen Sauerlander (1955); Otto Eckstein, Patricia Mosser, and Michael Cebry (1984)
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income hypothesis. The major limitation of this in empirical studies is that 
permanent income and expected lifetime income or wealth cannot be directly 
observed. Friedman approximates permanent income as weighted average of 
current and past values of measured income with the help of the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis. Likewise, Hall’s main objective is to examine the 
impact o f the inclusion of forward-looking rational expectations and 
uncertainty on consumption behaviour. His exposition states that if agents are 
forward looking and have rational expectations, current consumption should 
only be related to the most recent period’s consumption and that all other 
lagged variables should be irrelevant in predicting present consumption.
Hall (1978) considers a conventional life-cycle/permanent income model 
under uncertainty where household chooses a stochastic consumption plan to 
maximize the expected value of their time-additive utility function subject to 
an ‘evolution of assets’ budget constraint. The problem is to maximize
V(ct,c t+1,...,cl+r) = Et£ ( l  + S y Tu(ct+r) (2.6)
r=0
subject to
Z  0  + r Y ’ (c ,„  -  w,„  ) = A, (2.7)
r=0
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on
information available at time /, 8  is the rate o f subjective time preference, ris 
the rate o f interest which is assumed to be constant over time (r  > 8) ,  c is
consumption, A. are assets apart from human capital, T  is the length of
economic life; « (•) is the one-period utility function that is assumed to be 
stricdy concave and n> are earnings which are stochastic and the only source of 
uncertainty in this model.
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The consumer chooses consumption ct in each time period to maximize 
expected lifetime utility given all available information at that point. It is 
assumed that the consumer knows the value o f wt when choosing ct . No
specific assumptions are made about the stochastic properties o f w except that 
the conditional expectation of future earnings given today’s information 
exists. In particular, successive wt ’s are not assumed to be independent, nor is 
wt required to be stationary in any sense.
To solve the above problem, Hall uses the Euler equation approach to 
describe the individual’s behaviour. The advantage o f this specification is that 
it removes the marginal utility o f wealth from the model. Consequently, it is 
not necessary to explicitly model the distribution of future variables that could 
influence consumption choices. The Euler equation states that the expected 
utility lost from giving up a unit o f consumption (the right-hand side) must be 
equal to the expected utility gained by consuming the proceeds of the extra 
saving at any future date. More generally, under standard assumptions 
associated with the permanent income hypothesis and rational expectations, 
including the absence o f liquidity constraints and time separability, the Euler 
equation states that the marginal rate o f substitution between current and 
future consumption, istw,(c,+1)/w ,(cf) , must equal their relative price given 
by the rate o f interest and the rate of time preference, (l + £ ) /( l  + r )  . 
Therefore the rate of interest, individual’s preferences (the shape of the 
agent’s utility function and the rate of time preference), and unexpected 
events jointly determine individual’s consumption plan. Furthermore, if the 
expectation is fully rational then only the interest rate and preferences affect 
the consumption plan. Following Deaton’s (1992) argument [pp.25-9] the 
Euler Equation can be re-written as follows (arguments here follow Deaton, 
1992, pp. 25-9)
(1 + r ) g ,» '( Q =1 
(1 + S)u'{c,)
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The marginal utility functions are decreasing in the event of consumption 
under the assumptions about concave utility.
If we ignore the expectation operator, consumption will be growing when the 
interest rate is greater than the rate of time-preference and declining when the 
interest rate is less than the rate o f time preference. If we consider the 
expectations operator and the level of uncertainty, the general results cannot 
be derived when interest rates and consumption are stochastic. If  we assume 
utility functions are quadratic, that is marginal utility is therefore linear, and 
the real interest rate is non-stochastic, the results above can hold. Otherwise 
the concavity or convexity of the marginal utility function plays an essential 
role as well as the covariance between the interest rate and the marginal utility 
of money11. It is noted that interest rates also have a significant effect upon 
consumption and unanticipated changes in interest rates will move the 
consumption path up and down. Consequendy, the theory provides no 
general result for the effects of changes in interest rates on current 
consumption.
Friedman (1957) makes an assumption that agents will consume a portion of 
their wealth stock without influencing their overall stock of wealth. It can be 
shown, by substituting the Euler equation when utility is quadratic into the 
budget constraint and rearranging, that the individual will consume 1/ ( T — t) 
of his or her expected lifetime resources when the rate o f interest is equal to 
the rate o f time preference:
w + e 7 o + ry +c _   1 + r
T - t
where c is the bliss level of consumption in the quadratic utility function 
« (c,) = - l / 2 [ ( c ’ - c , f \ .
11 The implications about the convexity and concavity o f the marginal utility function are 
examined in more detail below.
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Solutions to the Euler Equation and the Plausibility of the Assumptions Used by Hall
Hall assumes that utility is quadratic and that the rate of interest is equal to the 
discount rate and these to derive the random-walk result that changes in 
consumption are white noise, and not related to anticipated changes in 
income and other variables that are in consumers’ information set. This 
insight o f Hall is often expressed in terms of the following Euler equation for 
consumer between period t-1 and t
c, = Xct_x + s t -> Ac, = a  + pQ t + s t (2.10)
where £( is unpredictable at t-1 and can approximate closely the stochastic 
behaviour o f consumption under the permanent income hypothesis12; A is 
the first-difference operator taken with respect to time; Qt includes variables
such as age and changes in family size to capture shifts in tastes. Assuming 
utility takes the form of constant relative risk aversion, utility is now generally
preferred, u(c) = c 1-p/( l  — p)  , where p  > 1 and denotes the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. In this case, E,(u'(cHl)/uXc,))= E,{cHI/c tYP . An 
approximation to this expression can be made by taking a (first-order) Taylor- 
series expansion around the point where consumption growth is zero.
Equation c, = Xct^ + £t Ac, = a  + f3Qt + £t (2.10) is what we
refer to as the basic REPIH and there are several important assumptions 
underlying it 13 . First, equation c, = Xct_x + £t ^  Ac, = a  + f3Qt + £t
(2.10) is only a linear approximation of the exact Euler equation even under 
the assumption o f constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. It can 
be shown that c, = Xct_x + £t Ac, = a  + j3Qt + £t (2.10)
implicidy assumes that the higher-order conditional moments of the
12 As Deaton (1992) states, the equation does not say anything about the variance o f £ ,  
and there is no reason to believe that the variance is constant. Hence, strictly speaking, 
equation (2.11) is not a random-walk.
13 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a review and discussion o f the issues.
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expectation errors are orthogonal to variables in the information set by using 
a second-order Taylor series expansion on the marginal utility of 
consumption. Second, equation c, = Xct_ j +  £  t A ct = a  + j3Qt + £t
(2.10) is based on a utility function that is intertemporally separable in the 
sense that the marginal utility of consumption in period t  depends only on the 
level o f consumption in period t. As a result, it excludes behaviour arising 
from time nonseparable utility function such as habit persistence, catching up 
with the Joneses, disappointment and loss aversion, preferences that have 
been used with some success in explaining the equity premium puzzle in the 
finance literature14. Third, it assumes separability between consumption and 
leisure. Therefore, labour supply variables are absent from the Euler equation 
for consumption. Fourth, the real interest rate is subsumed in the constant 
a  . This is because although micro data have abundant information on 
consumers, the time period is rarely long enough to allow sufficient variations 
in the interest rate for an accurate estimate o f the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. Finally, the capital market is assumed to be perfect in the sense 
that agents can freely transfer the desired amount of resources from one 
period to the next.
The economic implications of this equation are that the best prediction about 
the level o f consumption in the next period is today’s level o f consumption. 
The disturbance term s t , unpredictable events at time t, leads to the 
divergences between the two levels of consumption. The result is consistent 
with rational expectations postulations despite changes in consumption being 
unpredictable. An agent informed rational expectations will use all available 
information relevant to the behaviour of consumption when in forming their 
expectations. Given the information available in period t-1, the agent at that 
time will set consumption at CM which is equal to his or her estimate of his 
or her permanent income as shown in equation ct = Xct_x + £t 
Ac, = a  + PQt + £t (2.10). The right hand side of the equation gives
14 See, for example, Abel (1990) for the former two specifications, Epstein and Zin 
(1991) for the third.
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that estimate o f permanent income. A rational decision about consumption, 
, would have taken account of all information regarding the evolution of w
and r and the needs of the consumer described by the utility function and 8  
available at time t-1 and earlier. Since in period t-1 the agent has consumed an 
amount equal to his/her permanent income, his/her stock o f wealth 
(At + H t ) in period / will be the same as it is at the beginning of t-1 if agent
does not receive new information about the future in period t. And so, in 
period t  the consumer’s estimate of his/her permanent income will be 
unchanged and he/she will set consumption, ct , at the same level as before, 
. In other words, consumption in period t would change only if new 
information becomes available between periods t-1 and t. Because new 
information is defined to be unpredictable, it must be the case that 
consumption differs from lagged consumption only by an unpredictable 
element15. Hence, the disturbance term reflects information about the impact 
of all new information that becomes available to the consumer in period t 
about his/her lifetime wellbeing. The lagged consumption term contains all 
the past/predictable information. Hall argues that it is possible to derive an 
expression for that unpredictable element:
Evolution o f non-human assets can be expressed by
4 = 0  + r ) ( 4 - i  -  c,_, + w,_i) (2.11)
and evolution o f human wealth is present by
H, =(1 + r ) ( f fM - w M ) + ^ ( £ , w , +r (2.12)
r=0
So that the behaviour of the total wealth stock is given by the following 
equation:
15 Attfield, Demery and Duck (1991), pp. 208
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A  + H t -  0  + rX A -i ~ ct-\ + Ht-1) + (2.13)
where Tjt = '^^{.Etwt+T — Et_Ywt+T) . Then, the evolution of total wealth
T = 0
depends on the relationship between two informational variables, 7}t and £t .






Tit =  (XTJ( (2.14)
This is according to Hall cthe modified annuity value of the increment in 
wealth. The modification takes account o f the consumer’s plans to make 
consumption grow at a proportional rate X over the rest o f his life’, (pp. 975- 
6)
All the Euler equation results discussed above still apply. The consumption 
equation is simply a stochastic generali2ation o f the simplest life-cycle model 
in which consumption is constant over life with (predictable) variations in 
income, which is offset by appropriate asset transactions.
However, the economic implications of this solution to the Euler equation 
and the Euler equation itself must be taken into perspective for the following 
assumptions:
i. Consumption is the only argument in the consumer’s utility 
function.
ii. Capital markets are perfect so that consumers can borrow/lend 
without any restrictions at a constant rate o f interest as long as the 
present value of their consumption does not exceed the present 
value o f their human and financial wealth (this means that there are 
no non-linearity in the budget constraint),
iii. The rate of time preference does not exceed the rate of interest,
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iv. Certainty equivalence is assumed by Hall
v. There are no habits or adjustment costs,
vi. The consumption of non-durable goods is the only goods
considered.
vii. There are no measurement errors or transitory shocks to
consumption
viii. The coincidence o f the frequency of consumers’ decision making 
with the observation period of the data,
ix. Infinite lifetime
The first two assumptions infer that rational agents can substitute between 
current and future expenditures to achieve the maximum level of lifetime 
utility without any difficulties. The ability to borrow and lend makes the 
optimal consumption plan independent of current income under certainty. 
Current income would affect consumption path in a rational expectations- 
permanent income framework with certainty equivalence only through its 
unpredictability represented by the error term in the consumption equation. 
This explains why consumption plans are independent o f the level of current 
income and only depend on the preferences, the rate o f interest faced by the 
consumer and unforeseeable events. Note that the second assumption implies 
that consumers do not face any type of liquidity constraints. But more and 
more economists have relaxed this assumption to allow for the possibility that 
consumers may be liquidity constrained in their theoretical and empirical 
work. This can be taken to mean that consumers are denied credit altogether 
or that they cannot borrow as much as desired16.
The third assumption describes the patient nature of consumers. Since if 
consumers are assumed to be strongly impatient and their incomes are known 
with certainty, they would consume more than their current income and go 
into debt. Under this assumption, the consumers are to be willing to 
accumulate wealth in the form of savings. Without this assumption, agents
16 Consumers whose cost o f borrowing is higher than the return to saving can also be 
viewed as liquidity constrained, but this channel is not being considered here because 
the real interest rate is assumed constant.
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would undertake too high levels of consumption in their early life under 
certain income process or under certainty equivalence.
The certainty equivalence assumption is helpful in solving the Euler equation. 
The presence of uncertainty and the resulting expectation operator cause the 
main difficulty associated with solving the Euler equation. We can solve this 
problem by passing the operator through the equation with the assumption 
that marginal utility functions are linear, such as certainty equivalence 
assumption. Therefore, this is a very powerful assumption made on the face 
of Jensen’s inequality, which says that the expected value o f the function is 
not (in general) equal to the function o f the expected value17. The actual shape 
of the indifference curve, whether it is concave up or concave dow n18, 
determines the direction o f error and the nature o f the result. If the function 
is a convex marginal utility function, then the marginal value of consumption 
is higher when consumption is low and the increasing marginal rate with 
decrease in consumption should be greater when consumption is low than 
when it is high. If the function is a line, in which case the second derivative is 
zero, there is no error between expected value o f function and the function of 
expected value. Accordingly, a linear marginal utility function rules a 
precautionary motive in consumer’s behaviour.
Deviations from Quadratic Utility (Certainty Equivalence)
In this section, some work on the relaxation o f the quadratic utility function 
assumption is reviewed. Based on Pratt (1964), Arrow (1965), Leland (1968) 
and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970;1971), Kimball (1990) develops a simple 2- 
period framework. He presents the two-period maximization problem as 
follows (pp. 59)
max u(c) + Ev(w - c  + y )  (2-15)C
17 Jensen’s inequality tells us that convex (concave) marginal utility, the expectation of the 
function is greater (Tversky et a l 1991) than the function o f the expectation.
18 It can also be described in terms o f the second derivative o f the function that measures 
the curvature.
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where u is the first period utility function, v is the second period utility 
function, c is first period consumption, w = w0 + y  where WQ is the 
consumer’s initial assets, y  is the expectation o f second period income, and 
y  is the risky component of second period income, such that y  = y  + y  . 
The first order condition is
u'(c) = Ev'(w  -  c + y )  (2.16)
Since the risky component of second period income, y , has an impact on 
marginal utility in the second period and disarrays the first order condition 
consequently, consumption in the first period would be affected as a result. If 
we define savings as s = w — c the first order condition can be re-written as:
u \c ) = Ev'(s + 50 (2d 7)
Following Pratt (1964), Kimball defines the following concepts (pp. 59):
1) If  a quantify if/* , which is called the compensating precautionary 
premium, exists that satisfies u'(w — c) = Ev'(w — c + y  + if/ ) and thus 
compensates for the effect of the risk y  on second-period expected 
marginal utility then first-period consumption will be unaltered by the 
addition o f the risk and the compensating precautionary premium; and
2) If a quantity if/ , which is called the equivalent precautionary premium, 
exists that satisfies v'(w — c — y/)Ev'(w — c + y ) , then the elimination of 
the risk y  at the cost to the consumer of the certain quantity iff will 
leave optimal first-period consumption unchanged.
Kimball suggests that if/ and if/* are ‘approximately equal “in the small”. 
Also, nearly all important qualitative results about equivalent risk premiums 
are convertible with corresponding results about compensating risk premium. 
Moreover, due to the close resemblance between the risk premium and the 
precautionary premium ‘one can be confident that a result about equivalent
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precautionary premium will imply a corresponding result about compensating 
precautionary premium.’
Kimball indicates that u \c ) can be ignored in the definition of precautionary 
premium for the model where marginal utility is constant for a fixed value of 
the decision variable c. Kimball then clarifies that the analogy between the 
theory o f precautionary saving and the theory o f risk aversion is particularly 
simple. He shows that the role of the negative of marginal utility, — v ', for 
precautionary saving is the same as the utility function for risk aversion. For 
instance, risk aversion is given by the concavity of v, whilst a positive 
precautionary saving motive is shown by the concavity of —v' (i.e. 
v ' »  > 0 ) . Another example is that the index of absolute prudence in this 
model represents the strength of the precautionary saving motive, which can 
be present if:
iy(w, c) = lyfr) -- -  ( V'(^  = (2-18)
( - V  ( j ) )  V (s)
Thus, because the third derivative of the utility function is different from 
zero, deviations from quadratic utility can lead to a precautionary saving 
motive although it is noted that these results only apply for a given level of 
wealth in this two-period model. In 1996, Carroll and Kimball extend this 
framework to a multi-period model to show that the precautionary saving 
Kimball investigated in his two-period model can come about at different 
levels o f wealth and consumption.
A number o f studies have tried to explore the impact of relaxing the quadratic 
utility function assumption on consumer behaviour. In the early studies, most 
economists relax the quadratic utility assumption on the basis of the Euler 
fl -I- v'sE mYc 1
equation-----------l------ tJ^ — = 1 (2.8), except for Caballero
(1 + S )u \c t)
(1990) who explored the consumption function in terms of CARA 
preferences. Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Skinner (1988) first tested the
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Euler equation under the assumption o f CRRA preferences. If preferences are 
CRRA, u(ct) = c)~p /( I  -  p ) , the Euler equation is given by
so that if we define the following quantity zt+l as
2- ' = T z f cZ - e?  (2'2°)1 + O
then according to rational expectations theory, any variable, say wtJ, which is 
dated at time t or earlier, should be orthogonal to zt+i m-
= l  J  (2.21)
*  <=1
where J  denotes the number potential instruments in the consumer’s set. In 
Hansen and Singleton’s work, data on non-durables consumption, services, 
treasury bill rates, and the return on New York Stock Exchange stocks were 
used to find that the Euler equation can be rejected when equation 
1 T
— ^  wtJz t+] = 0 , j  = 1,..., J  (2.21) is estimated using GMM.
T t=i
Browning and Lusardi (1996) review most o f the empirical evidence on the 
Euler equation and precautionary motive savings at the micro level. They 
argue that the evidence on the validity o f the Euler equation using the 
orthogonality condition discussed above is ‘deeply ambiguous’ (pp. 1835). 
How to construct an observable and exogenous measure o f risk that varies 
across the population (pp. 1835-6)19 become an open problem on the face of 
such ambiguity in all the studies examining precautionary savings. Most of the
19 Even Browning and Lusardi disagree on the evidence (pp. 1835).
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variables which are chosen to proxy risk along with the corresponding 
strengths and weakness are thoroughly discussed in their paper. In addition, 
they also review the evidence on the precautionary savings. Thus while some 
studies find little or no evidence to support the presence of a precautionary 
motive, others claim that such a precautionary motive can explain a large 
proportion of wealth holdings of household.
2.2.3 Failure of the REPIH
In summary, Hall’s REPIH states that changes in consumption reflect the 
new information that becomes available to a consumer, that consumption 
changes are unpredictable because this new information is unpredictable by 
nature and because this new information is immediately processed by the 
consumer. The first tests of the REPIH, which are known as orthogonality 
tests, introduces lagged variables other than lagged consumption to the 
martingale equation. With respect to equation ct = 2,ct_x + £t ^
Ac, = a  + PQt + S t (2.10) if lagged consumption alone is sufficient
to predict current consumption then no other lagged variables can have 
statistically significant coefficients when they are included in the models. Hall 
(1978) provides some empirical evidence to support his theory, as he finds 
that the change in consumption is independent o f lagged income. Although, 
in his work, he also finds lagged stock prices also had a significant influence 
current consumption. However he dismisses this latter finding he arguing that 
it is not unreasonable to approximate consumption by a random-walk process 
when stock prices themselves are supposed to follow such a random-walk as 
well.
However, the REPIH turned out to be controversial especially in 
consumption research where, the years, several empirical investigations 
indicated the existence of patterns of excess sensitivity of consumption to 
lagged income over the life cycle. Using large macroeconomic models to 
forecast the economic behaviour associated with the assumptions of the 
rational expectations framework, most applied consumption research refuted
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the random-walk prediction for consumption at the aggregate level. Hence 
economists like Flavin (1981), Hall and Mishkin (1982), Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) found that aggregate data suggested consumers did not 
smooth out their consumption as much as predicted by the Life Cycle or the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC/PIH), and had, instead, consumption 
reacted too strongly to changes in current income. This is known as the 
excess sensitivity. If  expectations are rational then Hall’s permanent income 
hypothesis can be refuted since the claim that changes in consumption are 
unpredictable is not fulfilled. According to the random-walk equation, only 
unpredictable changes in actual income can affect consumption, so 
consumption should not react too strongly to actual and past income 
changes20.
2.2.4 Some Explanations for the Failure
In view o f the above results which suggest the existence of ‘excess sensitivity’ 
and the failure o f economic agents to smooth their consumption, many 
economists have examined the possible reasons for the failure o f the REPIH. 
This section reviews some of the most important explanations.
Private Information
Campbell (1987) considers the possibility that different information sets are 
used by agents and researchers to make predictions about changes in 
permanent income from labour and capital income. He develops a model of 
savings under the REPIH to account for such a possibility, which shows that 
such an information discrepancy can lead to problems for excess smoothness 
tests but not for excess sensitivity tests which examine the significance of past 
income for making forecasts about changes in consumption.
Excess smoothness tests are subject to this information discrepancy because 
they are based on expectations about future income. However, such
20 The predictability component depends on the nature o f the income process so that if 
income follows a unit root the predictable component carries over to the future.
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predictions about future income and respective permanent income are likely 
to differ between the econometrician and the agent if the information sets 
they use are different from each other. Hence any predictions about the 
volatility o f permanent income that emanate from the predictions made by 
the econometrician about future labour income might not represent the actual 
behaviour o f the representative agent.
Campbell (1987) and Campbell & Deaton (1989) develop models that could 
account for this informational discrepancy. In order to forecast labour income 
and hence permanent income, they examine the (superior) information that is 
conveyed by savings. The principle used in those papers is that: agents will 
reduce the amount o f consumption at t  if they expect lower future incomes 
and therefore a lower permanent income at time /. Such a reduction in 
consumption will induce an increase in saving that is defined as the difference 
between current income and consumption. As a result, savings provide 
information about agents’ expectations about future labour income. This 
relationship can be expressed by the following equations21:
c, = y f  = r 4  + 'Z l P U'E,y,
i=0
(2 .22)
S, = y, + rA, -  c, (2.23)
Substituting ct = y pt ~ r
s< = y, + r4  ~ c,
A,+flpu,E,yl
i=0
(2.23) and rearranging yields
(2.22)into
s, = - j r ( l  + r)” £,Ay,
1=1
(2.24)
k21 Herey  is labour income and corresponds to w  and A . are assets and correspond to y  
in the previous analysis.
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Hence, as savings equal the expected present value of future declines in 
labour income, therefore savings will rise (fall) if future labour income 
changes are revised downwards (upwards). This equation is referred to as the 
‘savings for a rainy day’ aspect of the permanent income hypothesis, and can 
help overcome the information discrepancies mentioned earlier. Taking the 
savings equation:
s , = - j r ( l  + r)-'£,(A>'I+, K )  (2-25)
/=1
where I t denotes the agent’s information set at t. If  H t is the 
econometrician’s information set at /, and it is assumed that
H . Z I ,
then the agent’s information set encompasses the one used by the 
econometrician. It is also assumed that the econometrician observes the 
current saving decision of the consumer, so that savings are a part of H t . 
This is the crucial assumption that is needed to overcome the superior 
information problem. Given those two assumptions, taking the expectations
oo
of st = — ^  (1 + r)~l EtAyt+i (2.24) conditional on the
/= i
information set H t :
E { s , \ H , )  = - f j (\ + r y ‘E (E (A yM \ I , ) \ H , )  (2.26)
(=1
which, by the ‘law of iterated expectations’ and the two assumptions above, is 
equal to
= - E ( l + I/ / , )  (2-27)
/= ]
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so that the econometrician’s information set is used instead of the agent’s. 
The crucial assumption here is that savings are observed by the economist 
allowing them to bridge the gap between his/her information set and the 
information set of the agents.
From the ‘savings for a rainy day equation’, it follows that
st -  Ay, + (1 + r > M = - r s t (2.28)
Equations s t — Ay, + (1 + r).yM = —rs t (2.28) and
st = y t + rAt — ct (2.23) summarize the testable implications
of the permanent income hypothesis and are exploited in papers by Campbell 
(1987) and Campbell & Deaton (1989). Testing for the validity of the REPIH 
using st — Ay, + (1 + = — ret (2.28) is more powerful
than using equation ct = TcM + s t Ac, = a  + fiQt + s t (2.10) as
long as the data do not invalidate the intertemporal budget constraint 
s , = y , + r A , - c ,  (2.23).
00
The saving equation s t = —^ ( 1  + r)~l EtAy,+; (2.24) is also
;=1
important from a statistical and econometric point of view as it allows us to 
test the permanent income hypothesis through st — Ay, + (1 + r)st_^ = —r s t 
(2.28). Assume that labour income is stationary after taking first differences.
Then equations c, = y t = r A , + 2 p ME,y,
i=0
(2.22),
st = y t + rAt -  c, (2.23) and c, = Xct_x + £t ->
Ac, = a  + PQt + St (2.10) are also stationary in first differences, but
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savings22 is stationary in levels. From the cointegration literature equation 
s t = y t + rAt — ct (2.23) and the fact that savings are
stationary, consumption is a random-walk, and total disposable income is 
stationary after first differencing, then it must be the case that a linear 
combination o f consumption and income exists so that both variables are 
cointegrated. By Engle and Granger’s theorem, an ‘error correction 
mechanism’ between the cointegrated variables exists which enables ‘to put it 
into V A R  form by dropping one of the elements o f Axt (where 
xt = \ y t ,A n ct^ )  and replacing it with a'xt . [...] The resulting model is well-
behaved and has the property of cointegration without the restrictions on the 
V A R  coefficients’ [Campbell 1987, pp. 1256]. Accordingly, one can test the 
REPIH as a set o f restrictions on a vector autoregression for changes in 
labour income and savings. Campbell exploits this characteristic of 
cointegration and proposes a V A R  system o f labour income innovations and 
savings (which is obtained by rewriting the ECM into V A R  as mentioned 
above) to test the REPIH.
Campbell, Campbell and Deaton for the US and Attfield et al. (1990) for the 
UK showed that the data does reject the appropriate restrictions imposed on 
the V A R  thereby implying that the permanent income hypothesis is flawed23. 
However Muellbauer and Murphy (1993) debate the superior information 
finding by arguing that lagged saving has an insignificant negative effect on 
subsequent income for the UK economy.
West (1988) also investigated the problem of inferior information. By 
considering a variance bounds test, he examined the sensitivity of 
consumption under the hypothesis that income has a unit root. West tested to 
see whether the results in Flavin’s permanent income hypothesis model varied 
if consumers were allowed to use additional information than that conveyed
22 Intuitively, saving is a discounted present value o f changes in expected labour income. 
These changes must be stationary for otherwise they could be predicted.
23 The test demonstrates that there is excess smoothness and that the orthogonality 
condition (when lagged income is introduced) is breached.
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by lagged and current labor income for predictions about their permanent 
income. If  we denote the consumer’s and the observer’s information sets by I 
and H  respectively, Flavin’s model implies
e, ~ Ec, | = Ac, = y„ -  Ey„ | (2.29)
where y„ = r(l + r)_1 0 (1 +  r)~J Ey,+J \ I, .
Thus var(Ac,) = E ( y ]t — Eylt \ / M)2 = cr] . If  only current and past income
observations are used by the econometrician, then the observer can only hope 
for
&h = E ( y HT ~ Ey ht I Ht~\)
So that, unless H  = I t , Var(Act ) ^  cr2H ; and it is likely
that er^ > erf = var(Ac,) . This implies that the variance of an
econometrician’s estimates is greater than the variance of the consumers 
estimate. In other words, because economists have less information than 
required to make forecasts which resemble those of the agent’s, excess 
smoothness results.
West is able to work out the difference between a 2H and cr] by using the 
intertemporal budget constraint st = y t + rAt — c, (2-23), and
introduces another test for the permanent income hypothesis;
= CT/ + K1 + rf  - 1] var(^ - y ,H)
or
o \  = var(Ac,) + [(! + r f  - l ]v a r (c ,  -rA , -  y,H) = cr^ + a ]  (2.30)
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Under the permanent income hypothesis, these equations must be true. If 
consumers use more information than that conveyed by current and lagged 
income, then <J2 must be statistically different from zero. If the permanent
income hypothesis is true then g 2 h — <j \ c — cr2 must be zero.
West’s finding rejects the null hypothesis CJ2H — cj\ c — G at t i^e 5% level 
and the null <J2H — g \ c — cr2 = 0 . This is implies that the ‘insensitivity of
consumption to news about income is unlikely to result purely from the use 
by the consumer o f additional variables to forecast income’ [pp. 23]. West 
adds wealth shocks and transitory consumption into this model to explain the 
insensitivity by introducing.
Variable Interest Rates
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) relax the assumption o f a constant interest rate 
made in the permanent income hypothesis and replace it with a varying and 
uncertain real interest rate. They examine two models of the Euler equation: 
the first considers a single forward-looking rational agent who consumes his 
or her permanent income; while the second model assumes a proportion of 
consumers in the economy are reluctant to substitute consumption 
intertemporally in response to interest rate movements. Because the error 
term in the Euler equation may be correlated with the independent variables 
in the regression, they use instrumental variables to estimate both models. It 
can be considered as a restricted pattern of a more general equation system, in 
which both the dependent and independent variables are regressed direcdy on 
the instruments, to estimate the REPIH by instrumental variables where the 
independent variables are current income innovations and the interest rate. 
The martingale equation places over-identifying restrictions on the systems of 
equations when there is more than one instrument. Those restrictions are 
used to test the permanent income hypothesis.
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Permanent Income Consumers
According to Campbell and Mankiw (1989), the log-linear generalization of 
the consumer’s Euler equation that accommodates variable interest rates is 
shown by:
A ct = ju + ort + s t (2.31)
The rate o f interest rt is contemporaneous with the changes in consumption
at time /, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with lagged variables but to be 
correlated with the error term in this condition, cr is defined as the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and should capture the fact that high ex 
ante real interest rates lead to rapid consumption growth.
However, using instrumental variables to estimate this equation lead to 
disappointing results. As a result Campbell and Mankiw gave a number of 
reasons for why the above equation one is probably misspecified [pp. 198- 
200]:
1. The hypothesis that consumption growth is unpredictable is 
rejected at the 5% level or better, which is inconsistent with Hall’s 
(1978) interpretation of the data. If the REPIH were true, and cr 
were zero, consumption should be a random-walk. Furthermore, 
the over-identifying restrictions of this equation are rejected at the 
5% level or better whenever lagged real interest rates are included 
in the set o f instruments.
2. The estimates o f cr are highly unstable and small unless the 
nominal interest rate used as the instrument exceeds one.
3. Reversing the Hall regression yields estimates for — that are not
<7
as large as would be predicted by the REPIH.
Campbell and Mankiw suggest that this misspecification of the model is due 
to the exclusion of rule-of-thumb consumers.
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Rule-Of-Thumb Consumers
As a result, a more general model is then considered, in which a fraction X of 
agents in the economy, the rule of thumb consumers, consume their current 
income, and the remainder behave according to equation ct = Xct_x + £t 
Act = a  + PQt + £t (2.10). The following model is estimated by
instrumental variables
A ct = n  + My, +0rt + s t (2.32)
where 9  = (1 — X)<J . The two coefficients we interest are now X , the 
proportion of rule of thumb consumers, and 9  , the effects o f interest rates 
on consumption. By estimating this equation Campbell and Mankiw found a 
number of interesting implications. Firsdy, rule-of-thumb consumers appear 
to exist in the US economy since the coefficient of current income is 
substantial and statistically significant. Secondly, they found evidence that ex 
ante real interest rate is not in any way determining the amount of 
consumption growth. The coefficient 9  is small and indicates that the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the permanent income consumers 
is small as predicted by the theory. Finally, the robustness of these results is 
enhanced by the fact that the over-identifying restrictions are never close to 
being rejected.
These results suggest that the expected changes in consumption depend on 
expected changes in income because rule-of-thumb consumers exist in the 
economy. This may explain why the excess sensitivity phenomenon occurs 
and suggests that using a single representative agent to explain the behaviour 
of aggregate consumption is not entirely correct.
Liquidity Constraints
Deaton (1991) examines the nonlinearities in the intertemporal budget 
constraint associated with borrowing constraints in a model where agents face
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uncertain income and are allowed to be both ‘impatient’24 and pmdent at the 
same tim e25. On the condition that precautionary motives interact with 
liquidity constraints, facing income uncertainty, even impatient consumers 
have an additional incentive to accumulate assets when times are good 
because o f their inability to borrow when times are bad. Deaton shows that 
the consumption profile under this framework is dependent on the time- 
series behaviour of income.
Hall’s problem26 is modified with assumptions o f convex marginal utility, 
borrowing constraints and impatient consumers. To solve the Euler equation 
easily, Deaton specifies the framework by introducing the term ‘cash in hand’ 
which acts as the state variable. The familiar Euler Equation is changed with 
the introduction of the borrowing constraints:
X{ct) = max * (* ,) , E l £ , A ( c , +1)
1 + o
(2.33)
where X denotes marginal utility and x  is cash in hand defined as 
1 + 7*X = A, + y,  a n d  = B < 1. Since consumers are not allowed to spend
' 1 1 + s
more than their cash in hand, no borrowing is permitted in the current
period27. The solution to the problem is difficult to obtain because the
marginal utility function X is nonlinear. In order to proceed, Deaton changes 
the problem to look for a stationary stochastic optimum in which 
consumption is a function of the state variable x t , ct = f  (xt) . The marginal 
utility o f money is defined for this purpose as
24 The rate o f time preference is greater than the rate o f interest.
25 They have a convex marginal utility function.
26 Here we show the modification associated with an i.i.d. income process.
27 The constraint implies that consumption cannot be higher than cash in hand, so given 
the convexity o f the marginal utility function, that cannot be lower than X{x t ) . If 
X(xt ) >  f3EtX(ct+\) , the constraint will bind; otherwise with no liquidity 




c , = r ' [/>(*,)] (2-34)
This enables the Euler equation to be written as
p(xt) = m a x ^ O ) ,  1 + r)(x -  kp(x) + y)}dF(y)] (2.35)
Labor income becomes the only source o f uncertainty after expectations have 
been taken into account in this framework. Consequently, the marginal utility 
of money today equates to the maximum value o f either the marginal utility of 
cash in hand in the constrained situation or the discounted expected value of 
future marginal utility o f money. The solution to this equation is then used to 
characterize the equilibrium properties o f the marginal utility o f money and 
thus the policy function f(x). The solution is obtained (pp. 1227) with the 
specification of an updating rule used for a finite number o f periods
p»(x,) = max[/l(x), {(1 + r)(x-Xp„(x) + y)}dF{y)\ (2.36)
and with the backward iteration of the functions p 0(x), p x (x),..., p n{x) until 
the function converges. In this problem, n=0 is the last period where 
everything is spend p 0(x) = X(x)  if there are no bequests. The period before 
that, n— 1, p x (x) is determined by either the borrowing constraint or marginal 
utility. The problem is solved recursively. This modified problem has the 
following properties ‘the convexity of A(x) implies p(x)  is convex. [...] 
With borrowing constraints, the convexity o f p(x)  determines the degree of 
precautionary savings. Moreover p(x)  is more convex than A (x ), so that 
the inability to borrow in adversity reinforces the precautionary motive’ [pp.
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1227]. Deaton shows that for independently and indistinguishably distributed 
income there is a unique X  such that:
1. c — f i x )  = x when x < x and,
2. c = f { x )  < x , when x > x *.
The implications are that the agent will spend everything and no assets are 
accumulated if the total value of assets and income is below the critical level
X * , given a level of assets and a draw of labour income. If the amount of cash 
in hand, x, is greater than the critical value, something will be held over and a 
new positive level o f assets will be carried forward to be added to next 
period’s income.
Some characteristics of the solution are summarized as follows:
1. The distribution of consumption will not be symmetric; the 
consumer can prevent consumption from being high but cannot 
prevent it from being too low.
2. The evolution of marginal utility o f money p(x)  is a martingale 
in the standard case, but under borrowing restrictions it follows a 
renewal process i.e. as long as the consumer carries forward 
positive assets, we have the martingale result, but as soon as the 
assets fall to zero, the process loses its memory and starts again.
3. The level of x* and therefore the amount of smoothing are also 
determined by the coefficients p  28 (which) and <J 29.
The results change slightly when the income process is serially correlated but 
stationary. Income y  now becomes the state variable together with x  since 
both convey information about future consumption decisions. Consumers’ 
behaviour is similar to the previous case: an amount x exists whereby levels
28 It is the coefficient in the isoelastic utility function w (c) =  C p  and represents 
prudence.
29 It is the variance o f the income process and therefore represents uncertainty.
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of x  below it lead to all cash in hand to be consumed and levels of x  above 
X  lead to a proportion of the consumer’s cash in hand to be saved for future 
periods. The actual level of X  depends on the arguments given above, but 
this time also depends on the level of income, or the ‘state’.
Some characteristics of the solution for serially correlated stationary income 
are summarized as followed:
1. Consumption is smoother than income, but the distribution of 
consumption is still asymmetric. Savings are a much more 
effective cushion against high consumption than against low 
consumption.
2. The coefficient of the AR process plays an important role.
When the income process is nonstationary, the analysis is modified to make 
all the variables30 in the problem stationary. To achieve this, Deaton divides all 
those variables by the level of income. The solution is given in terms of these 
new variables using the same techniques. The implications for consumption 
behaviour when the income process is nonstationary are as followed:
*
*  X
1. In the case of the no serial correlation, a variable w = —  exists
y t
such that when w < w , assets will remain at zero; for w > w 
the evolution o f assets is more difficult to follow although it can 
be shown by simulations that n> will eventually decline below w 
in finite time and therefore assets will eventually become zero so 
that all income is consumed. When income is a random-walk and 
borrowing constraints are present, smoothing is not desirable: if 
income is above average it is expected to continue that way, so 
the additional income enables the consumer to get closer to the 
ideal level of consumption. When a fall in income occurs nothing 
can signal to the agent when the future trough in income will
30 Income, cash in hand and consumption
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occur in order to allow them to smooth their consumption. In 
consequence, the combination o f ‘the persistence of the random- 
walk and the binding liquidity constraints precludes the 
accumulation of assets [pp. 1238]
2. For the serially correlated case, a solution to the problem can be 
obtained by simulations. Deaton finds that as soon as a bad state 
is announced, savings switch from zero to positive and the 
consumer begins to accumulate assets. As the slump continues, 
the savings ratio stops rising and falls below zero if the slump is 
long enough. Assets go on rising for a while after the savings 
ratio has started falling, but eventually reach a ceiling above 
which they cannot go. A t this point, the negative savings ratio 
and asset income help protect consumption against the effects of 
income which has negative expected growth over the slump. 
Finally the slump ends and the boom takes over. As this happens 
the consumer uses all their accumulated assets to finance a 
spending boom and spends the boom with consumption 
equalling income. However, while this result is the exact opposite 
of that implied by the permanent income hypothesis, it does not 
appear to be supported by the data. Deaton dismissed this point 
by arguing that ‘even in the absence o f borrowing restrictions, 
conditions for aggregation to representative agents are 
implausible, so that a representative agent formulation is perhaps 
even more than usually misdirected when there are liquidity 
constraints’, [pp. 1241] This clearly opens the debate about 
aggregation in a representative agent framework.
Excess Sensitivity
Flavin (1993) considers an alternative specification to the REPIH where
consumption exhibits excess sensitivity to current incom e31 . With the
31 In this section we concentrate on the theoretical aspects o f Flavin’s paper. In chapter 6 
we concentrate on the econometric aspects.
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assumption that an individual will consume all of its permanent income and a 
proportion j3 o f its transitory income each period, Flavin argues that liquidity 
constrained individuals show excess sensitivity to their current consumption:
(2.37)
where 0 < /? < 1 and permanent income is defined by
Assuming that there are no unanticipated capital gains, then the change in 
consumption is given by
Thus, ‘even though transitory income and permanent income were defined as 
the transitory and permanent components of total income, inclusive of asset 
income, in the statement of the excess sensitivity hypothesis, the terms 
involving asset income cancel out, with the result that the first difference of 
consumption is a weighted average o f the first difference o f labour income 
and the expectation revision of the annuity value of future labour income’ 
[pp. 655]. In other words, the change in consumption due to an innovation in 
permanent income is less than one to one and can therefore be interpreted as 
liquidity constraints and/or precautionary savings. For example, if consumers 
receive good news today that their labour income will permanently increase 
tomorrow, they may decide to consume a proportion of their transitory 
income today until their higher labour income is reali2ed if they cannot 
borrow to increase and therefore smooth their consumption. Moreover,




because consumers are reluctant to consume all o f their transitory income and 
therefore all o f their disposable income recognizing that they cannot borrow, 
perhaps this reluctance can be explained by precautionary savings.
In this model, savings are now scaled by (1 — /?), viz.
y, T T 7 l r b ) £'» (2.40)
This model is able to explain both excess sensitivity and smoothness. 
Sensitivity will occur if /? ^  0 , and smoothness will occur if
var(Ac, )  =  p 2 var(Ay,) + 2/?(l -  /?)cov(Ay,, Ay f ) 
+ (1 -  P ) 2 var(Ay/7) < var(Ay f )
Using data for the US, Flavin found that the REPIH could be decisively 
rejected. However the restrictions which the excess sensitivity hypothesis 
imposes on the bivariate system of labour income innovations and savings32 
could not be rejected by the data.
Buffer Stock/Precautionary Savings
Carroll (1992;1997a) examines the role o f precautionary savings in a REPIH 
framework where consumers facing important income uncertainty have a 
precautionary motive and are impatient. The model predicts similar results33 
to those suggested by Deaton (1991) as consumers engage in ‘buffer stock’ 
saving behaviour. Carroll demonstrates that consumers in this framework 
have a target wealth-to-permanent income ratio — w  in Deaton’s work —
32 It is proposed by Campbell and Campbell & Deaton.
33 Carroll’s model differs from that o f Deaton in that it does not impose liquidity 
constraints and in that income is divided into its permanent and transitory parts. 
Consumers act as if they were liquidity constrained because whilst impatient, they show 
prudence. Carroll claims that Deaton’s results are due to his assumptions about 
impatient consumers and the convex marginal utility function rather than due to 
liquidity constraints per se. Carroll also claims that liquidity constraints reinforce the 
results o f  his paper.
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such that if wealth is above target impatience will dominate prudence and 
consumers will dissave. The important result o f Carroll’s work is that he is 
able to put forward a formulation for the components o f the optimal level of
cash in hand w  34.
Carroll shows that the Euler consumption equation is a problem similar to 
Deaton’s if shocks to consumption are lognormally distributed:
E,A In cHl & p ~ ' ( r -S )  + ) var, (A In cM ) + sM (2.41)
where p  is the coefficient of risk aversion, r is the interest rate, S is the rate 
of time preference. Consumption growth depends on three factors: the 
degree o f impatience over precaution, a random effect, and the conditional 
variance o f consumption in next period given information available in current 
period. The first two components are standard to intertemporal consumption 
behaviour. But the variance term, which is proven to play a significant role in 
consumers’ behaviour, had not been investigated until Carroll’s work. Carroll 
derives an expression for the average (aggregate) variance of consumption 
term to obtain further insights:
£ ./[var^ ( A ln c/^  i)]
vaV
(2.42)
where g is the growth rate of permanent income and denotes the
variability o f permanent income. From the Euler equation, Carroll (1992) 
demonstrates 35 that the expected variance of consumption growth is 
negatively related to wealth. Carroll (1997a) argued that this equation serves as
34 Deaton did not provide such explanation.
35 Kimball (1990) has shown that for isoelastic utility functions, precautionary saving 
declines as wealth increases. Since precautionary saving adds to wealth over time, 
consumption will become less depressed. Hence, the reduction o f precautionary saving 
when wealth increases generates the extra growth in consumption when 
E t var(Alnc, + 1) is high.
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a means o f providing inferences about the target level of wealth that 
consumers will hold to buffer themselves against an uncertain future, 
although it ‘should be viewed as a heuristic tool rather than as a rigorous 
analytical framework.’ [pp. 20].




(2.42) increases when the growth rate of permanent income, g and the rate of 
time preference, 8  increase. A higher than expected growth rate for 
permanent income will probably reduce the amount o f income uncertainty for 
the individual and given their impatient nature, the consumer will consume 
more. When the consumer discounts the future less (i.e., 8  falls) the 
individual is willing to postpone consumption and their stock of wealth
( 2 \
increases. The equation E t [vai* , (A In ct ,+1)] «  —
\PJ
(2.42) also shows that the variance term, which presents the target level of 
wealth, decreases (increases) when the rate of interest and the variability of 
permanent income increase ( c r ^ ). The explanation of this result for both
variables is straight-forward: as interest rates increase, the consumer becomes 
less impatient as consuming more in the present becomes more expensive 
and so the agent is willing to increase the amount of wealth that he or she 
holds. When the variability of the permanent income component increases, 
consumers become more prudent; and rather than behaving impatiendy, 
begins to accumulate more wealth. Finally, the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (p ) has offsetting effects: a higher coefficient represents a stronger
precautionary motive (more wealth is accumulated due to the p / 1  term) but, 
at the same time, a higher p  leads to a lower intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, thus p~l (r — 8)  decreases.
Carroll (1997b) has suggested that tests for the validity of the Euler equation 
— as given by equation Et A In ct+l «  p~x (r — 8) + (J^) var, (A In ct+l) + s t+1
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(2.41) — using instrumental variables must be interpreted with caution because 
the variance term in that equation is likely to be endogenously determined by
(2.42). Thus, for instance, it would be incorrect to use interest rates as one of 
the instruments to test the Euler equation.
Aggregation with Finite Lives
The existence of finitely lived life-cycle consumers may both explain the
(1991) investigates the aggregate stochastic implications o f Modigliani’s life
changes in per capita consumption. The main finding o f the paper is that 
‘smooth per capita consumption in the presence o f a permanent shock to per 
capita labour income is exacdy the outcome one should expect from a 
properly aggregated life cycle model in which saving for retirement, as well for 
consumption smoothing, is a motive for asset accumulation’ [pp. 853-4]. 
Since savings are required to finance consumption in retirement, agents will 
not react so strongly to permanent changes in their labour income as they 
need to save for retirement. This means that the MPC of a change in 
permanent income ought to be less than one (the REPIH assumes an MPC of 
one) and it is likely to decline monotonically with age. Clarida’s main 
consumption equation is (in per capita terms)
2 1
all o f the variables in E , [var, , (A In c, ,+1)] « — g ----—  -  p~x (r -  8 )
1 /v L  2
problems o f excess sensitivity and smoothness that appear in the data. Clarida
cycle hypothesis to explain the first and second moment properties of
Ac, =(pX + g£ t + <j>rjt (2.43)
where
= mU )
1 + (1 + r)~' +... + (1 +




1 * 4  1 ^ 4  ( M ( /g  + 1 ^
Vt-\ ~ ^ ] £t-n+i "*■ ^  £t-n+jn n j=l
1
^(1)v v jj
where n is the number of periods the individual lives, w is the number of 
periods the individual works (n-w is the therefore the retirement period), j  is 
the age of a consumer at time t, /u is the marginal propensity to consume out
of labour income and £t ( = w e t /ri) and X(=wglr i )  are functions of the 
error and the drift term in the following specification for labour 
income, y t = g  + y t_x + et . Clarida showed that, for plausible demographic
assumptions, £the variance of changes in per capita consumption predicted by 
a properly aggregate life cycle model is substantially less than is implied by the 
representative agent permanent income hypothesis when shocks to per capita 
income are permanent’ [pp. 854]. The implications o f Act = (pX + n s t + j
(2.43) are followed:
1. Aggregate per capita consumption has a positive drift even though, by 
definition o f the REPIH, individual consumption patterns are a random- 
walk without drift.
2. The drift in per capita consumption exceeds the drift in per capita labour 
income ( (pX > 1 since (p> 1 if r > 0)  whenever the rate of interest is 
greater than zero.
3. Changes in per capita consumption are correlated with lagged changes in 
labour income.
N ear Rationality
Cochrane (1989) considers the conditions where agents follow alternative 
decision rules instead to those implied by rational expectations and explores 
the utility loss suffered by those agents. As a result Cochrane finds that the 
utility cost to an agent who decides to set their consumption equal to their 
current income rather than to their permanent income is less than ten cents to
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a dollar per quarter. The utility costs are small because the utility costs of 
deviating from an optimum are an order o f magnitude smaller than the 
deviation itself. An agent will not change their consumption unless a shock 
forces them to be relatively far away from their optimum, so that the costs 
associated with their changing consumption behaviour are exceeded by the 
utility gain from moving consumption to the optimum point.
Partial Adjustm ent
Attfield, Demery and Duck (1992) examine the possibility that consumers 
may be slower to adjust to changes to their permanent income than predicted 
by the permanent income hypothesis due to factors such as inertia or habit 
formation. Attfield et al. look at two models. The first one is a conventional, 
forward-looking quadratic cost of adjustment model and referred to as PIH1. 
The second specification, PIH2, examines the additional costs of planning 
required to enable the agent to reach the optimal level of consumption.
PIH1
Attfield et al modify the permanent income problem developed by Flavin 
(1981) by assuming that consumers wish to minimize the following loss 
function
Mix L = E,Yj p J [o0 (clj  -  cHJ f  + a, (c,+/ -  cUJ_, )2 ] (2.44)
j =0
subject to the constraint
£ / >  V /  = (1 + r)A, + Y JP i y HJ
7=0 7=0
1 GLwhere p  = (1 + r)~ . In the paper, a0 = — and ax = — , where a  is a cost of
adjustment parameter and c is the optimal level of consumption at each
time period. The quadratic cost of adjustment makes large consumption
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changes undesirable. After straight-forward manipulation, Attfield et al obtain 
the following result
Ac, = (1 + r)(l -  0)Acm + 9wt (2.45)
where wt = AEtAyt+j and 9  is a function o f the two roots required to 
solve the first order condition of the problem. The change in consumption is
no longer a martingale process but an AK(1) one. One must therefore include 
the lagged dependent variable and examine, under the null hypothesis,
lagged variables have significant coefficients.
This model explains both excess smoothness and excess sensitivity. The 
change in consumption and hence in permanent income is likely to be 
correlated with lagged income because that change is written as a function of 
wt which is itself correlated with lagged income. From
and excess smoothness will arise if  the ratio is less than one, i.e. if
According to the REPIH, forward-looking consumers need to ensure that
expected level of desired consumption in all future periods. However, the 
costs o f adjusting a variable may not be specific to the point in time that the 
adjustment takes place but may extend to other periods [Attfield et al pp.
whether the error term is white noise. This is done by checking whether
Ac, = (1 + r)(l -  9)Act_] + 6wt (2.45)
var(Ac) _ 0 2
var(w) l - ( l  + r)2( l - # ) 2
PIH2
not only is actual consumption at point t  equal to desired consumption in 
point t  but also that actual consumption in all future periods equals the
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1206]. As a result the planning time required to making sure consumption is 
at its desired level may produce a slow adjustment of consumption to changes 
in permanent income.
Hence adjustment costs may arise under the REPIH problem. Given their 
tendency to discount the future, one would expect the effort devoted by 
individuals to planning them immediate future will exceed the amount of 
efforts they put into planning for the future. The proportion o f permanent 
income which is unpredictable before current consumption decisions are 
made determine how much actual consumption will deviate from desired 
consumption: if a high proportion of permanent income is predictable well in 
advance, then actual consumption will be close to its desired level. Thus, in 
this model, it is assumed that there is ‘some time span sufficiently long to 
ensure that any component of current permanent income which was 
predictable well in advance will have its full effect on current consumption’ 
[pp. 1212]. This is shown in the following equation:
c, = E,-„y? + Z  (2-46)
0
where n defines the time span over which the adjustment is less than 
complete and where the y  s follows the pattern 0 < y 0 < y } < ... < y n_x < 1.
Since the change in expectations is unpredictable, Etyf> — Et_xy^ = et then




where 0o = l - f i o , <f>j = [0 y_, /  (p  -  /?y)] for 0 < j  < n ; (/)n = 0 n_J  p  and
Pi ~ [(1 ~ 7iX i-iP i-i\/0- ~ Y i - i) for 1 > 0 and Po = 1 “  Yo ■ Thus the change 
in consumption is an MA.(n) process, where the error term is a function of
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changes in the expectations about permanent income. This equation can 
explain both excess sensitivity and excess smoothness. Hence et is white 
noise by definition, we can write:
var( Ac,) = var(e, ) £  <j>f (2.48)
0
Excess smoothness will arise if (f)f < 1.
Excess sensitivity arises in this problem because lagged shocks to permanent 
income, which are likely to be correlated to lagged innovations in labour 
income, are shown to influence the current change in consumption.
Attfield et al find that US and UK data favour both the PIH1 and PIH2 
models over the random-walk specification of Hall. They argue that the PIH2 
specification is the preferred one as US data was not able to formally reject 
that specification. For UK data, such a rejection was less decisive.
In forma don -Aggrega don
Goodfriend (1992) shows that the orthogonality restrictions implied by 
intertemporal optimization, rational expectations and information processing 
need not hold under the aggregation of randomly heterogeneous and 
imperfecdy informed representative agents. Economic variables are generated 
by aggregate and relative components which agents must distinguish between 
to follow optimal decision rules. Agents may be imperfecdy informed because 
data they use are published with at least one period lag and because of the 
need to distinguish which part o f their current income change is an aggregate 
one and which one is a relative one. Then the relative persistence of each 
component is held to explain the failure of the REPIH. These issues are 
investigated in more detail by Pischke (1995) who extended Goodfriend’s 
model by assuming that aggregate information may play a small role in 
household decisions since ‘ignoring it is not very cosdy for most households’
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[pp. 807]36. The optimal reaction of agents to changes in their individual and 
aggregate incomes is investigated to assess their subsequent consumption 
decisions. In each of Pischke’s models, it is assumed that agents have 
individual specific income processes that are different from the time series 
structure of aggregate income. However, it is assumed that all the other 
assumptions o f the REPIH hold.
All the models Pischke considers, agents have identical income processes, but 
each faces a different realization o f this process in every time period. The 
simple income process assumes Ay it = £■,+(! — L)uit , where subscripts i 
denote individual variables while no subscripts refer to aggregate variables. 
Both errors are uncorrelated by the assumption37. In particular, Pischke 
examines three scenarios:
1) Complete Aggregate Information. In this case the micro agent has 
full contemporaneous information on aggregate income so that 
individual and aggregate income changes can be distinguished. 
This corresponds to the permanent income models of Hall and 
Flavin.
2) Unobservable Aggregate Shocks. The individual cannot 
distinguish between aggregate and individual income components. 
A simple income process for the micro agent is assumed to look 
like this
where 6  is a function o f the individual and aggregate 
components £ and u. With this income process, Pischke shows 
that the per capita consumption innovation will be
Ac, = 0AcM + A s  t
36 This assumption can be based on near-rational considerations.
37 Other income specifications where the aggregate errors are white noise and the 
individual errors are random-walks can be considered (as well as other modifications).
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where A = (1 — [$/(1 + r)J) . Consumption does not follow a
random-walk but an AR(1) process. Excess sensitivity and 
smoothness are both present in this model: if the researcher 
runs an excess sensitivity test of the type Act = a  + f3Ayt_x + et
then the estimated sensitivity coefficient, which should be zero, 
is
and the degree of excess sensitivity depends on the parameter 
Q . Excess smoothness arises because
if the rate of interest is small enough and 0  > 0 . Hall’s 
representative model would hold if the aggregate and the 
individual income processes have the same persistence 
properties.
individual i can only observe both y it and the aggregate shock 
£t_l at time t. The consumer also has knowledge o f the history 
of both variables so that they are able to infer uit_x. The income 
process for the individual now takes the form
a cov(Ac„Ay,_|) 
var(Ay,_,)
3) Lagged Information about Aggregate Shocks38. In this case, the
38 This is Goodftiend’s model.
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where w = —r—-—-  is a kind o f signal extraction parameter. 
<*s + ° u
Aggregate consumption does not follow a random-walk but an 
MA(1) process. According to Pischke, the response to an 
aggregate shock is larger in the no information model than in the 
lagged information model since
(w + r ) / ( l  + r ) < i 4  = [ l - ( 0 / ( l  + r ) ] . The lagged information 
model contains information on contemporaneous shocks, whilst 
the no information model also contains new information on 
lagged shocks so that the agent’s response to innovations in 
income differs in both models.
The lagged information model will exhibit both excess sensitivity and 
smoothness. The excess sensitivity coefficient is given by
„ £ { [ ^ * ,+ 0
p  =  i i c  ; = 1 -  w (2.49)
which is different form zero. Excess smoothness arises because
(7 Ac
O' 1 + r
+ (1 - w f
which Pischke demonstrates is less than one for small value o f r.
Pischke then looked at the predictions made by models using empirical 
estimates for the individual and aggregate parts o f the income process. 
Pischke assumed that the individual income and aggregate income processes 
are described by an MA(2) specification in first differences. By definition the 
consumption processes differ from the case o f the no information39 and the
39 Consumption follows an s4R JM A (M . Fridman 1957).
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lagged information models40. Pischke then obtained estimates for /? and the 
variance ratio for different values for the coefficients in the MA(2) income 
process and for different measures o f the variability of the two components 
of the income process. He found that both the no information model and the 
lagged information model predict parameters which were very close to the 
time series properties of aggregate consumption but was unable to say which 
of the two models better explained the data, although both performed better 
than the full information model.
In two more recent studies, Demery and Duck (1999;2000) have identified 
the appropriate restrictions that the models of Goodfriend and Pischke imply 
for the dynamics of aggregate consumption. Using US and UK time series 
data, Demery and Duck found that both models can be formally rejected by 
the data, although Pischke’s model explains some features o f the data better 
than the permanent income hypothesis.
O ther explanations
Chtistiano, Eichenbaum and Marshall (1991) investigated the time horixon in 
which consumption decisions are made. They specifically address the criticism 
that consumers have no grounds for planning their actions in an annual, 
quarterly or monthly basis and instead argue that agents make such decisions 
on a continuous time basis. The assumption that agent’s decision intervals 
match the data-sampling interval is thereby replaced by the assumption that 
agents make decisions at time intervals which are even finer than this. Their 
work is based on the previous finding that temporal aggregation bias can 
induce serial correlation and spurious Granger-causality correlations. 
Christiano et al. find that their continuous time variant of Hall and Flavin’s 
models satisfies the martingale hypothesis and argue that their empirical 
findings, which suggest that the first difference in consumption is serially 
correlated and Granger-caused by a variety of other variables, are explained 
entirely by a temporal aggregation bias.
40 Consumption changes are an M A (1 ).
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Bemanke (1985) suggests that durable goods and adjustment costs could 
explain the excess sensitivity. Bemanke studies the consumer’s optimal 
spending patterns on durable and non-durables that are joindy determined.
Muellbauer (1988) examines whether lagged dependent variables in 
consumption represent agents’ expectations or adjustment costs, habits or the 
durability of goods. Muellbauer argues that habits, like convex adjustment 
costs, can account for the excess smoothness finding although he rejects these 
arguments as the complete explanation for the failure of the REPIH 
specification. Muellbauer (1994) suggests that other types of adjustment costs 
may in fact account for the failures of the REPIH.
Heaton (1993) examines habit formation and time-aggregation issues. He 
found that monthly consumption changes were negatively correlated, not 
positively correlated as were the quarterly changes. He suggested a model 
where the utility function would depend positively on stocks that come from 
the accumulation of purchases, and negatively on habits. In that model 
durability would dominate over short periods but where habits become more 
important as the observation period increases.
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2.3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed the most important developments in the 
consumption literature. Since the late 1970s, it appeared that consumption 
behaviour could not be modelled empirically. This led Muellbauer and 
Lattimore (1995) to summarize the then state o f consumption research as Tar 
from satisfactory’ [pp. 222]. In particular, the endogeneity of income in the 
consumption regression has been a major obstacle in empirical evaluations of 
the model. Moreover the technique, in which lagged values o f income act as 
predictors o f current and future income inevitably takes the form o f a 
distributed lag model in the empirical estimation, has faced numerous 
criticisms. In 1978, Hall’s consumption function was published called as an 
important breakthrough in testing the implications of the benchmark model. 
Following the rational expectations revolution — m ost forcefully advocated by 
Lucas in his famous critique — Hall introduces rational expectations and a 
number of other assumptions into the permanent income model of Friedman. 
He attempts to capture the stochastic implications of theory in a rational 
expectations setup. Hall’s consumption function argued that consumption 
should roughly follow a random-walk pattern apart from a trend, with lagged 
values o f income having no role to play in predicting present consumption. 
This is because information is unpredictable by its very nature and cannot be 
systematically predicted. Therefore it should not be possible to predict 
consumption. Hall tested this claim and found empirical to support for his 
hypothesis41. However, subsequent tests over more than two decades found 
that Hall’s consumption function could be formally rejected using data from a 
number o f different countries as consumption changed appeared to react too 
strongly to current income42 and too weakly to permanent income43. This 
suggests it should be possible to identify some variables that should prove 
useful for predicting changes in consumption.
41 Strictly speaking, Hall only attempts to test the hypothesis that consumers try to
smooth marginal utility. Because his marginal utility function is linear, this implies that
he is testing whether consumers smooth their consumption or not.
42 It is called the excess sensitivity.
43 It is called the excess smoothness.
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Consequently, this chapter presented some of the empirical studies that have 
tested the truth of both the REH and the REPIH, and described the principal 
theories which claim to explain why Hall’s consumption function fails at the 
aggregate level. Two main conclusions can be drawn: First, the bulk of 
empirical research on aggregate consumption has been undertaken on two 
data sets for the US and the UK economies that end in the mid 1980s. In 
other words these tests are out of date and based on a limited amount of data. 
Second, while there have been many different explanations given for the 
failure of the random-walk hypothesis, most involve different economic 
theories/concepts which in turn lead to very different consumption 
specifications. As a result there is therefore no common consensus about 
what the underlying consumption function should look like.
In the last decade, there has been much effort focusing on the question of 
whether the response of consumption to income changed is consistent with 
the permanent income hypothesis using micro panels44 and macro time series 
data sets. Many researches based on these, like that of Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989;1990) and Shea (1995ab), indicate a failure o f the REPIH. However, 
Attanasio and Weber (1995) show that the pattern o f US non-durable 
expenditure observed in household-level data conforms to the predictions of 
the standard theory on consumer intertemporal optimization. Amidst the 
contradictory results contrived from the various studies in this area, it 
becomes increasingly hard to explain the empirical puzzles that have surprised 
theoreticians for over five decades. As a result o f the contradictory results 
gathered from the various studies in this area, there is a need for extensive 
evaluation o f the theory. This study seems to derive a benchmark case study 
for the United Kingdom economy to help analyze these empirical puzzles.
44 Zeldes (1989) confirms the presence o f excess sensitivity o f low-wealth households 
and emphasizes the importance o f liquidity constraint in explaining the apparent excess 
sensitivity based on a micro data.
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Chapter 3
DATA DESCRIPTION AND EXPLORATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In traditional ‘time-series’ applied micro-econometrics, economists use data 
on aggregate quantities collected over time to model economic relationships. 
But it is unclear whether on how this method relates to the behaviour of 
individual agents. As a result, more and more economists are now focusing on 
developing alternative frameworks within which they can use data collected 
from individual agents to model the behaviour of such agents.
There are many reasons that micro-data sets are used in applied micro­
econometrics: from econometric theorists who are interested in testing a 
theory at work to policy-makers interested in knowing the potential impact of 
a proposed policy change. But, most probably, it is true to say that there is 
more o f an active interest in the concept subjectivity today than there has ever 
been in the past. There are several related reasons for this. The first one is the 
increased availability o f micro-data. More surveys are operated today than 
ever before and more survey data are made available for general use. Secondly 
the rapid progress of computer technology over recent years has made it 
easier to store and process the increasing amounts o f such data. Thirdly, and 
most importantly, the power of computers today makes possible what was 
considered impossible twenty years ago, in terms of estimating of the 
necessarily complex statistical models which use the increasing amount of 
available micro data.
The internal complexity of micro-econometric models arises largely from 
certain clumsy features possessed by micro data. Pudney (1989) discussed 
these issues. The behaviour of individual agents is often characterized by non- 
linearities, kink and discontinuities. Conversely, at the aggregate level, as 
variables are effectively averages over the population, these ‘clumsy features’ 
are not present because they have been, completely or at least partly,
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eliminated by the process of aggregation. Thus, in the case of aggregation, 
simple statistical models, such as least squares estimation, are therefore much 
more likely to suffice.
As a result there is an incentive to move from the individual level to the 
aggregate level in applied micro-econometrics as this can eliminate the 
problems associated with micro data and validate the more straightforward 
statistical techniques associated with aggregate data. However there is a 
drawback with this. Firsdy, any aggregation data must involve information 
loss while individual micro data can allow an economic problem to be viewed 
in its richest possible form. Thus models involving aggregates are impossible 
for explaining individual behaviour while strong assumptions are often 
required concerning the cross-section distribution of the model’s variables. 
Fry and Pashardes (1989) run an empirical investigation into the problems 
associated with moving from the household to the aggregate level in the 
analysis of tobacco consumption. They find that such problems are severe, 
and ascribe these to the complicated nature of the household decision making 
process which determines smoking behaviour. For these reasons, I am 
concerned more on movement towards individual data in this thesis.
The dataset used as a vehicle for this is the British Household Panel Survey 
(2003). The British Household Panel Survey started with a baseline survey in 
1991 and has provided data for many of units of observation in a cross- 
section sample which are surveyed annually. It satisfies the basic requirements 
of being data on individual units as opposed to aggregates, and in being 
heavily disaggregated in terms of the quality data it covers. In fact, it would be 
hard to find a dataset which is more suitable for understanding the dynamics 
o f change o f the whole population in the UK in which I am most interested. 
Generally, more than one variable o f interest are involved in micro­
econometric models. The variable o f interest is that variable the parameters of 
whose conditional distribution I wish to estimate. The variable o f interest is 
likely to have emerged from an economic model o f individual behaviour, in
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which case the parameters of its conditional distribution are the parameters of 
the underlying economic model.
It is common that the variable of interest is detached from the observed 
variable in some way in the process o f estimating a micro-econometric model 
using micro data. In general, the observed variable cannot show up all the 
information on agents and this information is not usually restricted for some 
reasons. This detachment may take four forms in the observed variables, 
censoring, grouping, truncation or some combination o f these. As a result, the 
most fundamental problem in applied micro-econometrics is what empirical 
economists are striving toward model is often different from what is observed 
in the real world.
Amemiya (1973) mentions the crucial importance o f this ‘damaged’ data issue 
which was referred to in the last paragraph. It is suggested that the stochastic 
specification o f a model must be correct to eliminate this problem and ensure 
consistency o f the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE). This is in contrast 
to the general linear model, in which the MLE is consistent whatever the 
nature o f the model’s stochastic element. With damaged data, the estimates 
obtained from any such model should not be taken seriously without rigorous 
testing o f the model’s distributional assumptions.
I have acquainted the concept of the term variable of interest that may arise 
from an economic model or some other type of behavioural model. In this 
thesis the traditional models of consumption are discussed in terms of 
variable o f interest.
Traditional models o f consumption are considered for application to time 
series data on aggregate quantities. Such models are usually constructed with 
the individual agent in mind within the framework of a constrained utility 
maximization problem. One example is Stone (1954) who derives the Linear 
Expenditure System from a simple direct utility function, and relates each 
goods consumption linearly to its price and the consumers’ income. Another 
is Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) who derive the Almost Ideal Demand
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System (AIDS) from a flexible expenditure function while relate the budget 
share o f each good to the logs of prices and the log of real income. There are 
also many other examples. For example, Christensen et al (1975) and Theil 
(1965) present some of the most widely used models. These models are all 
comparatively straightforward to estimate, many are linear in parameters and 
have been considered useful in the modelling of aggregate time-series 
expenditure data, although the results in terms of the testing o f the underlying 
economic theory have generally been not satisfied. Because of these rejections 
o f theory, some authors, like Christensen and his colleagues, began to explore 
alternative explanations beyond the framework of constrained utility 
maximization. Likewise, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) argue that such 
models are also inadequate for capturing the true nature o f consumer 
behaviour.
The increased availability of panel survey data over recent years and the 
increasing empirical work in which such data are applied have naturally led to 
the increased use of such data to model consumption. From aggregate 
expenditure data to cross-section expenditure data, there are four important 
changes occurring and each leads to a completely new type of econometric 
model. Firstly, it is assumed that there is no price variation in cross-section 
data. All households in a single cross-section are assumed to face the same 
price. All prices involved in the model are included in the constant term of 
the equation, and, under this assumption, an equation relating expenditure on 
a good to household income can be obtained. Since there is no price 
variation, the testable implications o f consumption theory, namely 
homogeneity, symmetry and negativity, are no longer testable hypotheses.
The second change is that characteristics o f households can be included in the 
models as conditioning variables. The most useful o f these are demographic 
variables like gender, education level, household size and so on. For example, 
Chesher and Rees (1987) modify the AIDS system of Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980b) to incorporate demographic variables in a way that preserves the
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linearity o f the model. Poliak and Wales (1981) discuss alternative methods 
for incorporating demographics.
The third important difference is that, a distinction needs to be made between 
consumption and expenditure when we use cross-section data. Consumption 
is usually thought of as a continuous process while expenditure is seen as an 
event that occurs at discrete period intervals. In other words, the quantity 
purchased over a one-week period is likely to be either greater or smaller than 
the quantity consumed over the same period. But in most cases of empirical 
research, expenditure acts as the observed variable when consumption is our 
interest variable. The rift between these two variables is one manifestation of 
the fundamental problem in micro-econometrics: what is modelled does not 
correspond exacdy to what is observed. However, if we used aggregate date, 
the problem would be eliminated: if we took an average of weekly 
expenditure in a certain time period over the population, household spending 
less than they would compensate for those purchasing more than they 
consume with the result that average expenditure would equal average 
consumption.
The fourth important change when we move from aggregate to cross section 
data is that o f zero observations in the data. When we consider the 
households consume a particular item, it is reasonable to expect that some of 
them are not consumers of this item. The possible reasons for this are that 
their income is too low, or some other characteristic which they have. These 
households are considered to be at comer solutions. In this case, a zero 
expenditure will be recorded even if the period of time is sufficiendy long. 
Because o f this feature of the data, the linear econometric methods applied to 
aggregate data are simply not suitable, because such methods are based on 
continuous distributions and do not allow a positive probability for a zero 
observation. As a result, when linear methods are used, the estimates obtained 
are generally inconsistent. The extent of this problem depends on the nature 
of the zero observations in the sample. N ot all the zero observations are 
necessarily comer solutions. Some may result from the nature of the
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purchasing process. In other words, it might be that an expenditure is not 
observed in the survey period even when a household does consume the 
good. This type of zero observation is referred as an ‘infrequency zero’. If all 
zero observations are infrequency zeros, all households are consumers of the 
good, but not all are observed purchasing it at any point in time, then it is 
appropriate to apply linear econometric methods. The observed expenditure 
data can simply be considered as consumption measured with error, and in 
such circumstances linear methods consistendy estimate the conditional mean 
of consumption. However, at the micro level, it is unreasonable to assume 
that any good is consumed by all households. It is therefore likely that the 
zero observations in any sample are a mixture of comer solutions and 
infrequency zeros.
Moreover, there are other possible explanations for zero observations. If a 
household would never purchase the good under any circumstances, we refer 
to this case as ‘abstention’. One of examples is meat consumption in a 
vegetarian household. Abstention, in this case, can be thought of as an 
extreme case o f a comer solution. Another possibility is non-disclosure. 
Households may wish to conceal information from the interviewer, resulting 
in zero expenditure being incorrectly recorded. Deaton and Irish (1984) have 
considered the statistical problems associated with non-disclosure in terms of 
expenditure on tobacco and alcohol. But the problem is not relevant in this 
study since food expenditure, which is used as a measure non-durable 
consumption in this thesis, is not a sensitive issue. Hence it seems 
unnecessary to assume a household has much incentive to withhold the truth 
about their consumption pattern in a food expenditure survey.
Meanwhile considering these problems in the transition from the macro-level 
data to the micro-level data, my analysis of consumption would be concerned 
on the cross-section time series data like panel data in the micro level in this 
thesis. The following section discusses the details o f panel data.
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3.2 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
In general, there are three types of database analysis: cross-sectional, 
longitudinal, and panel. Cross-sectional analysis focuses on respondents at 
one point in time and gives a representative picture of current social 
conditions at this point. Longitudinal analysis highlights the same people 
repeatedly through a period and compares their successive states. Panel 
analysis helps us to track individuals’ position through historical time. Panel 
analysis can be categorized into retrospective and prospective studies. 
Respondents are required to reconstruct some views and periods of their life 
in the retrospective study. Prospective study involves collecting information 
more or less simultaneously with the actual events portrayed. Recently, more 
and more economists have been interested in the understanding o f process of 
macro-social changes and changes at the micro level that are experienced by 
individuals, families and households. As a result, panel research is playing a 
much more important role in scientific activity and becomes an increasingly 
popular form of longitudinal data analysis among social and behavioural 
science researchers. In this section I discuss the origins o f panel data, show 
the development of it, consider a small sample o f panel data, and present an 
appraisal o f its utility.
3.2.1 Definition
A panel is a number of households or individuals who are surveyed and
followed periodically over a given time span. The term panel data refers to
“the pooling o f observations on a cross-section o f households, countries,
firms, etc. over several time periods.” (Badi H.Baltagi 2001 p.l) Panel data is
“data which consists o f both time series and cross-section values, e.g. a data
set that consists o f spending by a large sample o f households for several
years.” (Graham Bannock et al. 1998 p.311), Panel data is often concerned
with issues such employment, travel to work and mobility, earnings and
incomes, durable consumption like housing, and non-durable consumption
like food and grocery, and used to monitor and explain changes in economic
wellbeing and to study the effects of economic and social programs. As an
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example, Balestra and Nerlove (1966)’s analysis is based on the data on 36 US 
states over 13-year period. Panel data is also distinct from both pure cross- 
sectional data and pure time-series data. Observations on agents in pure 
cross-sectional data are at a point in time while observations in pure time- 
series data usually have an aggregate nature and without any longitudinal 
dimension. For some purpose, it may be useful to view cross-sectional data as 
a panel without a time dimension. In other words, panel data can be 
considered as “cross-sections over time” or “pooled” cross-sectional time- 
series data if we ignore the question of whether the cross-sections over time 
refer to identical agents or not45. In social science, researchers apply panel data 
to conduct longitudinal analyses in wide range of fields. For example, it is 
used to study classes of students or graduates over time in education; the 
behaviour o f political parties and organizations over time in political science; 
the characteristics of groups o f people followed over time are explored in 
sociology, psychology, and health research; while in economics panel data 
analysis has enabled researchers to analyze the behaviour of firms and 
individuals over time.
3.2.2 Development
US panels started operating in the 1960s. The two most well-known examples 
are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) collected by the Institute for 
Social Research at the University of Michigan and the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Labour Market Experience (NLS) collected by the Centre for 
Human Resource Research at Ohio State University and the Census Bureau. 
A large number of studies have used the PSID and NLS data sets. The 
Longitudinal Retirement History Study is another important labour force 
panel, which followed individuals aged 58-63 in 1969. The Current Population 
Survey (CPS) is constructed by the Census Bureau centres on labour force 
statistics and contains fewer variables with shorter time spans compared with 
the NLS and PSID. The University o f Michigan also collects the Health and
45 Verbeek (1996) gives a useful survey o f methods used to treat repeated cross-sections, 
not necessarily involving the same agents.
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Retirement Study (HRS) from 1992. More than 21,000 people over the age of 
50 are surveyed.
The European panels started being set up in the 1980s. The German Institute 
for Economic Research began to collect the first wave of the German Socio- 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) in 1984, which covers all persons above the age of 
16 in the households sampled. Standard demographic variables as well as 
political involvement, wages and income, benefit payments, level of 
satisfaction with various aspects of life, hopes and fears, etc are collected. 
Statistics Netherlands has operated the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (ISEP) 
from 1984-1997. The Luxembourg Panel Socio-Economique (PSELL) is 
based on 6110 individuals over the period 1985-94. The French Household 
Panel (1985-90) includes 2092 households. The Belgian Socioeconomic Panel 
covers a representative sample of 6471 Belgian households in 1985, 3800 in 
1988 and 3800 in 1992. The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
has been collected since 1992 by the Carolina Population Centre at the 
University of North Carolina. Statistics Canada started collecting the 
Canadian Survey o f Labor Income Dynamics (SLID) in 1993. The Hungarian 
Household Panel (1992-96) with a reference population o f 2059 households is 
collected by the Social Research Information Centre. The Institute for 
Household Economy constructed the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers 
(JPSC) in 1994. The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) involved 7799 individuals 
first interviewed in 1999. The British Household Panel Survey (Elena Bardasi 
et al 2003)is an annual survey of private household in Britain. The Institute 
for Social and Economic Research at the University o f Essex first collected it 
in 1991. The BHPS is a national representative sample o f more than 5000 
households containing demographic and household characteristics, household 
organization, labour market, health, education, housing, consumption, 
income, social and political values. More details of the BHPS are presented in 
section 3.3.
In 1994, the Statistical Office o f the European Communities (EuroStat) 
commenced the design and coordination o f the European Community
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Household Panel (ECHP), which was linked to existing national panels from 
the beginning or ran parallel to existing panels with similar content. In 1997, 
the ECHP was merged into the GSOEP, PSELL and BHPS.
3.2.3 Advantages and limitations
Panel data offers several important advantages over data sets with only a 
longitudinal or a temporal dimension. These include the following:
1) Their use may offer a solution to the problem of bias caused by 
unobserved heterogeneity46, which is a common problem in 
fitting economic models to cross-section data sets. Neither time- 
series nor cross-section studies control for this heterogeneity. For 
example, Hajivassiliou (1987) analyzes the external debt 
repayments problem using a panel of 79 developing countries 
over the period 1970-82. He investigates country-specific 
variables, such as colonial history, financial institutions, religious 
affiliations and political regimes and finds that these variables 
affect the lenders’ attitudes to these countries with regards to 
borrowing and defaulting and the way they are treated. The 
omission o f this country heterogeneity would lead to serious 
misspecification. Panel data are able to control for these country- 
variables whereas a time-series study or a cross-section study 
cannot.
2) A second attraction o f panel data is that they usually have very 
large numbers of observations compared to other types of 
datasets. As a result, there is more information, more variability 
and less collinearity among the variables in panel data compared 
to others. Thus more degrees of freedom and efficiency are 
generally available in panel data sets than with conventional time- 
series data, although cross-section data sets are often very large. 
For example, in this paper, because there are 28243 observations
46 E.g. see Moulton (1986;! 987)
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in 12 waves of the BHPS, there are potentially 
28243x12 = 338916 observations. Further, because it is 
expensive to establish and maintain them, panel data sets tend to 
be well-designed and rich in content at the beginning of 
operation.
Panel data are better able to reveal dynamics that are difficult to
detect with cross-section data. Cross-sectional distributions
appear relatively stable and fail to reveal a great number of
information on changes. Moreover, because panel data are less
highly aggregated than typical time-series data and the same
individual units can be observed through time, researchers can
test more complicated dynamic and behavioural hypotheses than
those that can be tested using uni-dimensional data. As a result,
panel data are considered to be a suitable vehicle to study
processes such as unemployment, job turnover, residential and
income mobility, and the duration o f economic states. For
example, in measuring unemployment, cross-sectional data can
estimate what proportion of the population is unemployed at a
point in time and will find that some individuals are employed,
some are unemployed, and the rest are economically inactive.
However for policy purposes, one would like to distinguish
between frictional unemployment and long-term unemployment.
As the later can indicate a serious social problem. Thus policy
makers designing an effective policy to counter long-term
unemployment need to know the characteristics of those affected
or at risk. In principal it is possible to capture the information
with a cross-section survey using retrospective questions about
past labor force status. However, in practice the scope for this is
often very limited. The further back into the past we go, the
worse are the problems o f a lack of records and fallible
memories, and the greater becomes the problem of measurement
error. Panel data avoids this problem and can estimate what
proportion of those who are unemployed in one period remain
72
unemployed in another. Also, “panels are necessary for the 
estimation of intertemporal relations, life-cycle and
intergenerational models.” (Badi H.Baltagi ,p.7)
4) More complicated behavioural models than those using purely 
cross-section or time-series data can be constructed and tested 
with the help of panel data. For example Baltagi and Griffin 
(1988) and Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) argue that 
technical efficiency is better studied and modelled with panels.
5) Panel data usually consists of micro units, like individuals, firms 
and households. Because many variables can be more accurately 
measured at the micro level, any biases resulting from aggregation 
are eliminated47.
However, on the other side of the coin, Badi (2001) argues that there are four 
main limitations of panel data. These are as followed:
1) Design and data collection problems. Kasprzyk et al. (1989)
discuss the problems that arise in designing panel surveys as well 
as data collection and management issues. These are problems of 
coverage48, non-response49, recall50, frequency of interviewing, 
interview spacing, reference period, the use of bounding and time- 
in-sample bias.
2) Distortion of measurement errors. Faulty responses due to
unclear questions, deliberate distortion of response, memory 
errors, misrecording, inappropriate informant and interviewer 
effects in the process of collecting panel data may cause
measurement errors.
3) Selectivity Problems.
i. Self-selectivity. In cases where the reservation wage is
47 see (R. Blundell 1988;1996); (N. A. Klevmarken 1989)
48 Incomplete account o f the population o f interest
49 Due to lack o f cooperation o f the respondent or because o f interviewer error
50 Respondent not remembering correctly
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higher than the offered wage, people can choose not to 
work. So, in such circumstance, we observe the 
characteristics of these individuals instead of their wage. 
The sample is expurgated if only their wage is missing. But 
this would be a truncated sample if we do not observe all 
data on these people. Inference from a truncated sample 
introduces bias that is not helped by more data because of 
the truncation51.
ii. Non-response. Item non-response occurs when one ore 
more questions are left unanswered or are found not to 
provide a useful response. Non-response can make serious 
identification problems for the population parameters. 
Horowitz and Manski (1998) argue that the seriousness of 
the problem is directly proportional to the amount of non­
response. Non-response rate in the first wave of the British 
Household Panel Survey is 26%. The comparable non­
response rate for the first wave of the PSID is 24%, for the 
GSOEP (38%) and for PSELL(35%).
iii. Attrition. If subsequent waves o f the panel are subject to 
non-response, we call this more serious problem ‘attrition’. 
The degree of attrition varies depending on the panels. The 
attrition rate varying from the first and second wave is 12% 
in the BHPS. Rotating panels, where a fixed percentage of 
the respondents are replaced in every wave to replenish the 
sample, are sometimes used in to counter the effects of 
attrition.
4) Short time-series dimension. The number of individuals tending 
to infinity in panels crucially affects asymptotic arguments in 
analysis. Increasing the time span o f the panel increases cost and 
the chance of attrition.
51 see (J. A. Hausman, D.Wise 1979)
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In sum, the increasing availability of panel data provides rich and powerful 
data sets for researchers who are interested in studying both the space and 
time dimensions of economy and social phenomenon. These data sets are 
called balanced panel data if there is an observation for every unit of 
observation for every time period. But if there are missing values, a panel is 
described as unbalanced. The analysis in this thesis applies to unbalanced panel 
data, because missing observations are endogenous to the model while a 
balanced panel, which could be created artificially by eliminating all units of 
observation with missing observations, may lack the representative nature of 
the underlying population.
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3.3 BHPS DATA DESCRIPTION
3.3. Ilntroduction
There are four major national household panels: the Panel Study o f Income 
Dynamics (PSID) surveying a large representative sample of the US 
population; the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) which gathers data 
on issues ranging from labour market and income issues to the value of 
domestic production; the British Household Panel Survey, which is a random 
representative survey at the micro-social level o f around 5,500 households 
and over 10,000 representative British people; and the Hungarian SOEP, 
which uses a similar sample and set o f rules to the BHPS to describe the rapid 
changes occurring in Hungarian society.
This study intends to focus on the BHPS. The BHPS has been collected and 
analyzed by the ESRC Research Centre for Micro-social Changes at the 
University o f Essex over a period o f years and monitors and describes the 
responses o f individuals, families and households to macro change. The 
BHPS also combines components of both prospective and retrospective 
studies as it not only uses similar variables and questions to those used in 
cross-sectional surveys to trace their changes, but also allows the construction 
o f continuous variables to analyze individuals’ behaviour over time. There are 
six broad topic areas included in the questionnaire: household organization, 
the labour market, housing, income and wealth, health, and socio-economic 
values.
The data used in the analysis are taken from the BHPS from September 1991 
through to September 2002. The bulk of interviews are taken place by the end 
o f December each year, although some of them do extend well into the 
following year. The end of the following April is the cut-off point. The BHPS 
is a random sample from the British population. One o f the most attractive 
characteristics o f the BHPS is that we can use it to examine the relationships
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between respondent’s financial expectation52 and their actual consumption 
outcomes. Likewise, to understand the broader impact of uncertainty on 
individual welfare situation, we can also investigate the interaction between 
the households’ observed behaviour (for example, their savings and purchases 
of consumer durables) and their feelings of financial wellbeing53 or, in order 
to explore the rationality of consumers expectations, the BHPS provides us 
with panel data with which we can compare a sample member’s expectations 
in one wave with out-turns in a subsequent wave. Unfortunately, the 
household’s responses to questions only involve their financial situation 
instead o f the exact amount of expected income. For example, respondents 
answer the question like “Looking ahead (back), how do you think yourself 
will be financially a year from now (ago), will it be better than now, worse 
than now, or about the same?” The answers to all such questions are discrete 
and ordered. But it still can help us to identify the characteristics of 
respondents’ expectations and the ability o f their introspection in the 
successive waves using ordered discrete variables. Furthermore, using the 
BHPS allows us to explore how individuals form their expectations in 
comparison with early investigation that relied on aggregate data.
3.3.2 Purpose
The BHPS is a household survey based on a sample of the whole population 
o f Great Britain and its intention is to understand the dynamics o f change of 
the whole population, and its evolution over the lifetime of the study. Each 
individual wave o f the BHPS addresses issues o f relevance to the whole age 
range. It also collects data and usually follows all the people living in the 
sample household instead of just a reference individual.
52 In questionnaires, observers are required to predict their future financial statement, 
better off or worse off, instead o f the expected income. “Looking ahead, how do you 
think you yourself will be financially a year from now, will you be better off than you 
are now, worse off than you are now, or about the same?”
53 A narrow interpretation is current income; a broader interpretation would also take 
into account the values o f any assets they hold and the incomes they expect to receive 
in the future. Most interesting, some who had experienced an increase in current 
income felt themselves worse off.
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The first and central purpose of the BHPS is to provide high quality data on 
the short-term processes of change at the individual and household level. The 
collection of this short-term data allows the construction of longer sequences 
of high quality biographical information across a range of domains. The origin 
o f panel studies was the need to explore the dynamics o f poverty and income. 
It followed from an understanding that these could not be explored through 
separate snapshots, but rather required an approach which collected a 
continuous record about incomes in particular. This implies frequent 
interviews to minimize recall problems. These general statements can be 
broken into a range of research uses:
1) The analysis o f the incidence of state and events such as poverty or 
unemployment over time, which provides a very different understanding 
o f their distribution in society from that provided by cross-national data.
2) The measurement of the rates of transition between states, and the factors 
associated with these transitions. This analysis may be based either on 
repeated annual measures or on the construction of complete histories 
based on monthly calendars for the periods between waves. This short­
term retrospective data is much more reliable than that collected from 
longer period life histories.
3) The design in which all household members are interviewed and followed 
permits the analysis of associations between the life course o f different 
household members, and how their individual decisions may impact on 
each other. It also makes the household panel study particularly suitable 
for the analysis o f the dynamics of household formation and dissolution, 
and the associated events and outcomes.
4) The analysis of the association between changes in the different domains, 
for example health and the labour market, in order both to understand 
causal ordering, and to understand the wider social key events and 
processes.
5) The analysis o f associations between measures in a modelling context, 
which takes account of unobserved heterogeneity through the use of 
repeated measures in fixed and random effects models.
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6) The accumulation of life history data, both within the panel itself and in 
the retrospective life history collected in the early waves, makes the panel 
particularly suited to the analysis of the long-term accumulation of 
resources (personal and financial), and their impact on later outcomes.
By continuing into the over the next decade and beyond, the BHPS will start 
to provide data on period differences in some of the short-term transition 
processes, for example, whether jobs and families are becoming still more 
unstable — something which is difficult to explore with retrospective data.
Certain new advantages start to emerge as the panel increases in length. For 
example it becomes possible to analyze some o f the longer spells and 
sequences with full data on antecedents and the evolution o f events during 
the spell. It also becomes possible to analyze the impacts of earlier life stages, 
including for example the impacts o f childhood poverty on family disruption 
on later life circumstances, with information from multiple measurement 
points, allowing inference about impact and instability. It also becomes 
possible to analyze other lifetime acquisition processes, especially of wealth 
accumulation, so allowing for the prediction o f economic circumstances in 
retirement. It is also becoming an important resource for the analysis of 
mortality.
Analyses o f within household relationships and influences are also informed 
by better historical information on all household members. It also becomes 
possible to undertake analyses o f inter-generational influences.
The existence o f an extensive network o f household panel studies, 
throughout Europe, in North America, means that there is already a 
substantial level of international comparative research, and one key goal is to 
expand the opportunities for such research.
The highest priority o f the BHPS is the maintenance of annual measures from 
the original core sample. Even though there are some other emerging issues, 
especially concerning overall sample size, and re-sampling, the BHPS
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maintains high data quality and low attrition, compared with the attrition rates 
o f the PSID in the USA, and rather lower than the GSOEP. There is 
therefore no doubt about its ability to continue to provide high quality data.
The BHPS is intended as a multi-purpose study with a sample size sufficient 
to permit analysis o f key policy relevant socio-economic groups. In addition 
to its academic user base, the BHPS meets most o f the basic requirements for 
government research needs, but its sample size54 is sometimes seen as too 
small. Both academic and government users would like to increase the 
resolution o f the study, to allow further regional breakdowns, and to permit 
analysis o f smaller subgroups. As part o f government departments review of 
their data needs, Payne, White and Lakey (1999) report that T he  sample size 
becomes more of a constraint when the focus is a minority sub-sample: 
people with disabilities, those in further and higher education, women with 
school-age children or using childcare services and so on. Also, the 
proportions experiencing particular kinds o f transition in any one year may be 
small.’
3.3.3 Consumption
In contrast with the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), the BHPS does not try 
to give a detailed analysis o f expenditures. The primary measures of 
nondurable consumption available in the BHPS are expenditure on total food 
and grocery bills, expenditures on oil, gas and electricity and expenditure due 
to mortgage or rent housing costs. Unfortunately, information on spending 
on fuel is present in most, but not all, waves while expenditures on durable 
goods are not recorded continuously. Thus only discrete values are available 
and these are not consistent with our definition o f consumption. The 
nondurable consumption we are interested in is defined as the aggregation of 
expenditure on total weekly food and grocery bills. Because of the lack of 
other consumption information in longitudinal datasets, food consumption
54 It includes around 5000 households in the core sample.
80
has been used in numerous studies of household consumption behaviour55. 
Therefore, for each household, we use the food and grocery expenditure as a 
proxy for real nondurable consumption. Although food is only one 
component o f overall household expenditures, it has the benefit o f being a 
non-durable good which is necessary for estimating standard models of 
household consumption behaviour. Food spending is considered as a 
necessary good with small income elasticity and provides quite a strong test of 
consumption smoothing. If households do not smooth spending on food, 
they are unlikely to smooth other forms of spending (although if food 
spending is smoothed, it cannot be rejected that total spending falls). Despite 
some reservations o f usage of food and grocery consumption56, the results of 
regressions using the BHPS food consumption variables may interest some 
readers.
The survey question explicitly asks about expenditure at the household level. 
Households are asked “approximately how much does your household usually spend 
each week in total on food and groceries. ” In the first wave, they are asked to give a 
continuous answer; in subsequent waves, they are asked to say in which band 
(out o f 12) their weekly food spending lays. They are told to include all food, 
bread, milk, soft drinks etc, but asked to exclude pet food, alcohol, cigarettes 
and meals out. Take-away food eaten in the home is, however, included. To 
obtain a weekly spending figure, each individual is assigned the mid-point of 
their reported band each year, adjusted for inflation in food prices57. In sum, 
the answers to food spending in the BHPS are continuous and range from 0 
to 250. Following to Souleles (2001), changes in the number o f adults and in 
the number o f children are included in the regressions to control for the 
influence o f household composition on food expenditures.
55 See, for example, Hall and Mishkin (1982), Altonji and Siow (1987), Zeldes (1989), and 
Shea (1995b).
56 Carroll (1994) is skeptical about this strategy; Attanasio and Weber (1995) discuss the 
non-separability o f food consumption; Shapiro (1984) states the large amount of 
measurement error in food consumption.
57 For wave 1, the continuous answers were first banded, and then midpoints were 
assigned.
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Figure3.1 H ousehold Consum ption of N on-durables
It is apparent from the above plot in Figure3.1 that household consumption 
rises up to an individual middle ages and starts falling thereafter. The plot 
reveals the much talked about hump shape or inverted TJ’ shape of 
consumption over the life cycle. In the consumption literature, this plot is 
often used as a starting point for doubting the theoretical prediction of 
consumption smoothness.
3.3.4 Incomes
At the cross-sectional level, the BHPS shows the different incomes associated 
with different household types58. As Figure 3.2 shows, the single elderly and 
lone parents have the lowest incomes; couples with children have higher 
incomes; while comparably, couples without children have highest incomes of 
all.
58 Single non-elderly; single elderly; couple without children; couple with dependent 
children; couple with non-dependent children; lone parent with dependent children; 
lone parent without dependent children; more than two unrelated adults; other 
households.








1-Single Non-elderly;2-Single Elderly;3-Couple No Child;4-Couple 
Dep Child;5-Couple Non-Dep Child;6-Lone Parents Dep Childr;
7-Lone Parents Non-Dep Childr;8-2+Unrelated Adults;9-Others
Longitudinally, the BHPS also shows that larger numbers of respondents 
experience a substantial change in their income (both falls and rises) at some 
time in the observation periods. An example is shown in the following Table 
3.1.
Table 3.1 Change in Incom e Between 1991 and 1992
Change in income between 01/09/90 and 01/09/91
Fell 4+ deciles Fell 2-3 deciles Stable (-1—hi) deciles Rose 2-3 deciles Rose 4+ deciles
1415 316 305 253 1822
34.42% 7.69% 7.42% 6.15% 44.32%
Furthermore, the BHPS also allows us to determine the relationship between 
changes of income and other factors, like household composition, marriage 
and divorce or separation, etc. For example, Buck et al (1994) find the 
incomes of the rich are much more likely to fall than those of the poor in 
using the BHPS database between 1990 and 1992. In other words, the
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incomes o f the poor are less likely to fall compared to those of others. In 
summary, because the BHPS collects income information from the same 
individuals each year, it is possible for us to trace the evolution of incomes 
over a long period of time and measure the household’s or individual’s 
wellbeing. Household income in the BHPS is defined as the combination of 
labour market earnings, social security benefits59, investment income, and 
other sources. It is strongly associated with two main characteristics: the 
composition o f the household and the employment status o f its members. 
Buck et al. (1994) also introduce the ideas o f equivalent income and use 
income deciles to describe the distribution of income and to measure income 
changes. The purpose o f using equivalent income is to take account the 
effects o f changes in household composition change on needs, while income 
deciles are used to handle the possibility that changes in household welfare 
may not be linearly related to income. In this study, income is measure as the 
Retail Price Index (RPI) deflated annual household income. This variable is 
transformed into natural logarithms to allow for the concavity of the financial 
wellbeing/income relationship.
3.3.5 Financial Wellbeing Variables
The questions which this research focuses on relate to individuals 
expectations o f their expected financial change in the coming year, the actual 
financial changes which take place, and a derived variable, agents’ expectation 
errors, which is formed by subtracting the expected financial change in the 
previous year from the actual change in their financial position in the current 
year. In the BHPS, questions Xfisitc60 and Xjisitx ask the individual own 
financial position. XJisitc asks about changes over the previous year while 
Xjisitx asks for a forecast of the respondent financial situation in coming year. 
The responses to Xfisitc and Xjisitx are constrained to one o f four categories 
(1-better off, 2-worse off, or 3-same, or —1-unknown). To describe the
59 It plays critical role to benefit elderly households, lone parents, and some household 
with children.
60 The ‘X ’ relates to wave number.
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relationship between the individuals’ expectations and their outcomes, and 
make the subsequent analysis easier, I recoded the financial wellbeing 
variables. After the process, for all financial conditions, +1 denotes the good 
state. I consider responses to qualitative questions asking respondents to 
choose among ordered-response categories. The questions are as followed 
and the allowed responses are in brackets.
Before I explore the profiles of expected and realized financial situation, I 
should note some of the dynamic aspects of the financial situation variables. 
There is a great deal of individual-level variation in the current financial 
situation responses over time with 94% of respondents changing their 
financial situation response at least once between 1991 and 2002. Moreover, 
the average spread (i.e. maximum minus minimum reported value) in the 
current financial situation is fairly wide at 1.81. Similar dynamics were found 
for the expected financial variable, with 91% (96% for the actual financial 
outcome) changing their response at least once with an average spread of 1.33 
(1.66 for the realized financial situation). As a result, the means of cross- 
sectional data are calculated.





In the above Figure 3.3, the wording of financial expectations questions in the 
year matched that of financial outcomes of the following year. Analysis found 
that both of these variables are neither obviously pro-cyclical nor counter­
cyclical. Also, the correlation between them were not as significant as that 
found in Souleles’s (2001) paper.
a) Fisitx. (Financial Situation Expectation for year ahead) — “Looking ahead, 
how do you think you yourself will be financially a yearfrom now. Will you be [worse 
than now, about the same, better than now]?” This is a prototypical economic 
expectations question with each response receiving equal weight. Thus, 
there are three categories of expectations of financial situation change that 
take on three values, 1, 2, and 3. The bigger the number, the more the 
individual financial situation is expected to be improved. The distributions 
of the answers per wave are shown in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.2.
Figure 3.4 Yearly D istribution of Expectations
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Table 3.2 Univariate Frequencies (in %) of Financial Expectations
(t=1991...2002)
F isitx
(#obs:3279) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1: Worse Off 






































Mean 2.170 2.045 2.065 2.098 2.142 2.154 2.164 2.164 2.153 2.159 2.121 2.116
We can see that the number of respondents expecting the same beyond 
50% and increase moderately with the exception of 1993 and 1998. In all 
cases, the proportion of respondents expecting to be better off are much 
more than those expecting to be worse off. These results support one of 
the main arguments used by Easterlin (2001) in which he argued that 
‘people at any given point in the life cycle typically think that they will be 
better off in the future than at present’ (p.471). Likewise, Cantril (1965) 
conducted a study using data from 15 countries and found that 









Figure 3.5 Financial Situation Change Expectations across Age
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A plot of the financial situation change expectations vis-a-vis the age of the 
respondent is shown in the above Figure 3.5. It displays a hump shape in the 
early lifetime and a CU’ shape thereafter.
b) Fisitc. (Financial Situation Realization) Individuals also answer the question 
'Would you say that you yourself are mrse off (1), about the same (2) or better off (3) 
financially than you were a year ago?” The numbers of observations per wave are 
presented in the following Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3.
Figure 3.6 Yearly D istribution of Financial Realizations
Yearly Distribution of Fisitc
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Table 3.3 Univariate Frequencies (in %) of Financial Realizations
(t= 1991... 2002)
F isitc
(#obs:3279) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1: Worse Off 






































Mean 1.986 1.927 1.939 1.922 1.972 2.068 2.098 2.063 2.072 2.063 2.085 2.037
If  we compare Table 3.2 with Table 3.3 we can see that the dispersion in 
realized financial changes is much larger than that for expected financial 
changes. This is not surprising, since the expected financial change refers to 
the respondents’ subjective financial change distribution, while the realization 
variable is one draw from the actual distribution of financial change. The 
number of people becoming worse off is more than the number o f people 
becoming better off before 1995. From 1994 the number of people realizing 
worse off declines sharply (almost linearly), and by 1996 it is less than the 
number of people becoming better off. This pattern continues thereafter. 
This is probably due to the macroeconomic conditions which prevailed in the 
UK over this period.
c) Fisite. (Expectation errors) With panel data we are able to compare micro 
data on expectations o f prospective outcomes with data on realized outcomes 
and use these to construct individual ‘expectation errors61’. That is, we can 
calculate expectation errors for the matched pairs o f questions by taking the 
outcome from the second interview (provided in wave /+ /) and subtracting 
the corresponding expectation from the first interview (provided in wave t). 
Thus, for a given respondent the expectation error regarding their financial 
situation is defined as:
fisite it = fis itc l t+x -  fisitx it (3.1)
where t  refers to the first respondent interview in the BHPS data, while t+ 1 to 
the second interview. As a result we can confront the three-ordered-category 
expectations question Fisitx with the corresponding three-ordered-category 
realizations questions F isitc , both coded in (1, 2, 3}, give a five-ordered
61 The vague wording o f the questions might imply a possible weakness o f using the term 
‘error’. According to habit formation effect, if someone has experienced strong 
decreases in the past, one may have got used to it, and won’t use the word strong again. 
We find that the size o f either strong optimism or strong pessimism is small. We can 
eliminate this problem in future by combining the categories 1 and 2 and the categories 
4 and 5, so that the difference between strong and moderate is eliminated. We can then 
recalculate the test-statistics to investigate whether overestimation is still significant in 
subsequent waves.
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category of expectation errors Fisite coded in {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2}. If fisitct+x is 
larger than fisitxt then we can say that the respondents ex post appeared to 
underestimate their finance growth. Analogously, if fisitc t+] is smaller than 
flsitxt then financial growth was overestimated because of respondents’
optimism. Strong optimism is coded as -2, weak optimism as -1, realism as 0, 
weak pessimism as +1, and strong pessimism as +2. The following Table 3.4 
describes this coding scheme in more detail.
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To make the answers more comparable, we constructed a balanced panel 
data, in which information on all the required variables was reported at each 
wave and observations were limited to respondents who answered questions 
every year, to explain the distribution o f expectation error. The following
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Figure 3.7 and Table 3.5 present the frequencies of respondents who were 
optimistic and pessimistic concerning their expected financial change.
Figure 3.7 Yearly D istribution of Expectation Errors
Yearly Distribution o f  Fisite




— 0 —  Strong Pessi
Table 3.5 Univariate Frequencies (in %) of Expectation Errors
( t= 1 9 9 1 . . .  2 0 0 2 )
Fisite (#obs:3279) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-2: Strong Opti. 0.0793 0.054 0.0564 0.0525 0.0436 0.0378 0.0515 0.0415 0.0464 0.0415 0.0335
-1: Optimistic 0.2501 0.2318 0.2406 0.2263 0.2025 0.1903 0.1961 0.1943 0.1918 0.1952 0.2013
0: Normal 0.5191 0.5081 0.516 0.5377 0.5557 0.5788 0.5682 0.5956 0.5819 0.5721 0.5904
1: Pessimistic 0.1375 0.1778 0.1635 0.1622 0.1812 0.1763 0.1702 0.1528 0.1659 0.1781 0.165
2: Strong Pessi. 0.014 0.0283 0.0235 0.0213 0.0171 0.0168 0.014 0.0159 0.014 0.0131 0.0098
Mean -0.2431 -0.1052 -0.143 -0.126 -0.074 -0.056 -0.101 -0.093 -0.091 -0.074 -0.084
It shows that more than half of the respondents did not have expectation 
errors. This means that most respondents are realistic and that their future 
financial situation changes in line with their expectations (From 52 per cent to
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59 per cent). In cases, we can see that the percentage of individuals 
overestimating exceeds the percentage of individuals underestimating their 
future financial changes. This negative means conclude that there are more 
over-optimistic respondents than over-pessimistic respondents on average.
Figure 3.8 Yearly Average of Expectations and Realizations
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As Figure 3.8 shows, the expectations of financial situation change (Fisitx), 
and realizations of financial situation change (Fisite) on a year-by-year basis. 
Expectations of financial situation change at /+ / are far higher than 
realizations at t in the first 4 years of the BFIPS. After that, actual and 
expected financial situations converged by 1995 and 1996, demonstrating that 
respondents quickly correct their over-optimism. The divergence between 
realized and expected situations reappears, but the difference does not 
become as big as it did in the first four years. Thus in the following years, the 
difference between realized and expected tends to converge. This supports 
one of the main assumptions of the REH, in which individuals are assumed 
to keep reviewing their mechanism for expectation formation until no 
systematic errors. However the difference never quite disappears in our
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observation period. In other words, it suggests that respondents were, on 
average, fairly over optimistic in their expectations but corrected their 
expectations close to the actual outcomes. But, after nearly a decade, a 
significant differential still remains between expectations and outcomes. 
Notably, in most cases the forward-looking, Fisitx, appears to lead the 
backward-looking, Fisite.
3.3.6 Other Variables
Demographic characteristics are important in the evaluation of lifetime 
consumption patterns. The most important demographic characteristics 
considered in this thesis are marital status (MARRIED, UNA1ARRIED) and 
the highest educational qualification attained by the end of the sample period 
in ascending order of attainment after recoding. It is also included the number 
of adults living in the household including the respondent (HHSIZE), and the 
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Figure 3.9: H ousehold Size Profile across Age
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The plot in Figure 3.9 shows that family size increases until middle-age and 
starts to fall thereafter. As a result family size is at a maximum around 40 
years o f age for sample households in the BHPS. Age is included as a second-
order polynomial (AGE, AGE2 = A G E2/ l 00 ), and a vector of time 
dummies are included to account for aggregate financial shocks, time-varying 




This chapter briefly describes the information on the BHPS database and 
gives some details o f variables I intend to use in the following empirical 
chapters. These relate to consumption, income and financial wellbeing. The 
food and grocery expenditures in the BHPS are considered to be proxies for 
non-durable consumption expenditure in the simulations o f expected income. 
This is because in the process o f developing detailed simulation models, we 
were able to identify these proxies for non-durable consumption. While some 
economists would consider food and grocery expenditures to be fairly 
unresponsive to changes in purchasing power based on aggregate data. That 
is, the consumption o f food is relatively inelastic to income. But in the level of 
the individual or household, it is expected that significant changes will be 
observed in food and grocery expenditure when there are noticeable changes 
in their financial circumstances and that there is also a reasonable relationship 
between food expenditures and a household’s financial wellbeing. As a result, 
in this thesis, movements in the consumption of food and groceries are 
related to perceived changes in a household’s financial wellbeing across the 
waves o f the BHPS to explore which factors are relatively strongly associated 





The previous chapter presents the main characteristics of panel data and the 
properties o f the interest variables in this thesis. Accordingly, this chapter 
summarizes the principal models o f panel analysis along with some of their 
relative advantages and disadvantages. I also discuss a process to determine 
whether to use fixed or random effects models associated with panel data.
4.2 PANEL DATA MODELS
Panel data models have become increasingly popular among applied 
economics researchers due to their heightened capacity for capturing the 
complexity o f consumer behaviour compared to cross-sectional or time series 
data models. However because panel data has both cross-sectional and time 
series dimensions, the applications o f regression models to fit econometric 
models are more complex than those for simple cross-section datasets.
There are several types o f panel data analytic models. A general panel data 
model can be expressed as followed:
y i t =cc + X'itf i + uit, i = t = l,...,T  (4.1)
where i denotes households, individuals, firms, countries, etc. t  denotes time, 
OC is a scalar, and /? is K  x 1 , and X it is the z’/th observation on K
explanatory variables. Most panel data applications utilize a one-way error 
component model for the disturbances, with
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«/, = M ,+ v„ (4.2)
where /Ul denotes an unobservable unit specific effect which is time-invariant 
and accounts for any unit-specific effect that is not included in a regression. If 
Mi is correlated with any of the X t variables, the estimates from a regression 
of y  on the X t variables will be subject to unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
vit denotes the remainder disturbance and varies with units and time. It can
also be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. Panel data 
models are generally categorized as constant coefficient models, fixed effects 
models, and random effects models. As an example, for a consumption 
function utilizing data on agents across time, y it will measure expenditure 
and X it will measure income and demographical variables. The unobservable 
individual specific effects will be captured by the . We can think of these as 
representing unobservable individual characteristics.
4.2.1 The Constant Coefficients Model
The constant coefficients model is also called the pooled regression model. It 
makes the assumption that both intercepts and slopes have constant 
coefficients. If  X t controls are assumed to be so comprehensive that they 
capture all the relevant characteristics o f the agent, there will be no relevant 
unobserved characteristics. In that case the JUl may be dropped and we could
pool all o f the data to run an ordinary least squares regression model, treating 
all the observations for all of the time periods as a single sample.
4.2.2 The Fixed Effects Model
There are three versions of the fixed effects approach. In the first two, the 
models are manipulated in such a way so that the unobserved effect is 
eliminated.
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1) Within-groups fixed effects
In the first version, the mean values o f the variables of the observations 
for a given individual are calculated and subtracted from the data for that 
individual. In view of y it = a  + X'itf3 + uit, i = l,...,jV; t = 1
(4.1), one may write
y ,= a  + Y jP iX u  + V. (4-3)
7=2
subtracting this from y it = a  + X'itfi  + uit, i = t = 1
k _
(4.1) y, = a  + Z f i j X , j  + n t + vit , one obtains
7=2
y« ~y,  =11  Pj (x ijt - X y )  + vu -  v* (4-4)
7=2
and the unobserved effect disappears. This model is called as Within-groups 
regression model because it explains the variations around the mean o f the 
dependent variable in terms of the variations about the means of the 
explanatory variables for the group of observations relating to a given 
individual. Researchers can use this model to detect unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. But there are three problems in the application of this 
model.
a) The intercept a  and any X  variable will drop out o f the model if 
they remain constant for each individual. Even after ignoring the 
elimination of the intercept, the loss o f the unchanging explanatory 
variables may be aggravated. For example, if one is fitting an 
expenditure function to data for a sample of individuals who have 
completed their schooling. It is assumed that the schooling variable 
for individual i in period t is eduit. If the education o f the individual
is complete by the end of the first time period, eduit will be the same
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for all t  for that individual and eduit = edui for all t. Hence 
(edu[t — edu^ is zero for all time periods. Hence if all individuals 
complete their schooling during the first time period, eduit will be
zero for all i and t. one cannot get a result from a regression model 
when a variable’s values are all zero. In this case, we would fail to 
obtain an estimate of the consumer expenditure behavior in terms of 
schooling untainted by unobserved heterogeneity bias.
b) The second problem is the potential impact o f the disturbance term. 
This is because the precision of OLS estimates depends upon the 
variances of the explanatory variables greater than the variance of the 
disturbance term. However if the variance in (X  j — X is much
smaller than the variance in X  ., the impact of the disturbance term
will be relatively large, giving rise to imprecise estimates. The 
situation is especially problematic when combined with measurement 
error. As this will lead to bias, the greater the bias, the smaller the 
variance of the explanatory variable will be in comparison with the 
variance of the measurement error.
c) A third problem is that one degree of freedom for every individual in 
the sample is lost in the model when researchers manipulate the 
model to eliminate unobserved effects.
2) First-differences fixed effects
The first-difference regression model is one where unobserved effects are 
eliminated by subtracting the observation for the previous time period 
from the observation for the current period for all time periods. Thus for 
individual an i in time period t  the model can be written as following:
k
(4.5)
For the previous time period, the relationship is
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Subtracting = a  + £  P j X IJt_t + ft, + viM (4.6) from
j=2
k
y« = a  + S  P jx tji + Mi + vi, (4-5)>one obtains
1-2
A =  (4.7)
7=2
and so the unobserved heterogeneity has disappeared. But the intercept 
and any X  variables that remain fixed for each individual will disappear 
from the model and n degrees o f freedom are lost because the first 
observation for each individual is not defined. Moreover, the error term 
for Ay it is (v;, — v;/_j) while that for the previous observation is
(v<M — v it_2) .  Thus these two error terms both have a component vtM 
with opposite signs and this may cause negative moving average 
autocorrelation. In the case that vit is subject to autocorrelation:
= pv»-1 + 0>u (4-8)
where 0)jt is a well-behaved innovation, the moving average disturbance 
term is equal to (1 — p )v /Y_, component could be small and so the first 
difference estimator could be preferable to the within-groups estimator.
3) Least squares dummy variable fixed effects
With the assumption of constant slopes, intercepts in one of fixed effects 
model differ according to the cross-sectional unit, such as area o f residence or 
level o f educational attainment. In other words, while they are no significant 
temporal effects, there are significant differences in education levels in this
1 0 0
type of model. In this case, the are assumed to be fixed parameters to be 
estimated and the remainder stochastic disturbances with vit independendy 
and identically distributed IID(0, <j] ) . The X it are assumed independent of 
the Vlt for all i and / such that
y« = a,+  Gigroup, +  a 2group2 +.. .  + fixX lt + p 2X 2, + ... + «„ (4.9)
Another kind o f fixed effects model has constant slopes but intercepts that 
differ according to time. In this case, the model would have no significant 
group differences but might have autocorrelation owing to time-lagged 
temporal effects. As a result the residuals o f this type o f model may have 
autocorrelation in the process. Furthermore this kind o f fixed effects model 
also suffers from a large loss o f degrees o f freedom. As a result for large 
consumer panels, where N  is very large, regression may not be feasible if it 
includs (N-1) dummies, because too many dummies may aggravate the 
problem of multicollinearity among independent variables in the regression. 
In this case, the variables are homogenous across the groups (e.g. they could 
be similar in education levels). For example, welfare policies may lead to 
group specific characteristics that affect the temporal changes in the variables 
being analyzed. We could account for this time effect over the / years with t-1 
dummy variables on the right-hand side of the equation. With such dummy 
variables named according to the time (e.g., the day, month, or year they 
represent) such a model could be specified as follows:
y it =  at + A, Year! 991 +  Year1992 + ...
^ 2 (4.10)
+  P\X\t + Pi i^t +  — +  «//
Further, there is another fixed effects panel model which assumes that the 
slope coefficients are constant, but the intercept varies of country as well as 
over time. Here we would have a regression model with i-1 group dummies 
and t-1 time dummies which could be presented as follows:
1 0 1
y it = a t + a ]group] + a 2group2 +... 
+ \Y ear\99 \ + A,2Year\992 +. 
+ P\X\t +  Pi^it +  — +  Uu
(4.11)
Another type o f fixed effects model has differential intercepts and slopes 
which both vary according to unit. We formulate this model by including 
both group dummies, and their interactions with their time-varying covariates.
y„ = a l +a,groupl + a 2group2 + /},X u + P2X 2, 
+ Pigroupl x X ll + P5group2X 2luu +«„
Finally, there is a fixed effects panel model in which both intercepts and 
slopes might vary according to group and time. This model includes i-1 group 
dummies, t-1 time dummies, the variables under consideration and the 
interactions between them.
Because fixed effects estimators depend only on deviations from their group 
means, they are sometimes referred to as within-groups estimators (R. 
Davidson, J. G. MacKinnon 1993). If  the cross-sectional effects are correlated 
with the regressors, then the cross-sectional effects will be correlated with the 
group means. As a result Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimated based on 
the pooled sample would be inconsistent, even though the within-groups 
estimators would be consistent. However, if the fixed effects estimations are 
uncorrelated with the regressors, the within-groups estimator will not be 
efficient. However if there is only variation between the group means, then it 
would be permissible to use errors that are correlated with the group means 
o f the regressors (R. Davidson, J. G. MacKinnon 1993).
The big advantage o f fixed effects models are that the error terms may be 
correlated with the individual effects. But in most cases, fixed effects models 
have too many cross-sectional units o f observations requiring too many 
dummy variables for their specification. Too many dummy variables reduce 
sufficiendy the number of degrees o f freedom to allow for the use of
1 0 2
adequately powerful statistical tests. Furthermore, too many variables in a 
model may cause multi-collinearity, which increases the standard errors and 
thereby drains the model o f the statistical power needed to test its parameters. 
Finally, there could also be group-specific heteroskedasticity or 
autocorrelation over time even the model residuals are assumed to be 
normally distributed and homogeneous.
4.2.3 The Random Effects Model
To avoid the loss of degrees of freedom caused by the inclusion of too many 
parameters in the fixed effects model and to include variables o f interest that 
are constant for each individual, an alternative approach, known as a random 
effects model, is often introduced. There has been considerable interest in 
using random-effects models for longitudinal, hierarchical, clustered, or 
multilevel data in economics. In this model, each of the unobserved variables 
is supposed to be drawn randomly from a given distribution and this may well 
be the case if individual observations constitute a random sample from a 
given population. One example is the BHPS where the respondents were 
randomly drawn from British adults aged 16+ from 1991. The random effects 
model is a regression with a random constant term drawn from a given 
distribution. It is assumed that the intercept is a random outcome, which is a 
function o f the mean value plus a random error. In this case
M ~ IID(0,crl),  vit ~ IID{0,crv2) and /u, are independent of vit . In other 
words, the cross-sectional specific error term jiii must be uncorrelated with 
the errors o f the variables if this is to be modelled. The random effects model 
is an appropriate specification if we are drawing N  individuals randomly from 
a large population. This is usually the case for household panel studies. In 
panel data studies, care is taken in the design o f the panel to make it 
representative of the population. In this case, N  is usually large and a fixed 
effects model would lead to an enormous loss o f degrees of freedom. The 
time series cross-sectional regression is one example of the random effects 
model:
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y„ -  Pi + P\X i, + P i^n  + Mi + vu (4.13)
where the random error /ni is heterogeneity specific to a cross-sectional unit 
and fa constant over time. This means that, for all the observations relating 
to a given individual, fJ.l will have the same value, reflecting the unchanging 
unobserved characteristics of the individual. For to be properly specified, 
it must be orthogonal to the individual effects. The random error vit is
specific to a particular observation. The random effects model has the distinct 
advantage o f allowing time-invariant variables to be included among the 
regressors, because the model includes a separate cross-sectional error term.
4.2.4 Fixed Effects Model or Random Effects Model?
Fixed effects and random effects models were discussed in the previous 
sections. This section explores a model which is more suitable for panel data 
study which is used in this thesis. Much work, in terms the relative merits of 
fixed vs. random effects models, has been done in the panel data econometrics 
literature. For example, Mundlak (1961) and Wallace and Hussain (1969) 
advocate the fixed effects model, while Balestra and Nerlove (1966) are 
proponents o f the random effects model. According to Mundlak (1978), it is 
assumed exogeneity o f all the regressors with the random individual effects in 
the random effects model. In contrast, the fixed effects model allows for the 
endogeneity o f all the regressors with these individual effects. In principle 
random effects models are more attractive because the observed 
characteristics that remain constant for each individual are retained in the 
regression model whereas in fixed effects models, they have to be dropped. In 
addition with random effects models we do not lose n degrees o f freedom, as 
is the case with fixed effects models. This is why many applied researchers 
have interpreted a rejection as an adoption of the fixed effects model and 
non-rejection as an adoption of the random effects model.
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However, if either of two preconditions for using random effects are violated, 
fixed effects would have to be used instead. One precondition is that the 
observations can be described as being drawn randomly from a given 
population, as this has already been suggested, is a reasonable assumption in 
the case o f the BHPS because it was designed to be a random sample. The 
other is that the unobserved effects are distributed independendy o f the X }
variables. The standard procedure where either of these occurs is an 
implementation of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test used to help choose 
between using OLS or Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation in models 
where there is suspected measurement error or simultaneous equations 
endogeneity. The null hypothesis is that the /Ul are distributed independendy
o f the X j . If  this is correct, both random effects and fixed effects models are
consistent, but fixed effects models will be inefficient because they involve 
estimating an unnecessary set of dummy variable coefficients. However if the 
null hypothesis is false, random effects estimates will be subject to an 
unobserved heterogeneity bias and will therefore differ systematically from 
the fixed effects estimates.
As in its other applications, the DW H  test determines whether the estimates 
o f the coefficients, when taken as a group, are significantly different between 
the two regressions. They are excluded from the test if any variable are 
dropped in the fixed effects regression. Under the null hypothesis the test 
statistic has a chi-squared distribution. In principle this should have the same 
number o f degrees o f freedom to the number o f slope coefficients being 
compared, but for technical reasons relating to the matrix algebra for required 
an explanation, the actual number may be lower. We can use STATA to 
determine the actual number of degrees of freedom in a regression 
application that implements the test.
In summary, it is natural to think that random effects estimation should be 
used when the unobserved effects can be characterized as being drawn 
randomly from a given population only if the unobserved effects are
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distributed independendy of the X j  variables and that fixed effects models
should be used where unobserved effects are considered to be non-random. 
The following Figure 4.1 summarizes the decision-making process for fitting a 




Use random Use pooled OLSUse fixed effects
Use fixed effectsPerform both fixed effects and 
random effects regressions.
Provisionally choose random 
effects. Does a test indicate the 
presence of random effects?
Does a DWH test indicate 
significant difference in the 
coefficients?
Can the observations be described as being 
random sample from a given population?
Figure 4.1 Decision Making Process for Fitting a Model
4.2.5 Random Effects Ordered Probit Model
To control for individual-heterogeneity we use the random effects ordered
probit model which has recently become very popular due to the increasing
availability of panel data such as the BHPS (W. Arulampalam, A. L. Booth
1998;1996). The ordered probit model is one of the commonly used
methodologies for estimating categorical dependent variables and has a nature
order in panel data. I apply it to estimate the relationships between an ordinal
dependent variable and a set o f independent variables. The financial situation
variables derived from the BHPS discussed in this thesis are ordinal variables
that are both categorical and ordered. For instance, “improved”, “same”, and
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“deteriorated” might be the answer to agent’s current financial status change. 
In ordered probit models, an underlying score is estimated as a linear function 
of the independent variables and a set of cut-points. In such models the 
probability o f observing outcome i corresponds to the probability that the 
estimated linear function, plus random error, is within the range of the cut- 
points estimated for the outcome:
Pr{outcomej = i) = Pr(/rM < PxxXj + P2x2j + ... + P kxkj + « . < k ,.) (4.14)
The properties of random effects ordered probit models are discussed in 
Appendix C.
In the following analysis, STATA 8.0 provides the “reoprob” command 
written by Frechette (2001) to estimate the random effects ordered probit 
models. In the next chapters I examine the empirical evidence covering the 
period 1991 to 2002 covered by the BHPS. The likelihood ratio (LR) test 
statistics distributed as %2 (10) and the pseudo-R2 are two goodness-of-fit 
measures I use to compare across models. The coefficient o f within group 
error terms is denoted by p  , which measures the significance of random 
effects. To save space, I do not report the coefficients o f time dummies but I 





The advent of the rational expectations hypothesis, which coincided with an 
increasing interest in optimising behaviour in economics, was a remarkable 
revolution in economic thinking following the Keynesian revolution of a half- 
century ago. As a result, numerous models and policy prescriptions based on 
the rational expectations hypothesis have been developed. Simon (1978) 
states, economics is not simply the study of the allocation o f scarce resources, 
but increasingly the study of the rational allocation of scarce resources. As 
under the doctrine of rationality, expectations form a major part of the 
decision made in an economy. This chapter tests to see whether the rational 
expectations hypothesis is the best available objective method for modelling 
the form that such individual expectations take.
Most previous rationality tests have used aggregated macro data or micro data 
for short sample periods only. However, aggregated data can lead to spurious 
rejections o f rationality when agents’ information sets differ62, while micro 
data cannot efficiently average out forecast errors over a short time period 
even if individual forecasts are perfectly rational. For example, expectations 
that might have been rational ex ante, may not appear to be so rational ex post, 
because the sample might have, by chance, received some unexpectedly good 
shocks over the period. As a result, it is important to test rationality using 
micro data on expectations over long sample periods. Keane and Runkle 
(1990) and Bonham and Cohen (2001) argue that unbiased tests for rational 
expectations can only be undertaken using such survey data due to the 
existence o f ‘micro-heterogeneity’. This leads to a rejection o f the rational 
expectations hypothesis with aggregate data even if expectations are rational
62 M. P. Keane, D. E. Runkle (1990)
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at the individual level, since individuals make their forecasts using different 
information sets.
The British Household Panel Survey is unique in containing 12 years’ worth 
o f individual and household data, where a great deal of information is known 
about respondents at the point when they make their forecasts. As a result, 
while twelve years might not be long enough, the BHPS allows us to directly 
identify the types of individuals whose expectations are structurally incorrect. 
Also, I can analyse the robustness of the results over time and such a result 
would be as significant as a finding o f irrationality, because o f the available 
limited datasets. This chapter applies the panel facet o f the BHPS to test more 
clearly than usual whether expectations are unbiased and efficient. I interpret 
the results by characterizing the type of shocks that hit different types of 
individuals over time. Such a characterization is o f methodological interest, 
because both theoretical and empirical models are generally sensitive to the 
assumptions made about shock processes. In particular, many such models 
assume that “aggregate” shocks affect all respondents uniformly.
The rational expectations hypothesis does not argue that agents are always 
right in their expectations of future variables. Instead, the expectations error is 
held to be a random variable, which is uncorrelated with the other variables in 
the process and the information set available to the agent. Hence expectation 
errors are random, have a mean value of zero and a variance which is less 
than that associated with other models of forecasting. Thus, on average, 
rational expectations will be correct because the mean value of the 
expectations error is zero and this also means that rational expectation are the 
most efficient means of forming expectations, because such expectation 
errors have the property of minimum variance. Because of this, this chapter 
tests whether expectation errors are classical, in other words, whether they 
contain systematic components. For instance, over the sample period less 
educated individuals might, on average, have been optimistic about the future, 
and have received disproportionately positive shocks. Chamberlain (1984) and 
others have specified that systematic expectation errors can be a potential
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problem in estimating any rational expectation or forward-looking model 
using short panel data. This chapter uses direct measures o f individual 
expectation errors derived from the BHPS to test this point directly.
In empirical tests of life cycle models, direct information on respondents’ 
future expectations is rarely used. Conversely this thesis uses the BHPS over 
the period 1991~2002 to directly compare survey information on what agents 
expect with ex post measures of what results: information on whether output is 
expected to increase, decrease or remain same over the next year is compared 
to similar information collected twelve months later on what actually 
happened. At first, this chapter explores the characteristics of expectation 
errors, which is done by comparing expected and realized financial status 
changes, to test the rationality o f expectations. It then investigates how people 
form their expectations by identifying the factors which significantly affect 
respondents’ subjective attitude concerning their financial wellbeing. The next 
chapter investigates consumer behaviours which are thought to be related to 
correlation between their demographical characteristics and financial 
expectations, financial outcome or expectation errors.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 surveys related 
empirical studies. Section 3 presents the methodology for testing the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Section 4 presents the results concerning the 
rationality o f expectations by exploring the characteristics o f expectation 
errors and identifies the factors which influence respondent’s expectations. 
Finally, section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
1 1 0
5.2 METHODOLOGY
Before exploring the characteristics of financial expectations, this thesis tests 
the rationality of respondents’ financial forecasts, in particular their 
unbiasedness and efficiency, by analysing the properties o f respondents’ 
expectation errors. The approach to empirically investigating their rationality 
is to examine the determinants of the expectation errors between the financial 
expectation at time t and the corresponding outcome at time /+ /. These 
results can also be interpreted as characterizing the shocks that, ex post, have 
hit different types of respondents over time because, up until now, in many 
models such shocks have been generally assumed to affect all respondents 
uniformly.
Unbiased expectations are those which have the same mean as the actual 
outcomes. There are three ways to test for the unbiasedness o f financial 
expectations. First, many researchers assume that individuals have a perceived 
outcome probability distribution63. With the help of the assumption that the 
stated expected category is the modal category, or includes the median of the 
expected outcome distribution, it is possible to compare the probability of the 
outcome being worse than that expected with the probability o f it turning out 
to be better than expected in terms of expectation errors. This leads to the use 
of nonparametric sign tests, which are used to test if the probability o f falling 
into the single northeast cell significandy differs from the probability of falling 
into the single southwest cell. To use a nonparametric test, the categories 1 
and 2 and the categories 4 and 5 are combined, and the middle (0’s) responses 
are dropped by merging them into one o f the other two responses (+1 or —1). 
Thus, the 5x5 forecast error tables are collapsed into 2x2 tables. The main 
problem with this is that dropping and merging categories may waste a good 
deal o f information and that this approach makes it difficult to infer the 
individual or structural determinants of forecast errors. Second, expectation 
errors are parameterised by seeing their values (-2, -1,0, 1,2) as cardinal. This 
means that being two places off the diagonal is twice as bad as being one
63 For example, Das et al., 1999
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place off. This allows us to summarize the expectation errors by regressing 
the errors on a constant by the use of OLS. However, whichever way this is 
done means that we cannot conclude that respondents are generally over- 
optimistic or over-pessimistic uniformly across time. Alternatively, most 
previous studies have used time dummies to explain all systematic 
heterogeneity with the strong assumption that shocks hit all people uniformly. 
Instead, this thesis only uses the time dummies as independent variables in 
regressions to test for any significant time effects in the expectation errors, 
Fisite , without cardinalizing them, which is suggested by Souleles (2001). 
The following equation Fisiteit = d'timeit_j + vit (5.1) is
estimated using the year dummies as independent variables.
Fisite*t = d'timefM + vit (5.1)
Where t { t— 1992,.. .,2002) refers to the second respondent interview in the 
BHPS data, t-1 to the first interview. Fisiteit denote expectation errors in the 
wave t.
Efficiency requires that expectation errors are uncorrelated with any variable 
in an agent’s information set at the time of forecast; otherwise the forecast 
does not take advantage of all the available information. Efficiency is tested 
by looking for systematic demographic components in respondents’ 
expectation errors. The focus is on cross-sectional heterogeneity, because 
there is such variation available in the BHPS data. Specifically, heterogeneity 
in expectation errors will be analysed by adding the demographic variable Z to 
equation Fisiteu = d'timejM + vit (5.1) along with the full
set o f year dummies as follows:
Fisite*t =  a'time t +  6 'Z rt_, +  uit (5.2)
where t-1 refers the first respondent interview in the BHPS data and t to the 
second interview. Since the demographic variable Z /M is known to agent i at
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time t-1 of forecast, efficiency requires that b' = 0 . Fisite is restricted to {-2, 
-1, 0, 1, 2} so the estimate is regressed by the random effects order probit 
model.
It is noted that, in this thesis, we test the REH at the micro level by a 
presupposition that for market expectations to be rational all agents surveyed 
must be forming rational expectations. However, we know that hypothesis is 
based on the market, on average, having rational expectations. Thus, if my 
empirical test attacks on the REH at the micro level, we cannot take the result 
as absolute and reject the hypothesis. Manski (1990) argues the divergences 
between individuals’ intentions and actual behaviour may not indicate the 
individuals are poor predictors of their future, but rather than actual 
behaviour may depend on events not realised at the time o f the survey. 
Hence, predictions at the time of the survey may be the best possible given 
the information available to individuals at the time o f the prediction. In life 
cycle models of individual behaviour, future expectations play an important 
role. Thus even if expectations based on every individual are not fully rational, 
they may still help forecast individual behaviour in relation to consumption or 
saving. This has lead to an increasing interest in data on, and the empirical 
modelling of, individual expectations. As a result, this chapter also uses direct 
information on respondents’ future financial status change expectations, 
which is different from the standard approach64 found in the literature of 
inferring expectations from panel data on outcomes that leads to the 
assumption o f rational expectations, to explore whether there is any evidence 
o f micro-heterogeneity65.
This thesis used a random effects ordered probit model to investigate the 
characteristics o f subjective data by describing the relationship between 
individual financial expectations, explanatory variables such as realized 
financial changes in the past and a set o f demographical variables. To see
64 See the discussion in Guiso et al. (1992, 1996), Lusardi (1993), and Alessie & 
Lusardi(1996).
65 Identifying the types o f individuals who make the largest forecast errors and conversely 
to identify those individuals whose forecasts are the most accurate.
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whether different social groups have different financial change expectations, it 
includes various dummy variables. Furthermore, it explores in more detail 
sub-samples differentiated in terms o f gender, marital status, and education 
level. Since much experimental evidence indicates that expectations depend 
on the status quo, current financial situations are excluded from regressions 
which, instead, involve two dummy variables derived from financial outcomes 
to understand their effects on respondents’ expectation. It is assumed that 
these take the following stacked form:
Fisitx*t = y[Fisitc~t_x + y'2 Fisitc*t_x + j3'Zlt + a'timet + at +uit (5.3)
where the index i represents the respondent and index t represents time
(t=1991,1992......2002). Fisitx* denotes the financial situation change
expectations in wave t. Zit is a ^-dimensional vector o f background variables
reflecting, for example, gender, age, the logarithm o f real household income, 
and dummy variables for marriage status, smoking, housing wealth, education 
level, labour market status, number of children, household size, and 
geographic location, etc. /? represents the coefficients vector FisiteJt_x and
Fisite* _ x which represent the realized financial deterioration and 
improvement in wave t-\ respectively. It means that the prediction Fisitx*t 
given in wave t depends on the realized financial change Fisite lt_ x the 
respondent has experienced during the past twelve months. It may also reflect 
a psychological effect of past financial changes on future expectations. This 
effect should not be present if the assumptions o f the rational expectation 
hypothesis (REH) are satisfied (y[ = y'2 = 0 ) .  ai is an individual effect which 
is assumed to be a random effect, and distributed with mean zero and 
variance cra . uit is an error term and assumed to follow a distribution with a
zero mean and variance cr2. Year dummies timet are included to control for 
business cycle effects and allow for macro-economic shocks, assumed to be 
common for all respondents, and not varying with Zit , Fisitc~_x or
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Fisitc*t_x . For all the financial questions, larger values of Fisitxit reflect 
better states. In the preliminary analysis I investigate the effects of 
background (demographical) variables and realized financial changes in 
previous time periods on respondents’ expectations of financial change over 
time.
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5.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section tests the rationality of expectations and analyzes the properties of 
households’ expectation errors and expectations. To start with, the 
demographical variables in my regression included race. But, after dropping 
observations with item non-response, most of answers to the race question 
were inapplicable. As a result, race was excluded from the demographical 
variables considered. As a result, the following analysis controls for the 
following individual and household characteristics: age, real household 
income, marital status, gender, smoking behaviour, housing wealth, 
educational attainment, employment status, number of children, household 
size, and geographical region.
5.3.1 Expectations Rationality Tests
We start by testing the unbiasedness o f financial change expectations. To do 
this equation Fisiteit = d'timeit_x + vi( (5.1) was estimated
for the whole sample and for various sub-samples based on both the 
unbalanced and balanced database. Because the results from both databases 
are similar, we report the one based on the unbalanced database. The resulting 
coefficients and standard deviations for the whole sample are graphed in 
Figure 5.1. For discrete expectation errors the chi-squared tests implied that 
the year dummies were jointly significant, suggesting there is significant 
variation in respondents’ financial expectation errors from year to year, except 
the model in the case o f ‘others’ in the education sub-sample. These findings 
accord with the Dutch evidence reported by Das and Van Soest (2001). 
Regression results controlling for time effects were, therefore, reported in all 
instances except the ‘others’ case.
As Figure 5.1 shows, financial change expectation errors are found to be 
consistently positive throughout the 12 years for the whole sample, suggesting 
that people were continuously and positively surprised over the period. In 
short, the respondents’ financial expectations appear to be significantly biased.
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The coefficient o f  cross-correlation p  is strongly significant across samples, 
suggesting there is significant heterogeneity effect.
Figure 5.1 U nbiasedness T est
Expectation Errors
0.00
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Whole Sample (unbalanced): #obs=94094, LR Chi2(10)=186.84, p  = 0 .103  . 
Source: Derived from the British Household Panel Survey.
That is, respondent expectation errors appear to be biased. But, it requires 
many years, even decades, to distinguish whether they are biased e x  ante, or 
just e x  p o st. The bias is problematic for empirical studies with short sample 
period in either case. In particular, individual expectations have higher- 
frequency systematic patterns in expectation errors. The results based on the 
different demographic groups are present in figures in Appendix A.
Turning to the efficiency o f  financial change expectations, I used equation
Fisiteu = a'time(_l + b'Zit_] + uit (5.2) to estimate the results
based on the unbalanced sample. These are show n in Table 1 in Appendix B.
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The pseudo R 2 s are small, implying that expectation errors are largely 
unsystematic. However, the demographic variables are jointly significant 
according to the chi-squared statistics, which is counter to the assumption of 
efficiency. The errors tended to be especially positive on average among those 
on high incomes, in paid employment, married couples, female-headed 
households and those with no children. They were also more positive among 
those living in East Anglia, Yorkshire or the North. However, the errors were 
more negative among older respondents, smokers, and those purchasing their 
house on a mortgage. Meanwhile the overall average expectations error was 
negative shown in Table 3.5, the bias in financial status change expectation 
tended to increase with some demographic variable like age, number of 
children, and unemployment status.
In summary, while this analysis o f the deviation between financial 
expectations and outcomes suggests that the assumption on rational 
expectations or absence o f macro-economic shocks are invalid, whether this 
can be interpreted as evidence of “irrationality” is a subde issue. Because we 
assume that time dummies capture all systematic components of forecast 
errors, the results can be interpreted by the ex post shocks. It could be that the 
young, those on low incomes, smokers, those paying a mortgage, the 
unemployed, and parents, have perfectly rational expectations ex ante, but ex 
post have received disproportionately more bad or good shocks over the 
sample period. This is consistent with the literature that finds evidence of 
increasing inequality over the period, in part due to skill-biased technical 
change66. The assumption in empirical studies that time dummies capture all 
systematic components of forecast errors makes the ex post interpretation of 
the results problematic. The inefficiency of financial expectations is hard to 
explain and more likely represents ex ante inefficiency.
66 Cutler and Katz (1991); Attanasio and Davis (1996)
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5.3.2 Financial Expectations
This section presents the relationships between financial change expectations 
and the perceived financial change outcomes. It uses a random-effect ordered 
probit model to investigate the characteristics o f subjective data by describing 
the relationship between an individual’s financial expectation and explanatory 
variables including past realized financial changes and a set of demographical 
variables. To see whether different social groups have different financial 
change expectations, it also included various dummy variables. Furthermore, 
it explored various sub-samples based on gender, marital status, and 
educational attainment. Since much experimental evidence indicates that 
expectations depend heavily on the status quo, the current financial situation 
is excluded in the regressions, which instead use two dummy variables derived 
from past financial outcomes to understand their effects on respondents’ 
expectation. The results are shown in Table 2 of Appendix B, which presents 
the effects o f realized financial improvements or deteriorations on individual’s 
financial change expectations. The total number of observations in the sample 
is 72921. No restrictions were imposed upon the slope coefficients across the 
various waves.
The relationship between financial change expectations and background 
variables is set out in Table 2 (Appendix B). The effect o f Deteriorated (-0.21) is 
significantly negative and the effect o f Improved (0.36) is significantly positive 
for the whole sample. It implies that those who experience financial change 
deterioration in the past have a higher probability o f expecting further 
financial change deterioration than others. On the other hand, those who 
experience financial change improvements tend to have higher expectations 
for their financial change. In other words, it means that expected financial 
changes can be predicted with some certainty by previous financial change 
outcomes. Individuals having experienced deterioration (improvement) have a 
higher probability of being financially pessimistic (optimistic). In terms of the 
magnitude of the effects, the estimated coefficients on the control for 
financial optimism in the previous time period outweigh those for financial
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pessimism are statistically different from them at the 15 per cent level, there 
seems to be a persistent asymmetry in how individuals evaluate the effect of 
financial gains and losses on their future financial wellbeing. People are likely 
to have higher expectations when their situation improves, and refuse to 
expect worse outcome even when they had become worse off in the past. 
This result can be potentially helpful to explain loss aversion in economic 
behaviour if expectation affects consumers’ choice.
The results from the sub-samples are also presented in Table 2 in Appendix 
B. It shows that men’s expectations are more sensitive to both improvements 
(0.32 v 0.30) and deteriorations (-0.10 v -0.05) than those of women. It means 
the past experience impacts more on male respondents. In addition, the 
magnitude of the effect o f realized improvements and deteriorations on the 
subject’s expectation is not symmetric either. Similarly, the realized changes 
influence the expectations of the married and the highly-educated 
respondents more than those of the unmarried, and those with only a 
secondary education level, respectively. In other words, married people, or the 
highly educated, were more sensitive to realized financial changes. In addition, 
the realized improvement has a greater effect on expectations than realized 
deteriorations in both cases. It is noted that realized deteriorations do not 
influence the expectations of the respondents with secondary education level. 
In other words, there is no difference between realized deterioration and 
realized non-change when individuals with secondary education level form 
their expectations. The asymmetry of response is more evident when I 
consider the schooling effect.
Generally speaking, the family has been the traditional source o f protection 
against the economic consequences o f uncertain events. This is because the 
economics literature has demonstrated that marriage partners can be made 
strictly better-off, provided their incomes are not perfectly correlated. 
However the above analysis shows exactly the opposite: being married was 
associated with a lower expectations comparing to those of the unmarried. 
The effect (-0.10) is statistically significant using a /-test. This result may be
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explained by the extent to which families depend on market conditions. In 
countries with developed welfare systems, providing good medical or 
unemployment insurance, one does not need to rely on one’s spouse to enjoy 
increasing returns or to pool risks. Furthermore, establishing a new household 
involves considerable start-up costs (for the ceremony itself, the purchase or 
rental o f a new house, furniture, household equipment, etc.), while the 
maintenance cost o f a new household may in the early years be higher than 
those bome by the two families of origin. O n the other hand, it could also 
explain why the unmarried decrease their expectations more as they age 
relative to the married. This should have been the case in UK. The gap in 
expectations between the married and the unmarried among the higher- 
educated group (-0.08) is less than among the secondary-educated group (- 
0.12). This means the secondary-educated are more sensitive to changes in 
their marital status, and lower their expectation more than the highly educated 
after they get married. Also, the gap in expectations between women and men 
among the married group is less than the gap among those in the unmarried 
group. The possible explanation is that marriage does make women feel a bit 
more dependant over their future.
Females tended to have lower expectations than males: the coefficient for 
women (-0.06) was negative and significant. This result is similar to that found 
by Barskey et al. (1997) and Donkers et al (1999). A t a deeper level, there may 
be biological reasons, with women’s position in procreation relative to men’s 
requiring them to be more risk averse. An explanation for why females are 
more prudent may be because they dispose o f ‘household income’ rather than 
their ‘own income’. We could use working female in future regressions instead 
simply their gender in further investigations. If  the explanation of females 
being more risk averse is because they do not work, it would be expected that 
the coefficient of working female would be significantly different from the 
coefficient o f simply being female. If this were not the case, it would suggest 
that female risk aversion is not related to having no income o f their own. 
However, the results present that there is not significant difference between
121
highly educated women and highly educated men when they make their 
expectations.
Although the above results show higher education gives women more 
confidence in the process of forecasting their future, there is no significant 
difference between the highly educated and those with secondary education 
level in the samples.
Age is generally used as a proxy for unobserved social status, health and 
cohort effects. The analysis found that age had a small negative effect (-0.041) 
on financial change expectations. Individual expectations decrease as their age 
increases. There are a number of potential explanations for this: that the old 
are not happy the longer they live; the old feel less in control of their 
environment; or have lower aspirations, which are hence easier to meet (A. 
Cambell et al 1976). The coefficients of age were significantly different 
between the married (-0.036) and the unmarried (-0.051). This suggests that 
although the married have lower expectations at a point in time relative to the 
unmarried, the unmarried were more likely to lower their expectations more 
quickly than the married with increasing age. Similarly, considering the 
schooling effect, highly educated people decreased their expectations with age 
more quickly than people of the secondary education level.
The results found significant negative effects for real household incomes (- 
0.03) on individual expectation, as might have been expected, in either the 
whole sample or some o f the sub-samples. The negative coefficient means 
that, for such people, financial optimism is negatively associated with income. 
A 1 percent increase in income raises the probability of being financially 
pessimistic by around 3 per cent. The higher their household income in the 
past 12 months, the worse the financial situation expected in the coming year. 
Furthermore, when a variable to capture income variance was included in the 
regressions, its coefficient was significantly positive in all cases, although very 
small. This result conflicts with the general idea that those with higher 
‘permanent’ incomes are, on average, more likely to be optimistic than others.
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There is a strong positive relationship between being a smoker and an 
individual’s expectations. If smoking is viewed as a proxy for risk-aversion, 
smokers might be considered to be risk-lovers who have higher expectations. 
Another explanation is that smoking alleviates the smokers’ stress and this 
leads them to have higher expectations of the future than non-smokers. In the 
gender sub-sample, although the female have lower expectations in the whole 
sample, smoking behaviour pushes their expectations much more than the 
male. In other words, smoking behaviour can diminish the gap in expectation 
between the female and the male. Also, smoking leads a diminishing gap 
between the married and the unmarried. For highly educated smokers, they 
have lower expectations relative to those with secondary education level.
Housing wealth had a significant effect on individual’s expectation or 
respondents owning their own home had significantly lower expectation than 
non-owner, while respondents with a mortgage had the highest expectations 
than all others in the whole sample. The possible explanation is that 
respondents with a mortgage are confident o f their improved future financial 
wellbeing and consequently prefer take out mortgage to support their 
housing. However, the secondary educated with a rent have higher 
expectations relative to others.
Five types of labour supply status were considered in the analysis: paid 
employment, self-employment, unemployment, retired, and various forms of 
economic inactivity. The largest effect is from unemployment, where 
unemployed individuals have a 36% higher probability of being financially 
optimistic, relative to paid-employment. The retired had the lowest 
expectation. This conflicts with the view that the unemployed have to 
persistently lower their expectations because o f the strong causal relationship 
between past and current unemployment shown by Arulampalam et al. (2000). 
One explanation for this is that it reflects their higher expected chances of 
finding a job due to an upswing of the business cycle, or unemployed 
individuals believe that their job search will be successful within a year. The 
unmarried and the secondary-educated exhibited a greater attachment to
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being unemployed than the married and the highly educated respectively, 
related who tended to be in employment.
There is considerable evidence of a strong negative correlation between 
household size and income per person in developing countries. As a result, it 
is often concluded that people living in larger and (generally) younger 
households are typically poorer. The poor also tend to devote a higher share 
of their budget to essential goods. But because certain goods (water taps, 
cooking utensils, firewood, clothing and housing) allow for the possibility of 
sharing or bulk purchase, i.e. economies o f scale, the cost per person of a 
given standard of living is lower when individuals live together than apart. In 
this analysis, individuals living in medium-sized households had higher 
expectations compared to those in smaller and larger households, while those 
in the smallest households had the lowest expectations. However it is 
interesting to note that the unmarried living in large households had lower 
expectations than others, while the married living in large households had the 
highest expectations in similar circumstances. One reason for this is that the 
unmarried focus on the household’s costs, while the married focus on the 
emotional aspects o f family life. Female respondents lower their expectations 
more than male if their household size changes from medium to small. 
Conversely, if their household size changes from medium to large, the female 
lower less, relative to the male. Considering the previous results, we found 
that the female usually have lower expectations, which indicates that the 
female also take into account the emotional aspects of family life, and large 
household size can increase their expectations. There did not appear to be 
significant difference in expectations by household size for respondents with 
only a secondary level education.
Similarly, this analysis found that respondents with two children were the 
most optimistic in the whole sample and sub-samples. One explanation for 
this is that the subsidy from government is the same or greater than the family 
costs for two children. In terms of marital status, the unmarried people with 
more than two children had the lowest expectations. It was not significantly
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different for their expectations if the number of children was not more than 
two. Interestingly, the birth of the first baby will lower the expectations of the 
secondary-educated, but after the first born, more children make their 
expectations recover, and then have no further positive influence thereafter. 
In all cases, parents with two children had the highest expectations.
Individuals living in both East Anglia and Wales have the highest probability 
of being financially pessimistic. For social group o f female, women living in 
Scotland have the highest probability of being financially optimistic 
comparing to women living in other areas. Individuals living in Wales have 
the highest probability of being financially pessimistic cross the highly- 
educated respondents.
5.3.3 Properties of Financial Expectation errors
The previous section explained why different social groups have different 
financial expectations, and showed who have higher or lower expectations. 
This section identifies who were rational, and who usually made mistakes in 
forecasting their future, by analysing the characteristics of financial 
expectation errors in more details. This is important to aid our understanding 
of the ability of respondents to foresee and adjust to impending financial 
status changes. We added financial change outcomes in the wave t-\ into 
equation Fisiteit = a*timeM + &'Z/M + uit (5.2) in line with
the regression o f financial expectations. Table 3 in Appendix B shows that 
most independent variables are significant at the 95% confidence level. The 
coefficients o f financial change outcome come in with the expected sign in 
the samples. This suggests that financial outcomes have a strongly positive 
relationship with respondents’ expectation errors. Individuals significantly 
overestimate their expectations when they realize that their financial position 
has worsened over the past 12 months, while those whose financial situation 
has improved have a larger probability o f underestimating future increases 
than others. Relating to the coefficients of expectations in the previous 
section, I find that even the realized improvement increases respondents’
125
expectations but the actual improvement is still underestimated. Similarly, the 
actual deterioration is greater than respondents expect when they have 
experienced deterioration. In short, the magnitude of improvement and 
deterioration are both underestimated. Further, the magnitude o f this effect is 
also significantly asymmetric: the magnitude o f the negative effect of 
Deteriorated (-0.21) is significantly less than that of the positive effect of 
Improved (0.31). The most plausible explanation of this is that those 
respondents whose financial situation have deteriorated are either too 
optimistic about the future, or are more likely to view these negative financial 
changes as temporary.
Furthermore, the demographic variables are also economically significant. 
For instance, the expectation errors are about 4.7 percentage point larger 
(more positive) for married respondents, relative to the unmarried. Similarly, 
the errors are about 9.4 percentage points larger for female, relative to male. 
As a result, married women (0.07) were more pessimistic than married men 
(0.05) in this analysis, because the magnitude o f expectations, which men (- 
0.13) and women (-0.12), decrease, were nearly same relative to the 
unmarried. In terms o f education sub-samples, the married with a secondary 
education level, appeared more pessimistic than unmarried, because they had 
lower expectations. The interesting point is that the highly educated married 
have lower expectations than the unmarried, but they do not appear more 
optimistic or pessimistic. Also, the highly educated women and men have the 
same expectations, but women were found to be more pessimistic than men. 
At the same time, there is no significant difference across education level in 
the whole sample.
The coefficient of age becomes insignificant in expectation errors regression, 
while it is significantly negative in expectations regression. It means that 
although respondents’ expectations decrease with their age, the change in 
their age will not influence their ability to make expectations. The coefficient 
of income is positive. It means that individuals feel financially over-pessimistic
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with the increase o f income. Considering the sub samples, the highly-educated 
individuals are less over-pessimistic.
Smokers are more optimistic than non-smokers in all samples, and this result 
could be consistent with the view that smokers are considered as risk-lovers. 
Smokers with only secondary level education are more optimistic than those 
who were highly educated. Smoking behaviour can be considered as an 
important factor indicating individuars optimism.
Respondents who rent are more pessimistic relative to both those owning 
their own home, or non-owners, in the whole sample, although they have 
higher expectations than home owners. In other words, they usually receive 
more ex post good shocks, or have lower ex ante expectations relative to others. 
Further, the actual financial improvement of home owners is less than others; 
since home owners have the same expectation errors as respondents with a 
mortgage, while they have the lowest expectations. However, the secondary 
educated with a mortgage are more optimistic than those who rent, even 
though they have lower expectations than the latter. The unemployed have 
highest expectations, and are the most optimistic, while the in-paid- 
employment sample members were the most pessimistic. This result is 
consistent in all samples. As a result, unemployment can also be considered to 
be an important factor indicating over-optimism.
In relation to the number of children, one child is jointly significantly 
negative. This means that respondents with only one child are more 
optimistic than others, although respondents with two children have higher 
expectations. But women with two children appear more optimistic than 
other women, because they have obviously higher expectations. Another 
exception is the secondary-educated with two children, who are the most 
optimistic.
In the whole sample, there are no significant differences o f forecast errors 
among respondents living in different-sized households, even people living in 
small households have lower expectations. In the female sub-sample,
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respondents in medium household size appeared more optimistic than those 
in other household size. Men, and the unmarried in big households, appear 
more pessimistic
The differences between regions are not significant in the whole sample, 
except that people living in East Anglia and Yorkshire are more pessimistic 
than those in other regions. Considering male sub-samples, there is no region 
appearing more pessimistic or optimistic than the others. But, for female, 
women living in Wales and Scotland are more optimistic than those living in 




This chapter analyzes the subjective data on financial expectations and 
compares them to the outcomes using the BHPS covering the period 1991- 
2002. Its main findings are as follows. First, the number of people 
overestimating future financial changes is larger than the number of people 
underestimating them. This suggests that people’s expectations are not 
rational, as agents whose financial situation has deteriorated are systematically 
too optimistic, or view negative financial changes as temporary. Second, those 
people whose financial situation has improved in the past tend to be more 
sensitive than those whose financial position change has deteriorated. This 
result, potentially, can explain the asymmetric nature o f consumers’ behaviour 
in terms o f loss aversion in the consumption literature. Thirdly, the 
expectations o f men, the married, and those with only a secondary level 
education, are more sensitive to their financial outcomes than others. Fourth, 
with respect to expectations, there are no significant relationships between 
real household incomes and an individual’s expectations. The married are 
more pessimistic than the unmarried, but marriage can alleviate people’s 
pessimism over the time scale, or make women and smokers more optimistic. 
However women and the highly educated individuals generally have 
comparatively lower expectations, while individuals living in medium sized 
households, or those renting accommodation, with two children, or who are 
currently unemployed, have relatively higher expectations than the others. 
Fifth, comparing the expected and realized financial outcomes over the same 
time period suggests that the married, women, the paid employed, and people 
living in smaller households, are more pessimistic than others, whilst smokers 
and the unemployed are over-optimistic. In addition, individuals with only 
one child find it easier to be over-optimistic generally, but the results are 





The arguments over the PIH /LCH  and the rational expectations extension of 
it, concerning suggestions of excess sensitivity o f consumption, have been 
continued for decades without an explicit solution. This is because there have 
been no conclusive findings in empirical studies. Most empirical results show 
confidence in supporting one or rejecting the other. This vagueness has 
significant and negative consequences for understanding the 
consumption/savings processes of households and for improving our 
knowledge of economic trends and stabilization from a policy perspective.
In the literature, many researchers have carried out investigations to test the 
validity of assumptions such as hyperbolic discount rates67, binge augmented 
consumption, habit persistence, and the excess sensitivity of consumption to 
income. However, only a few empirical papers have investigated the impact of 
individual subjective information on economic outcomes. Thus, we explore 
whether expectations are useful in predicting consumption behaviour in this 
chapter.
The methodology developed by Souleles (2001) to test for excess sensitivity 
with respect to household data has a deep intuitive appeal. Rather than testing 
excess sensitivity using aggregate data, Souleles used US household-level data 
from the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment. He found that consumer 
sentiments were useful in forecasting future consumption, even after 
controlling for lagged consumption and macro variables such as stock prices.
In this chapter, I follow Souleles (2001) by using data derived from the BHPS. 
This contains questions on the expected level and changes in a number of 
relevant economic variables and British respondents’ uncertainty in making
67 People value present more than the future, as in Laibson(1997).
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these predictions covering the years 1991 until 2002. One of the main 
novelties o f this thesis is that it uses the financial situation validated in the 
BHPS to value the respondents’ wellbeing, instead of the term ‘income’ 
popularly used in most papers. This is particularly interesting, due to the 
potential relationship between macro-economic shocks and individual 
psychological wellbeing. Thus, while a narrow interpretation o f financial 
situation is income, a broader interpretation would take into account the 
values o f any assets agents hold, and the incomes they currendy received, or 
expect to receive in the future. Most interesting, some who experience an 
increase in current income may feel themselves worse off financially. This is 
similar to the results in chapter 5, in which respondents’ expectations decrease 
with increasing real income. In other words, the idea of an agent’s financial 
situation or satisfaction can potentially include many factors that are difficult 
to identify, or value, but can significandy affect agents’ decision-making 
behaviour in the real world. Furthermore, Das and Van Soest (1996) argue 
that subjective answers reflect real, rather than nominal, changes. Although 
the questions in the BHPS are not very well specified, it seems reasonable to 
assume that respondents have the same broad concepts in mind when 
answering questions on their financial outcomes and future expectations. In 
each wave o f the BHPS, agents answer questions on whether their actual 
financial situation has changed in the past twelve months, and on whether 
they expect it to change over the next twelve months. Both questions are 
answered on a three points scale68. In addition, the following analysis breaks 
down the whole sample into various sub-samples, to test for excess sensitivity 
among each o f these groups. It is hoped that these results can provide a 
deeper insight into the divergence of sensitivity o f each individual component 
to consumption fluctuations.
681 — worse off; 2 — about the same; 3 = better off
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6.2METHODOLOGY
Hall’s random-walk hypothesis of consumption argues that if agents have 
rational expectations (that is, if they are forward-looking) then current 
consumption should only depend on consumption in the most recent period, 
and that no other variables will feature in equation ct = /lcM + st 
Ac, = a  + PQt + £t (2.10) of Chapter 2. The implication of the
REPIH is that if all past and predictable information is incorporated in 
current consumption, no lagged information can provide additional 
explanatory power in accounting for variations in future consumption. Thus, 
one way to test the predictions of the REPIH is to examine whether 
consumption is sensitive to anticipated changes in interested explanatory 
variables, such as income. This approach has been taken by Hall and Mishkin 
(1982), Altonji and Siow (1987), Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Lusardi 
(1996) among others. As a means of testing the impact of lagged variables on 
consumption, regression equations of the following form have been 
introduced:
AC,+1 = pE, O t+1) + eHl or Ac,+1 = PE, (y M -  y , ) + sM (6.1)
wherey  is household real income. If theoretical predictions o f the permanent 
income model and rational expectations are valid then H 0 : /? = 0 . In many
studies (eg. Hall, 1978; Zeldes, 1989; Jappelli et al., 1998) the (log) level of 
income is used. Attanasio and Weber (1993) used the growth in income. It is 
noted that the income term can be considered as predictable income or 
income growth in t  or /+/ ,  using instruments dated t-1 or earlier. The Euler 
equation is a period-to-period arbitrage condition and therefore does not take 
into account the effects of future constraints on current behaviour. As such, 
the Euler equation is a minimal test o f the REPIH. In addition, problems can 
arise when estimating Euler equations using panel data. Chamberlain (1984) 
states that “a time average of forecast errors over T  periods should converge 
to zero as N  —> oo. But an average of forecast errors across N  individuals
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surely need not converge to zero as N  —> <x> ; there may be common 
components in those errors, due to economy-wide innovations.” As a result, a 
set of time dummies are also included in equation Act+] = /3Et (y t+l) + £t+] or
Act+l = PEt ( y t+] — y t ) + s t+l (6.1) to guard against this problem in many
empirical studies69. Altug and Miller (1990) claim that these dummies can be 
interpreted as the undiversified aggregate risk facing intertemporal decisions 
under a complete market setting. Although the panel data (1991-2002) 
employed in this thesis is longer than that used in some earlier studies, the 
time dimension may still not be long enough. As a result, time dummies are 
included in the regressors.
In life cycle models of individual behaviour, future expectations play an 
important role. Even if expectations are found not fully rational in previous 
chapters, it is believed that they may still help in making forecasts of 
individual behaviour in consumption or saving. This has lead to an increasing 
interest in data on, and the modelling of, expectations. The preceding 
discussion has clearly indicated that standard theoretical predictions are prone 
to dismissal, primarily depending on the information sets the household faces. 
Any assumption on the homogeneity o f preferences and information sets the 
households face might lead to inefficient evaluations. To deal with this 
shortcoming, Souleles (2001) came up with a simple but novel way of 
estimating consumption patterns by exploring the response of different types 
o f households over time. In this chapter, following on from Souleles (2001), 
direct information on respondents’ future financial change expectations, 
which are different from the standard approach70 o f inferring expectations 
from panel data on outcomes that leads to the assumption o f rational 
expectations are used, to test for excess sensitivity.
In this analysis, the individual’s financial variables are used as a proxy of 
income to explore the relationship between financial wellbeing and household
69 Zeldes (1989), Altongji and Siow (1987), and Runkle (1991)
70 See the discussion in Guiso et al. (1992, 1996), Lusardi (1993), and Alessie & 
Lusardi(1996).
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consumption. To an extent, the current income shock y t+l — Ety l+] has taken 
the place of the financial expectation errors. Financial expectations change is 
related to future income expectations change Et (yt+] — yt) • This chapter 
follows Souleles’ (2001) method to test for the excess sensitivity of 
consumption to changes in financial expectations. To do this, Souleles added 
the lagged expectations variable Fisitx to a standard linearized Euler equation 
for consumption. Thus, for household i, the change in consumption between 
period /+ / and / is specified as
AcJV+1 = atimel+x + j3Fisitxit + y W it+l + eiM (t = 1,...,10) (6.2)
The coefficient equation is estimated in differences the household level by 
ordinary least square (OLS), where Ac refers to changes in household 
nondurable consum ption71 ; time includes a full set of year dummies 
(1992~2002), which controls for all aggregate (uniform) effects, including 
seasonality, aggregate interest rates, and other macro variables which allow for 
changes in the households financial situation from year to year; Fisitx denotes 
the expectations of financial situation change; while W  controls for 
demographic characteristics such as changes in the number o f adults and 
children72 in the household.
There are many possible sources of excess sensitivity, such as myopia and the 
existence of liquidity constraints. As a result, the second stage o f the analysis 
is to explore the possible sources of excess sensitivity associated with the 
whole sample and with some sub-samples o f it. The analysis also distinguishes 
between anticipated changes in financial situation that are negative 
(deteriorated financial situation changes) from those that are positive 
(improved financial situation changes). This asymmetry between negative and
71 Since many studies examine the change in log consumption, the results o f the analysis 
using this alternative dependent variable are presented as well.
72 Following Zeldes (1989), Dynan (1993), Lusardi (1996), and Souleles (1999), these 
variables help control for the most basic changes in household preferences over time. 
Expanding the variables in W  would be possible to eliminate almost any excess 
sensitivity. Therefore W is restricted to the commonly used set o f controls.
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positive resource changes is first discussed in Altonji and Siow (1987) and 
recently analyzed by Shea (1995b;1995a). A simple extension of equation 
A c i,t+1 = + fiFisitxit + yWit+l + eiM ( t = 1,...,10) (6.2),
following Shea (1995b), provides a deeper insight into the evolution of the 
consumption process given the following:
A cit+] = atimet+l + p xFisitx~{ + J32Fisitx*t + yWit+] + sit+l (t = 1,...,10)
(6.3)
where /?, and fd2 are dummy variables indicating Fisitx~t and Fisitx^
respectively. This form allows us to test whether excess sensitivity can be 
explained by the following reasoned assumptions:
1. Rule-of-Thumb Consumers. There are consumers who are myopic. They 
are assumed to have a constant marginal propensity to consume out 
o f current wealth or income and therefore do not behave as 
predicted by the REPIH. As a result, such consumers will be 
excessively sensitive to variables known in the information set. 
However, as mentioned in sub-section 2.2.3, rule-of-thumb 
consumers will respond to changes in their financial resources 
regardless of whether these are expected to be an improvement (a 
positive change) or a deterioration (a negative change). In other 
words, if consumers are myopic, and fi2 should both be 
significantly positive and of similar magnitudes.
2. Liquidity Constraints. Consumption models based on the presence of 
liquidity constraints predict a stronger (positive) response in 
consumption growth to positive predicted financial resource growth 
than to negative financial resource growth because liquidity 
constraints only preclude borrowing against future expected financial 
source growth, but do not inhibit saving ahead of future expected 
financial resource reductions. Hence consumers can save, and 
smooth their consumption when their financial resources are
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expected to fall. This outcome would also be expected if forecast 
errors represent a transitory financial situation shock as in buffer- 
stock saving models, such behaviour reflects ‘self-imposed’ liquidity 
constraints. Thus, if liquidity constraints were the main cause for 
rejections of the REPIH, we should observe excess sensitivity only 
when consumers expect increases in financial resource, but are 
prohibited from borrowing. In such a case, (52 should be significant 
if a household head is genuinely liquidity constrained, but /?, should 
be insignificant.
3. Asymmetric Preferences. Another plausible explanation for the excess 
sensitivity to predicted changes in financial resource is that 
households do not have time-separable preferences as assumed. If 
there is inertia in preferences, perhaps due to the role of habit 
formation, households will only adjust their behaviour slowly. In the 
case o f asymmetric preferences, should be significant while fi2 
should be insignificant. Carroll (1995) applied two dummy variables 
to test the existence of an asymmetric response of consumption to 
positive and negative shocks to permanent income by using 
information on union contracts to construct a measure of expected 
income growth for each household. He found that the response of 
consumption to negative income shocks was much higher than those 
associated with positive income shocks. Likewise, Bowman et al 
(1998) used a database derived from five countries (Canada, France, 
West Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom) to estimate the 
expected income growth and found empirical support for an 
asymmetry in consumption behaviour. Bowman et a ls method for 
estimating the expected income growth was to regress actual income 
growth at time t  against the second through fourth lags of 
consumption growth, income growth, ex post real interest rates, and 
an error correction term formed from the second lag of the 
difference between consumption and income.
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In sum, because the BHPS involves information on individuals’ financial 
wellbeing, this chapter tests to see whether individuals’ subjective financial 
wellbeing influences their consumption behaviour (non-durable 
consumption). Further, it examines the overall distribution of individual 
financial wellbeing and consumption, with respect to various categomations 
of household types.
In the process o f developing detailed simulation models I need to identify a 
proxy for non-durable consumption, while food and grocery expenditures are 
considered to be fairly unresponsive to changes in purchasing power in 
aggregate data, that is, the consumption of food is relatively inelastic to 
income, at the level o f individual or household. We might expect to observe 
significant changes in food and grocery expenditure when there are noticeable 
changes in their financial circumstances, and a reasonably strong relationship 
between food expenditures and their financial wellbeing. All specifications 
have the same instrument sets for comparability. As a result, with the help of 
the micro data derived from the BHPS, I exploit cross-sectional variation by 
controlling for time effects and investigate the source of any excess sensitivity 
by using a random effects model.
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6.3RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
6.3.1 Evaluating Excess Sensitivity
In terms o f the excess sensitivity tests, there are two main findings. First, the 
following Table 6.1 provides robust estimates of the model parameters for the 
estimating equation
Ac,.,+1 = atimet+] + j3Fisitxit + yWi[+] + s it+] (t = 1,...,10) (6.2).
Table 6.1 Excess Sensitivity Test
Dependent Variable = Change in Nondurable Consumption (BHPS: 1991~2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Ind. Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Change "Expectations -0.1148** -1.96 -0.0847 -1.33 -0.0446 -0.94 -0.0584 -0.70 -0.0585 -0.98
Age -0.0733** -4.48 -0.1247** -7.39 -0.0259** -2.55 -0.1475** -4.61 0.0030 0.20
Age A ge / 1 0 0 0.0883** 5.94 0.1289** 8.28 0.0300** 3.26 0.1613** 5.46 0.0084 0.64
A d u lt Ho. Change 1.3579** 10.97 1.2662** 9.56 1.0883** 11.20 0.9668** 5.44 1.9162** 15.85
Children No. Change 0.6440** 4.06 0.6762** 4.32 0.5879** 4.47 0.7103** 3.46 1.5401** 8.18
Constant 1.3644** 2.96 -36.4337** -77.09 0.6872** 2.23 -40.5018** -47.20 -0.3528 -0.86
Wald chi2(15) 106752.9 103831.3 41442.8 89434.74 45883.84
R 2 0.7427 0.7830 0.6946 0.8279 0.7118
Number of Obs. 35495 27769 18026 17646 17849
Employee Self-employed Higher Secondary Others
Ind Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Change Expectations -0.1096* -1.79 -0.1441* -1.86 -0.1605** -2.16 0.0522 0.52 0.0339 0.10
Age -0.0643** -3.86 0.0233 1.07 -0.0032 -0.15 -0.1808** -6.65 -0.0848 -0.93
Age.Age/100 0.0790** 5.23 0.0082 0.43 0.0307 1.59 0.1779** 6.65 0.0973 1.14
A d u lt No. Change 1.3412** 10.22 1.4836** 8.97 1.1939** 7.95 1.5559** 7.24 1.2357 1.47
Children No. Change 0.6946** 4.07 0.8849** 3.37 0.9221** 4.38 0.3875 1.59 1.1247 1.14
Constant 1.1867** 2.51 -1.3904** -2.13 -0.5752 -0.90 4.0056** 5.63 1.5711 0.60
Waldchi2(15) 94818.27 50805.26 71613.4 35960.68 2551.19
R2 0.7379 0.7135 0.7396 0.7667 0.7461
Number of Obs. 32308 19577 23974 10637 884
Note: Every equation contains full year dummies. Instruments are same for all 
estimated equations. The dependent variable is the change in weekly food and 
grocery consumption.
** = significant at 5%, *=significant at 10%.
Source: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
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If the REPIH holds, one would expect to find that the coefficient o f financial 
wellbeing growth, /? , would not be statistically different from zero. Instead, 
the test reports a significant ft with a coefficient estimate of -0.1148 for 
nondurable consumption in the whole sample. This clearly indicates that 
consumption fluctuated with anticipated changes in financial wellbeing, and 
this amounts to a decisive rejection of the REPIH: consumption is excessively 
sensitive to current financial wellbeing changes, or, in other words, it suggests 
that individuals fail to peg their consumption to expectation of their 
permanent wealth.
Carroll (2001) explains the correlation between future expected resource 
growth and the probability of excess sensitivity by arguing that such 
households are more likely to want to borrow, or because expected resource 
growth effectively raises the degree of impatience. In addition, the 
information on financial expectations appears to help predict consumption. 
The signs on /? are negative in most sub-samples. Thus, in all cases, better 
financial states are associated with less steep consumption profiles - that is, 
higher expectations are associated with less saving. This outcome is both 
consistent with precautionary motives for saving (Deaton, 1992; Carroll, 1992; 
Lusardi, 1998) as well as with increases in expected future resources. While 
adding demographic variables into the consumption regression reduced the 
significance of the financial variable considerably, these variables act as 
important control variables. Thus age is employed as a significant variable in 
the regressions. Age decreased consumption up to 41.5, and thereafter
increased it (because quadratic ax2 + bx + c turns over at X = ~
for age and age2 coefficient is (  ^ ^ 0 0883^ x 1 ^ 0 ~ 41.50). Other
demographic terms also showed plausible signs. For example, there was a 
positive relationship between consumption growth and family size, or change 
in the number of children.
Second, the evidence for excess sensitivity is statistically significant in only 
some sub-samples. For example, with respect to household heads who were
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highly educated, (3 (-0.1605) was statistically significant at the 5% level; 
however it was insignificant for other groups in the education sub-sample. 
This suggests that highly-educated agents fail to smooth their consumption, 
but agents with comparatively lower education levels smooth consumption 
very effectively, in the sense that they do not display excess sensitivity. In the 
same vein, I can refer the employee, the self-employed, or higher degree 
holders as the excess sensitivity groups. Among the other groups, agents’ 
expectations did not affect their nondurable consumption. In other words, 
the REPIH could not be rejected for results in these sub-groups.
6.3.2 Tests for Myopia and Liquidity Constraints
As was indicated earlier, deeper insights into the relationships between the 
excess sensitivity o f consumption, and the dependence o f consumption on 
financial situation change, can be obtained by extending equation 
Acit+] = atimet+l + J3Fisitxit + yWiJ+] + s lt+x (t = 1,...,10) (6.2) to
equation
A cu+l = atimel+l + j3xFisitx~( + j32Fisitx?t + yWlt+x + sit+x {t = 1,...,10)
(6.3). Changes in financial situation are divided into negative and positive 
parts to investigate whether consumption changes are more sensitive to 
stochastic financial deteriorations or improvements. The estimated equation 
and results are presented in the following Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Possible Sources of Excess Sensitivity
Dependent Variable = Change in Nondurable Consumption (BHPS: 1991~2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Ind. Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Deteriorated 0.2395** 2.42 0.2572** 2.34 0.0540 0.68 0.1793 1.27 0.0999 1.03
Improved -0.0124 -0.14 0.0446 0.48 -0.0372 -0.54 0.0376 0.31 -0.0229 -0.26
Age -0.0725** -4.43 -0.1236** -7.32 -0.0258** -2.54 -0.1468** -4.59 0.0033 0.23
Age A g e /100 0.0882** 5.94 0.1287** 8.26 0.0300** 3.25 0.1611** 5.45 0.0083 0.63
A du lt No. Change 1.3594** 10.98 1.2680** 9.57 1.0884** 11.20 0.9688** 5.45 1.9162** 15.85
Children N o. Change 0.6402** 4.03 0.6706** 4.28 0.5877** 4.46 0.7037** 3.43 1.5404** 8.18
Constant 1.1265** 2.60 -36.7163** -83.21 0.5911** 2.09 -40.6955** -49.34 -23.9266** -62.47
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Waldchi2(16) 106758.8 103841.1 41440.7 89436.58 45882.09
R 2  0.7427 0.7830 0.6946 0.8279 0.7118
NumberofObs. 35495 27769 18026 17646 17849
Employee Self-employed High?r Secondary Others
Ind. Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Deteriorated 0.2665** 2.66 0.0332 0.29 0.1867* 1.64 0.1716 0.90 -0.4017 -0.56
Improved 0.0260 0.28 -0.2830** -2.20 -0.1348 -1.19 0.1884 1.35 -0.1693 -0.34
Age -0.0630** -3.78 0.0221 1.01 -0.0030 -0.13 -0.1792** -6.59 -0.0858 -0.94
AgeAge/1 0 0 0.0786** 5.21 0.0084 0.44 0.0306 1.58 0.1772** 6.62 0.0969 1.14
A d u lt No. Change 1.3438** 10.24 1.4839** 8.97 1.1943** 7.95 1.5564** 7.24 1.2270 1.46
Children N o. Change 0.6892** 4.04 0.8862** 3.38 0.9213** 4.37 0.3807 1.56 1.2056 1.21
Constant -33.1035** -75.42 -1.5727** -2.54 -0.9157 -1.53 3.9791** 5.91 -43.8725** -17.51
Waldchi2(16) 94829.95 50809.74 71610.9 35965.68 2549.62
R 2 0.7379 0.7136 0.7396 0.7667 0.7462
Number o f Obs. 32308 19577 23974 10637 884
Note: Every equation contains full year dummies. Instruments are same for all 
estimated equations. The dependent variable is the change in weekly food and 
grocery consumption.
** = significant at 5%, *=significant at 10%.
Source: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
A similar set o f instruments as in the previous case were used for these 
estimates. These find that p x in equation
Ac, , +i = atimet+l + P^Fisitx  ^ +  fi2Fisitxlt + y W lJ+l + s il+x (t = 1,...,10)
(6.3) is strongly significant only when consumers expect deterioration in their 
future financial situation. Conversely, the coefficient o f positive financial 
wellbeing growth is insignificant and ambiguous. The above exercise proves 
an important point in that we can formally reject f t  = fi2 = 0 in favour of 
Pi > P 2, a result strikingly similar to that found by Shea (1995b).
Under predictable or expected financial wellbeing changes, myopia would 
imply that consumption fluctuates equally in response to both positive and 
negative financial situation variations. Thus, if households are indeed myopic,
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they would be incapable of pegging their consumption to their permanent 
income, in which case, consumption should increase whenever their financial 
situation improves, and decrease whenever their financial situation 
deteriorates. Hence, changes in consumption should be uniformly related to 
changes in financial wellbeing. This analysis finds that consumption is 
affected only by negative financial wellbeing growth. This does not conform 
to the situation of myopic consumption behaviour. O n the other hand, if 
liquidity constraints exist, predicted financial situation deterioration should 
make forward-looking individuals save more, and thereby avoid a decline in 
their consumption. Therefore, consumption should be more sensitive to 
predicted financial situation improvement than to financial situation 
deterioration, due to the existence of anticipatory savings. However, if 
financial wellbeing fluctuations are predictable, the above results are not 
indicative of either myopia or liquidity constraints. And, the effect of 
anticipated financial wellbeing fluctuations might be quite different. 
Individuals, then, would be incapable of forecasting financial situation 
deterioration. Thus, it is plausible that an inability to borrow pulls 
consumption down, with the deteriorated financial situation. Nevertheless, 
the failure of the REPIH is apparent from the empirical results. However, the 
cause for this breakdown remains unclear in the present analysis.
Consequently, asymmetric preferences appear to be the most important 
source o f the excess sensitivity found in this study. There are many ways to 
model time nonseparabilities in preferences, and I would focus on those that 
induce asymmetric responses to positive and negative predicted financial 
resource changes. Such behaviour could arise if individuals weigh outcomes 
that are above and below a certainty equivalent, or treat gains and losses 
differently.73 For example, if consumers with asymmetric preferences (i.e., 
they are averse to negative changes) expect a negative income change in /+1, 
they would gamble that the negative shock will not occur, rather than revise
73 Examples include “loss aversion” proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and 
extended by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1993) into a saving model; 
“disappointment aversion” axiomatized by Gul (1991) and used to explain the so- 
called Allais paradox.
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ct downward in expectation of the negative shock. A small reduction in ct 
and a large negative change in ct+l can therefore translate into a large negative 
Ac(+l for a given expected change in financial resources. In contrast, when 
consumers anticipate a future but positive income change in period t, they will 
revise ct upward immediately just as any expected utility maximizer would.
This implies that Act+] will be small in response to the anticipated positive
change in financial resources. In summary, I used equation
A ciJ+] = atimel+l + j3xFisitx~t + fi2Fisitxlt + yWit+] + s it+l (t = 1,...,10)
(6.3) to test three hypotheses and found that Asymmetric Preferences appears to 
be the most important source of excess sensitivity.
Turning to the results from sub-samples, the coefficients o f anticipated 
financial wellbeing deterioration are significant in the male, employee, and the 
highly-educated groups, in line with the explanation of asymmetric 
preferences in the whole sample. However, the coefficient of financial 
wellbeing improvement is significant in the self-employed group. This result 




This chapter has presented a comprehensive discussion on the implications of 
the REPIH and has evaluated the model empirically with a household micro 
panel data set which includes exhaustive information on consumption. The 
theoretical formulation presented here is that o f a benchmark consumption 
model following the main assumptions o f the REPIH. The primary focus of 
the discussion was to re-evaluate the excess sensitivity puzzle o f consumption 
behaviour. Simple investigations on the BHPS data set, used for empirical 
aspects of this thesis, revealed some interesting facts. What follows from this 
empirical work is that consumption may be associated with variables other 
than financial wealth. In the introductory sections, I reviewed the work by 
Souleles (2001) and Flavin (1981) which used US data sets. Their studies 
appear to be an excellent benchmark for formulating the analysis strategy: this 
empirically revisits the random-walk hypothesis o f consumption using 
Souleles’s method; used the extensions presented in Shea (1995b) to evaluate 
myopic consumption behaviour and the existence of liquidity constraints; and 
finally, a follow-up of the Flavin test of excess sensitivity was carried out to 
investigate the role of expectation errors in explaining the excess sensitivity. 
While this previous work used aggregate data to test the REPIH hypothesis, 
the present study employed their methodology to investigate patterns from 
the BHPS data set in the micro level.
The results clearly refute the predictions o f the rational expectation extensions 
o f the REPIH. In the first regression (Table 6.1), the results indicate an excess 
sensitivity o f current consumption to one-period lagged financial wellbeing. 
Higher financial expectations were correlated with less saving in the whole 
sample. Age decreases consumption up to 41.5, and thereafter increases it. 
The coefficients of family size and change in number of children are 
significant and positive.
However, although the failure of the REPIH is substantiated from these
results, they do not shed light on whether it is myopia or liquidity constraints
that are the main cause for this failure. Ambiguity arises because if myopia
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exists, then consumption should fluctuate with both financial wealth 
improvements and deteriorations. If liquidity constraints exist, and financial 
situation changes are predictable, individuals should be able to smooth their 
consumption in cases o f declines in financial wealth by saving beforehand, in 
forecast of the future financial deterioration. If financial deterioration cannot 
be forecasted, anticipatory saving is not plausible. In the presence of strict 
borrowing constraints, households might face a fall in their consumption in 
such circumstances. In the second step, financial wealth growth was divided 
into positive and negative parts. The results in the whole sample indicate that 
consumption fluctuations are significandy related to financial wealth declines, 
but not related to financial wealth increases. This wiped out both myopic and 
liquidity constraints and makes asymmetric preferences to be the most 
possible source of excess sensitivity in this empirical analysis. Further, given 
the significance o f the cross-sectional distribution o f expectations, the failure 
o f the REPIH in the male, the highly educated, and employee sub-groups, 
was due to asymmetric preference. Meanwhile, the rejection o f the REPIH in 






In most cases, economists who assume that individuals do not make 
systematic errors under the REPIH find that it works well using aggregate 
data. However, this is especially likely to be a problem in our empirical micro­
level analysis since both the financial situation variables and expectation errors 
were found to be correlated with household’s demographic characteristics in 
Chapter 5. These findings suggest that even a long sample period and a full 
set o f time dummies might not be enough to ensure the orthogonality o f the 
expectation errors with the financial situation variables74. Consequently, 
another possibility to explain the failure of the REPIH, but one that has not 
previously received much scrutiny in the literature is systematic heterogeneity 
in expectation errors. The greatest research potential for this possibility will be 
the extent to which we can incorporate the large amount o f heterogeneity in 
the population into our empirical analysis. If consumption decisions are 
influenced by respondents’ financial situation expectations, then consumption 
changes will depend upon the perceived financial situation changes. The 
extent to which subjective financial situation expectations influence 
household decisions can be understood by analysing the relationship between 
consumption changes and expectation errors.
This chapter applied Flavin (1981)’s model to identify the consumers’ reaction 
to expectation errors and changes in expectations of their future resources. 
Melvin (2003) also examined the link between subjective job loss expectations 
and the subsequent impact on household consumption behaviour behind the
74 Souleles (2001) tests this hypothesis and argues that expectation errors might not be 
classical, but rather contain systematic component correlated with the excess sensitivity 
regressor.
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intuition suggested by Flavin (1981) and Campbell and Deaton (1989). The 
direct measures of households’ expectation errors found in the BHPS make it 
possible to explore whether expectation errors play an important role in the 
rejection o f the REPIH. As a result, the expectation errors were added into 
equation Acit+x -  atimet+] + fiFisitxi t + yWl t+l + ei t+x (t = 1,...,10) (6.2)
and equation
A cil+l =atimet+l + f3Fisitxt +cpFisiteit+x +</>AFisitxit+l + yWl t+l + £ it+l
(t = 1,...,10)
(7.11) was used to consider whether systematic heterogeneity in expectation 
errors was another source of excess sensitivity.
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7.2RELATED STUDIES
Flavin (1981) used the excess sensitivity tests to mount a powerful rejection of 
the REPIH. Two ideas are developed in her work. One is that a stronger test 
for consumption than the reduced-form equation c( = X ct_} + 8t 
Act — a  + PQt + £t (2.10) is provided. In addition, she attempts to
identify consumer’s reaction to both anticipated and unanticipated income 
shocks. Flavin’s model mainly focuses on the role played by current income in 
providing new information about future income. Under the permanent 
income hypothesis a rational agent can use such information to upgrade 
his/her permanent income expectations. A drawback of Flavin’s test is that 
both income and consumption processes need to be modelled, and the results 
which emerge from this are sensitive to the modelling specifications that are 
used75.
Thus, a trended ARMA representation was used to model the time-series 
properties of the income process and to specify agent’s expectations about 
their future levels o f income. Under assumption of an ARMA process for 
income, actual revisions in permanent income can possibly be acquired from 
the contemporaneous observation of current income. This revision is given 
by the forecast error in the ARMA specification, and such an error represents 
unanticipated news associated with current observations of income76. The 
magnitude o f the revision would then depend on the parameters of the 
ARMA representation of the income process. Together with this argument, 
one can ‘specify a structural equation relating the change in consumption to 
the contemporaneous revision in permanent income (modelled using the 
income innovation) and the change in current income’, [pp.976]. As a result, it
75 See Deaton (1992) chapter 3
76 Flavin also suggests that the error in the ARMA representation for income can 
represent, for econometricians attempting to model consumption, not just the ‘true 
innovation’ in income, but also the predictive ‘value o f all the lagged values o f variables 
observed by the individual, but not explicitly incorporated in the regression.’ [pp. 991]. 
This is an issue related to Campbell’s (1987) and West’s (1988) superior information.
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is possible to use Flavin’s model to explore the determinants of change in 
consumption for inferring agents’ expectations.
Since the path of future income is uncertain, an individual must make his 
consumption plans on the basis of some set of expectations about future 
income. Given the expectations about future income held in period t, the 
individual’s permanent income can be expressed as
y f = r A +E(r L )‘+'£ ,^  
fcS 1 +  r
(7.1)
where y f  is permanent income at time P, At is their stock o f assets at time P, r 
is the constant real rate of interest; y t is their labour income at time P, and Et 
is the expectations operator for expectations at time t.
Allowing for a stochastic, or transitory, component o f consumption, the 
consumption function for the representative individual becomes 
ct = y f  + ut , or
4  + Z ( Ti - )* +,£
to  1 + r ty t+k
+ u, (7.2)
where the error term ut denotes the transitory component o f consumption. 
Solving for ct+l in terms of ct , subject to At+] = (1 + r)At + y t —ct , gives:
c,+i = C, + ( A - ) 4+1 ( £ <+I -  E, )yMA -  (1 + r)u, + uM (7.3)
tS  1 + r
Consumption will evolve as random-walks only if the transitory consumption 
term is identically zero, ut = 0 . So I can re-write
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Ac,+i =rYd(l+ryk(E,* i ~Ei)y,+k
k =1
-k (7.4)
(£ ,+! -  E,)y,+k
Consequently, I use the above equation to understand how changes in 
expectations o f future income relate to consumption changes. Because the 
first term represents the household’s expectation errors concerning current 
income, y t+1, while the second term corresponds to the influence of changing 
expectations regarding future income y t+k, k > 2 ,  changes in consumption
between the two periods can be decomposed into these two terms. A basic 
empirical implication o f this model is that, even if the behavioural marginal 
propensity to consume out of current income is zero, consumption should 
respond to changes in current income because these innovations provide new 
information about future income, and therefore induce revisions in expected 
permanent income. In other words, one alternative hypothesis is that 
expectation errors might not be classical, but rather contain systematic 
components correlated with the excess sensitivity regressor. Chamberlain 
(1984) states that systematic expectation errors can be a potential problem in 
estimating any rational expectations (or forward-looking) model in a short 
panel. For instance, female respondents might, on average, have been 
optimistic about the future over the sample period, so that they increase their 
consumption, due to their over-optimism, or a positive correlation between 
consumption and expectations would not be inconsistent with the REPIH. 
The availability of the direct measures o f respondents’ expectation errors in 
the BHPS makes it possible to test this point directly.
The null hypothesis in Flavin’s paper is the permanent income hypothesis, in 
the form o f equation ct = AcM + st Act = a + f3Qt + st (2.10),
associated with an autoregressive specification for the process governing 
labour income. In general, it also can be specified as followed:
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Ac, = £ t = ai), = a  (1 + r)~k (£ , -  Et_x ){wt+k + y]+k ) (7.5)
k =0
(7.6)
where >>,+A: = wt+k + y]+k . Flavin also introduces the possibility of
unanticipated capital gains in the model, so surprises in non-labour income,
y x, are allowed to be different from zero. Stricdy speaking, Flavin’s excess 
sensitivity hypothesis is a substantial generalization of equation 
c, = Xct_x + s t -> Ac, = a  + pQ t + £t (2.10) 77 and allows
consumption to respond to current and lagged changes in income by more or 
less than is required by the permanent income theory. The extended version 
of Flavin’s model is as follows:
Z{L)yt = n  + e t (7.7)
Ac, = y  + 0£t + P (L )A y , + ut (7.8)
where £ ( I )  = J L f  i ' ,  £„ =  1 and /? ( ! )  = *  1 • & should be
noted that Flavin rearranges the AK(p) income process equation and 
substitutes the error term £t into the consumption equation for income
variable. Hence, the first difference of consumption responds both to current 
and lagged changes in income as well as the innovation in the income process 
in the unrestricted version of the model. The measures of excess sensitivity of 
consumption to current income, f t , provide an estimate of the amount of 
additional response of consumption to the new information contained in 
current income. In sum, according to the REPIH, consumption changes 
should not be related to other variables, except for the amount o f income
77 In her 1993 paper, Flavin argues that ‘the consumption data is generated by the excess 
sensitivity model’ [pp. 665]
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innovation provided by the error term £ . Hence, all the j3 coefficients, 
which represent the extent to which consumption responds to previously 
predictable changes in income, should be zero.
In Flavin’s paper, she mns an eight-order auto-regression (p—8) for the labour 
income process. The restriction /?0 — = ... = J37 = 0 is imposed on the
system to obtain a constrained system that can be estimated. She then used 
data on non-durable goods consumption from 1949(3) to 1979(1) and found 
that the likelihood ratio statistic for the hypothesis /?0 = f3x = ... = /?7 = 0
was 27.02 for ^ 2(8) = 21.96. Hence, the random-walk specification of Hall 
was rejected by Flavin, [pp. 999]. The estimates for the first three sensitivity 
parameters are .335, .071 and .049. These results indicate a strong excess 
sensitivity response of consumption to changes in current income, [pp. 1002]
However Mankiw and Shapiro (1985) and Deaton (1992) began to question 
the validity of the stationary income process assumption, one of the main 
econometric techniques used by Flavin, and discussed the actual form that 
modelling the income process should take when such a process appears to be 
non-stationary. They also criticized the method used by Flavin to account for 
the upward trending behaviour of income which dealt with the non-stationary 
nature of the income process by fitting exponential time-trends to both 
consumption and income, and by replacing consumption and income in the 
regressions by their residuals. In particular, Mankiw and Shapiro argued that 
excess sensitivity is induced by this detrending procedure, even if excess 
sensitivity is not present in the data. Basically, y  is a non-stationary variable 
while Ac is stationary, so running a system like <%{L)yt = ju + £t
(7.7) cannot provide much information for both sides o f the consumption 
equation, as each are of a different order o f integration78. The problems about 
making inferences about the coefficients on lagged income using standard t 
and .F-tests are essentially the same as the problems that occur in discerning
78 To see this note that in (21) the income equation is akeady in reduced form, and to 
obtain the reduced form for consumption I only need to substitute the income 
equation into the consumption equation (see Deaton (1992) pp. 89).
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the existence of a unit root in a univariate time series, and the use of standard 
normal tables at usual significance levels results in over-rejection. Deaton 
(1992) ran a Monte Carlo experiment79 to test this point and found that the t- 
statistics for excess sensitivity on each o f the income variables, and the test 
for excess sensitivity as a whole (an F-test), rejected more than the customary 
5%80.
However Stock and West (1988) challenged Mankiw and Shapiro’s suggestion 
that excess sensitivity was the result o f bad econometric practice by using the 
concepts of cointegration and error correction to provide a means o f testing 
excess sensitivity:
ct =b  o +  V m  +  hyU  + h y i 2 +  ut (7 -9)
where y d is the same income measure used by Flavin. Now, if savings is 
defined as
ct =b0+ (b} + b3)ct_x +  (b2 -  b3)y d_x +  b3st_x +  ut (7-10)
We would see that the savings variable plays the error correction role in this 
model if we expect the coefficient o f the lagged consumption variable 
(bx + b3) to be close to one. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that in a 
regression of integrated variables of the same order, standard asymptotic 
theory can be applied to parameters that can be written as the coefficients of 
stationary variables. If consumption and disposable income are cointegrated, 
then the last two variables of equation
ct = b0 + (bx +  b3)ct_x + (b2 — b3)yd_x +  b3st_x +  ut (7-10) are stationary.
Hence, it is possible to make inferences about the excess sensitivity 
parameters b2 and b3. Stock and West also used the Monte Carlo method in
79 Deaton himself recognizes that ‘the Monte Carlo results, although tailored to reflect 
the actual data, do not generate results that look like Flavin’s’, [pp. 94]
80 The overall F-test rejects 43% o f the time, and the t-test for /? 0 and rejects 14% 
and 21% o f the time respectively rather than the correct 5% [pp. 93].
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experiments to shqw that their technique worked and found evidence in 
favour o f excess sensitivity. Thus, according to Stock and West, the problem 
with Flavin’s test procedure is that the imposition of a unit coefficient upon 
the lagged consumption variable alters the asymptotic distributions of the 
estimates. However once I correct for this problem, evidence for excess 
sensitivity still appears to exist.
7.3 METHODOLOGY
To carry out a further investigation of the failure of Hall’s random-walk 
hypothesis, this chapter returns to equation c, = AcM + £, ^
Ac, = a  + pQ t + £t (2.10) in chapter 2. The residual, £ , in Equation
c( = Tc,_] + £t Ac, = a  + PQt + £t (2.10) determines changes in
consumption and potentially includes many factors, such as measurement 
error or unobserved heterogeneity in discount rates. According to Flavin 
(1981), Campbell and Deaton (1989), and Melvin (2003), equation
T- t
Ac, = s, = <w/, = (1 + r)-* (£ , -  )(w,+i +  y l k ) (7.5) can help
k =0
to decompose £ into two components: the change in consumption resulting 
from unexpected current financial changes; and any revisions in expected 
future financial situations. Empirically, the following equation 
Ac,,+] = atimet+l + fiFisitx, + (pF\sitei ,+1 + </>AFisitxi ,+1 + yWt ,+1 + c,,+]
(f = l,...,10)
(7.11) is used, which shows a direct relationship between financial expectation 
errors and household consumption, to assess whether systematic 
heterogeneity in expectation errors can lead to spurious inference more 
generally in forward-looking models.
Ac,,+] =atimet+] + j3Fisitxt + (pFisitelt+{ + <f)AFisitxlt+] + yWll+x + £jJ+]
(f = U ,10 )
(7.11)
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Where Fisite denotes financial expectation errors and AFisitx denotes 
changes in respondents’ financial expectations. For consistent estimates of (3 , 
the forecast errors need to be uncorrelated with the excess sensitivity 
regressor Fisitx. With direct measures of expectation errors, we can test the 
implications o f systematic heterogeneity in the errors. Also, shocks to the 
financial situation are considered to be among the most important sources of 
the overall changes in consumption in S . Under the alternative hypothesis 
that excess sensitivity is generated by demographic components in 
expectation errors, we would expect to find f3 = 0 and (p > 0 , since the 
REPIH allows for consumption to respond to the current financial shocks 
represented by Fisite. s i t = jUl + vt t , where jili captures the unobserved, time- 
invariant characteristics of the individual. It means that, for all observations 
relating to a given individual, jui will have the same value, reflecting their
unchanging unobserved characteristics. For //, to be properly specified, it 
must be orthogonal to the individual effects. vit are random errors. In this case 
fil ~ IID (0,ct*), vit ~ IID (0 ,a ])  and the //, are independent of the vit. In 
other words, the cross-sectional specific error term must be uncorrelated
with the errors of the variables if this is to be modelled with other explained 
variables. However the later assumption is unrealistic in the present context, 
as W  includes demographical variables that are correlated with, for example, 
any unobserved ability captured in //( . Furthermore, if this unobserved 
individual specific effect is also correlated with the expectation errors, then 
the main coefficient of interest, (3 , will be biased. Panel data allow us to 
overcome these potential problems of endogeneity by treating the unobserved 
effect jJ,i as random, and I estimate equations 
A cit+l = atimet+] + j3Fisitxt + <pFisiteit+l + </)AFisitxl[+l + yWi t+l + ei t+l
(* = U ,  10)
(7.11) using random effect models.
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7.4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
There is likely to be a multicollinearity problem if financial expectations 
changes are correlated with expectation errors. In other words, even a long 
sample period and a full set of time dummies might not be enough to ensure 
orthogonality of the expectation errors with the financial expectations 
regressors. To test for multicollinearity each x  was regressed on all of the
other x  variables. The 1 — R2 from this regression was then used to see what 
fraction o f the first x  variable’s variance was independent of the other x  
variables. The results from VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) in Table 7.1 give a 
quick and straightforward check for multicollinearity.




Financial Expectations 2 0.499809
Expectation errors 1.41 0.707325
Expectations Change 1.6 0.626314
Children No. Change 1.03 0.973695
Adult No. Change 1 0.99537
Mean VIF 14.07
Source: Data derived from the BHPS (1991~2002)
The 1/V IF column at right in a VIF table gives the values equal to 1 — R 2. It 
shows that 70.7% of the variance in expectation errors was independent of age, 
age2, financial expectations, expectations change, change in number of adults, and change in 
number of children. Similarly, about 62.6% of the variance in expectations change 
was independent of the other variables.
The VIF column in the centre of the VIF table reflects the degree to which 
other coefficients’ variances (and standard errors) are increased due to the
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inclusion of that predictor. This shows that both expectation errors and 
expectations change have virtually no impact on the other variances. In sum, 
there is no substantial multicollinearity in the regressions.
Table 7.2 shows that the coefficients of (p on the expectation errors, Fisite, 
are significant in the whole sample and nearly all o f the sub-samples, despite 
the inclusion o f the time dummies in the equation.
Table 7.2 Systematic Heterogeneity in Expectation Errors
Dependent Variable = Change in Nondurable Consumption (BHPS: 1991~2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Ind. Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Expectations 0.0916 1.06 0.0734 0.81 0.0340 0.52 0.0528 0.42 -0.0473 -0.54
Expectation errors 0.2712** 5.37 0.2008** 3.68 0.2098** 5.33 0.2292** 3.17 0.2319** 4.71
Expectations Change 0.0094 0.15 -0.0066 -0.10 -0.0787 -1.58 -0.0875 -1.01 -0.1799** -2.88
Age -0.0688** -4.32 -0.1175** -7.14 -0.0257** -2.70 -0.1381** -4.39 0.0055 0.38
A g eA g e /100 0.0833** 5.77 0.1219** 8.04 0.0292** 3.39 0.1502** 5.17 0.0043 0.33
A d u lt Ho. Change 1.4008** 11.11 1.3121** 9.72 1.0882** 11.17 1.0018** 5.55 1.9183** 15.64
Children No. Change 0.7338** 4.57 0.7849** 4.96 0.6148** 4.67 0.8679** 4.19 1.5349** 8.07
Constant -34.0602** -71.05 -36.8576** -74.61 -22.962** -71.00 2.6456** 2.94 -0.3036 -0.68


















Employee Self-empdoyed Highir Secondary Others
Ind Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Expectations 0.0274 0.30 0.2884** 2.51 0.0772 0.70 0.3247** 2.31 -0.3071 -0.61
Expectation errors 0.1973** 3.79 0.2801** 4.07 0.2559** 4.04 0.3063** 3.65 0.0423 0.14
Expectations Change -0.0103 -0.16 0.2538** 3.01 0.0593 0.76 0.0585 0.57 -0.6300* -1.72
Age -0.0560** -3.35 0.0332 1.55 -0.0014 -0.07 -0.1785** -6.59 -0.0793 -0.86
AgeAge/1 0 0 0.0704** 4.65 -0.0013 -0.07 0.0274 1.48 0.1767** 6.63 0.0872 1.01
A d u lt No. Change 1.3433** 10.06 1.6320** 9.58 1.2940** 8.50 1.5325** 6.95 1.1838 1.40
Children No. Change 0.7061** 4.10 1.1414** 4.29 1.0624** 5.04 0.4047 1.62 1.4404 1.40
Constant -33.1386** 65.96 -2.4334** -3.55 -0.9631 -1.46 -36.362** -48.38 2.3245 0.82
Waldchi2(17) 90390.05 48296.51 67982.0 34669.7 2559.19
R2 0.7380 0.7157 0.7419 0.7659 0.7502
Number of Obs. 30827 18515 22649 10323 870
Note: Every equation contains full year dummies. Instruments are same for all 
estimated equations. The dependent variable is the change in weekly food and 
grocery consumption.
** = significant at 5%, *=significant at 10%.
Sources: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
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It notes that the excess sensitivity regressor (5 becomes insignificant in all 
groups, except for the self-employed and the respondents with secondary 
education level, when expectation errors and expectations changes are 
controlled for. This means that some excess sensitivity persists among self- 
employed and the secondary-educated respondents and is not due to 
heterogeneity in expectation errors alone. However, for most respondents, 
some o f the excess sensitivity appears to be due to systematic heterogeneity in 
expectation errors. This suggests the possibility that previous excess sensitivity 
tests might have made spurious inferences. Also, the resulting coefficients of 
expectation errors in Table 7.2 are positive and marginally significant. In 
other words, the more positive the expectation errors, the more pessimistic 
the household is in regards to their financial situations and the larger is the 
magnitude by which they would change their consumption. The coefficients 
(f> of the changes in expectations of future financial resources are not 
significant except for the unmarried and the self-employed groups. The 
insignificance o f the (f) coefficients is consistent with the assumption that 
changes in expectations o f future financial resources are incorporated into 
current consumption.
For more details about the response o f consumption to expectation errors, I 
distinguished between expectation errors that were positive (under­
estimated/pessimistic) from those that were negative (over­
estimated/optimistic), and denoted them by Fisite*t+l and Fisite~t+] , 
respectively. The equation now took the form:
Acu+i = atimeM + fiFisitx, + q>{ Fisite~M + <p7 Fisite*^ 
+ (0AFisitx,M + yWIHl + elM (t = 0)
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Table 7.3 Asymmetric Preference in Expectation Errors
Dependent Variable — Change in Nondurable Consumption (BHPS: 1991~2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Ind. Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Expectations 0.0490 0.58 0.0385 0.43 0.0081 0.13 0.0180 0.15 -0.0727 -0.85
Over-estimated -0.4081** -4.87 -0.3243** -3.58 -0.2862** -4.38 -0.4059** -3.41 -0.4083** -4.99
Under-estimated 0.1088 1.17 0.0384 0.38 0.1571** 2.19 0.0079 0.06 0.0881 0.99
Expectations Change 0.0196 0.31 0.0028 0.04 -0.0768 -1.54 -0.0764 -0.88 -0.1743** -2.78
A ge -0.0694** -4.36 -0.1178** -7.16 -0.0259** -2.72 -0.1386** -4.40 0.0053 0.37
AgeAge/1 0 0 0.0833** 5.77 0.1216** 8.01 0.0291** 3.38 0.1498** 5.15 0.0039 0.30
A d u lt N o. Change 1.4039** 11.14 1.3132** 9.73 1.0935** 11.23 1.0049** 5.56 1.9179** 15.64
Children N o. Change 0.7322** 4.56 0.7836** 4.96 0.6162** 4.68 0.8642** 4.17 1.5370** 8.08



















Employee_______Self-unemployed________Higher Secondary________  Others
Ind. Variable Coef T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
Expectations -0.0035 -0.04 0.2462** 2.18 0.0421 0.39 0.2701** 1.96 -0.2683 -0.54
Over-estimated -0.3178** -3.68 -0.4010** -3.66 -0.3588** -3.49 -0.5398** -3.76 -0.0316 -0.06
Under-estimated 0.0544 0.58 0.0794 0.68 0.12.05 1.09 0.0748 0.44 0.2042 0.33
Expectations Change -0.0019 -0.03 0.2707** 3.20 0.0719 0.92 0.0634 0.61 -0.6364* -1.74
Age -0.0566** -3.38 0.0329 1.53 -0.0020 -0.10 -0.1781** -6.57 -0.0800 -0.86
A geA gef 100 0.0704** 4.65 -0.0012 -0.07 0.0275 1.49 0.1753** 6.57 0.0887 1.02
A d u lt N o. Change 1.3439** 10.06 1.6354** 9.60 1.2956** 8.51 1.5380** 6.97 1.1840 1.40
Children No. Change 0.7045** 4.09 1.1504** 4.33 1.0608** 5.03 0.4004 1.60 1.4624 1.42
Constant 0.9124* 1.80 -32.6397** -47.91 -33.678** -52.17 -36.132** -47.95 2.3397 0.82
W ald chi2(18) 90387.81 48285.78 67970.9 34675.5 2556.6
R 2 0.7380 0.7156 0.7419 0.7659 0.7503
Number of Obs. 30827 18515 22649 10323 870
Note: Every equation contains full year dummies. Instruments are same for all 
estimated equations. The dependent variable is the change in weekly food and 
grocery consumption.
** = significant at 5%, *=significant at 10%.
Sources: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
Table 7.3 shows that the results of splitting the expectations error term were 
again consistent with the predicted result: positive expectation errors were 
positively correlated with consumption but the relationship was insignificant 
except for women. In addition, there were no significant difference in the 
consumption growth changes between over-pessimistic agents and “smart”
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agents. This implies that agents refuse to decrease their consumption level in 
ct when they are pessimistic about their future financial source. Act+] will be 
small when their pessimistic expectations are proved to wrong. In contrast, 
the coefficient for negative expectation errors (over-estimated) are also of the 
correct sign and highly significant in all of the sub-groups. Thus consumers 
who tend to be optimistic increase their consumption more than those that 
have correct expectations of their future financial resources. It means that 
agents increase their consumption as soon as they feel optimistic about their 
future financial resources. But, if they are over-estimated, there would be a 
large increase in ct and a relatively lower increase, or even a reduction, in 
ct+l. This would lead to negative consumption growth. So, the results of
splitting the expectation errors provide more evidence to support the finding 
that asymmetric preferences are an important cause o f excess sensitivity.
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7.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we use the finding from a direct test of the rationality of 
expectations made in Chapter 5 to look into household or individual 
systematic expectation errors and relate them to the understanding of excess 
sensitivity puzzles found in Chapter 6. This chapter tried to remove the 
ambiguity in understanding the cause for the breakdown o f the REPIH by 
considering whether the systematic heterogeneity in forecast errors explains 
this failure. Previous studies, which lacked explicit measures o f these errors, 
have not been able to consider this hypothesis direcdy. The results in this 
chapter present that demographic components o f forecast errors were found 
to explain some of the excess sensitivity. Excess sensitivity in most o f sub­
groups was due to systematic heterogeneity in expectation errors alone with 
except o f the self-employed and the secondary-educated. The pessimistic 
agents had more fluctuated consumption profile. Generally speaking, since 
forecast errors are correlated with household demographic characteristics, 
they will be correlated with many regressors of interest in forward-looking 
models, suggesting that non-classical forecast errors are in practice a general 
and potentially serious problem. In addition, the asymmetric responses of 
expectation errors to consumption are consistent with another alternative 





Benchmark models of optimization, in the spirit of the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis, present a strong theoretical case for a smooth consumption 
regime in which households do not allow their consumption to fluctuate with 
anticipated variations in their income. Hall’s (1982) extension of the PILCH 
served as an important breakthrough in testing the implications of the 
benchmark model. His exposition clearly established that consumption 
should follow a random-walk pattern apart from a trend, with the lagged 
values o f variables having no role to play in predicting present consumption. 
However, numerous subsequent studies empirically rejected the main 
predictions of the REPIH, while Flavin (1981) presents a model which 
effectively captured excess sensitivity of consumption using US macro data. 
An excellent and more recent adoption of this methodology can be found in 
Souleles (2001) and Melvin (2003), which also present results that suggest a 
rejection o f the REPIH.
8.1 SUMMARY
This study attempts to provide future substantial insights into the 
determinants o f individuals’ expectations and the nature o f household 
consumption dynamics over the life cycle and to examine the causes of the 
failure of the baseline theory at the micro level. It is divided into six parts. The 
first provides a summary of the existing literature on household consumption 
o f the last 50 years. The more recent literature on both rational expectations 
and consumption are presented. This review is followed by a more detailed 
description of the REH and the REPIH, the theoretical model for explaining 
consumption behaviour at the micro level which forms the basis o f this study, 
and presents the main theoretical and empirical explanations that have been 
given for the failure of the REPIH. As a result, there are three findings drawn 
fiom the literature.
163
a) There is no common consensus about what the underlying
consumption function should look like.
b) These tests are out o f date and based on a limited amount of data. 
Researchers show more interest in micro panel and macro time-series 
data sets in the past decade.
c) The evidence against the REPIH suggests it should be possible to
identify some variables that should prove useful for predicting
changes in consumption.
To explain actual consumption patterns leads to two main empirical
objectives of the research: to quantify the failure of the REPIH using micro 
subjective data; and to explain what factors or behaviours account for this 
failure. In addition, one of the main assumptions in the REPIH, the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis, is reviewed in this chapter. As a result, the evidence 
in previous studies is not strong enough to reject the REH, and the direct test 
o f the REH at the micro level is an appropriate and worthwhile activity.
The third chapter presents the advantages o f using micro-level panel data for 
identifying the factors which may explain the failure o f the REPIH. The 
virtue and limitations of micro-data applications are both presented in this 
chapter. Three reasons are cited to explain the boom in micro data 
application. In particular, the general information on the BHPS database is 
briefly introduced. The distinctive properties in the BHPS, random sampling 
and the dynamics of change of the whole population in the UK, are 
emphasi2ed by the four advantages of the BHPS. Then, a preliminary analysis 
of main observation variables (consumption, income, financial wellbeing 
variables, and others) derived from the BHPS give more details with respect 
to the interest variables in this thesis. A plot shows that household 
consumption rises up, as far as an individual’s middle age and then starts 
falling thereafter. This hump shape is often used as a starting point for 
doubting the theoretical prediction of consumption smoothness.
The fourth chapter, following on from the characteristics of the BHPS
variable employed in the study, introduces three existing panel data models
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that can be used to analyse these characteristics, and provides the reasons for 
choosing a random effects ordered probit model. The highlights of random 
effects models are presented relative to the limitations of fixed effects models. 
Consequently, the match between the properties o f the data derived from the 
BHPS, and the requirement of the models, led to the availability of the 
random effects models used in this study.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 form the main empirical parts of the thesis. Chapter 5 
presents a major empirical analysis of the subjective financial welfare data and 
investigates whether the REH is the best available objective method for 
modelling the individual expectations by identifying the types of individuals 
whose expectations were structurally incorrect. According to the lack in the 
previous studies, micro-heterogeneity and a short time period, the value of the 
REH test in this thesis is highlighted. Expectation errors are found 
consistendy positively over 12 years, and demographic variables are joindy 
significant. These results indicate that expectations are biased and inefficient. 
As a result, the assumption on rational expectations, or the absence of macro- 
economic shocks, is invalid. Further, I explore the determinants of 
individuals’ financial expectations. Expectations and expectation errors in 
different social sub-groups were investigated. There exists significant micro­
heterogeneity in expectations and forecast capabilities across sub-groups. In 
other words, I identify particular groups prone to financially optimistic or 
pessimistic. Expectation errors are highlighted in the analysis because the 
findings suggest these are more complex than is usually assumed in empirical 
tests o f forward-looking models. I interpret the results by characterizing the 
type o f shocks that hit different types o f individuals over time. Such a 
characterization is o f the methodological interest.
Chapter 5 found expectations were not rational, and the existence of micro­
heterogeneity, systematic errors and any assumption on the homogeneity of 
preferences and information sets might lead to inefficient evaluations. 
Attention then turns to whether the individual subjective information helps 
predict household expenditure in Chapter 6, by exploring the relationship
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between an individual’s financial change expectations and household 
consumption, following in Souleles’s (2001) footsteps. The first set o f results 
suggest significant evidence of excess sensitivity in the whole sample, while in 
the sub-sample investigation, employees, the self-employed and higher degree 
holders showed excess sensitivity, although individuals in other sub-samples 
appear to follow the predictions of the REPIH. A second set o f estimates 
then investigated whether the existence o f myopia, liquidity constraints, and 
asymmetric preferences were the likely causes o f this excess consumption 
sensitivity. The results indicated that consumption changes were highly 
sensitive to financial resource declines, but not to financial resource increases. 
Under the assumption of myopic consumption behaviour, one would expect 
a symmetric response, in which consumption adjusts equally to unanticipated 
financial resource increases and decreases. Similarly, under the assumption of 
liquidity constraints, if financial resources are anticipated to fall, individuals 
could save in advance to keep their consumption constant, even when 
resource actually falls. Thus, consumption should be more sensitive to income 
increases. However the results neither confirmed myopia nor presented a 
strong argument in favour of liquidity constraints. Instead, the results suggest 
that asymmetric preferences are the most important cause of excess sensitivity 
in this study. It is noted that an exceptional case is the self-employed sub­
group. Their consumption decision significandy responds to their financial 
wellbeing improvement. As a result, the excess sensitivity of the self- 
employed is due to the liquidity constraints.
Chapter 7 provided another possible explanation of excess sensitivity - 
systematic heterogeneity in expectation errors. With the help of Flavin’s 
model, I investigate the relationship between consumption changes and 
anticipated and unanticipated shocks. The coefficients o f expectation errors 
are significant and positive, while the coefficients of expectations become 
insignificant. This suggests that expectation errors play an important role and 
need to be considered in excess sensitivity tests. Further, the remaining 
significant coefficients o f expectations in the self-employed and the 
secondary-educated indicate that their excess sensitivity in these two social
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groups is not due to systematic heterogeneity in expectation errors alone. This 
significant finding in this chapter sheds light on the likely reasons for 
consumption non-smoothness.
8.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In sum, excess sensitivity is a critical finding o f the present study. For the first 
time in the literature, to my knowledge, an attempt has been made to 
understand the divergence in the patterns of expenditure using subjective data 
from British households. Many studies in the past have discussed 
consumption behaviour using aggregated data. What I proposed, in this study, 
is a way of exploring the cross-sectional variation in financial wealth 
expectations, which contained information not included in the other macro 
variables used in forecasting. O f the BHPS survey questions, those asking 
specifically about the household, rather than the aggregate economy, were 
found to contain the most useful cross-sectional information. My thesis seems 
to derive a benchmark case study for the United Kingdom economy to help 
analyze some empirical puzzles.
This thesis examined the role of individuals’ expectations in consumer
behaviour and produced four interesting results. First, I explore the
relationship between the financial realization at time t+1 and financial
expectations at time t  by formulating a financial expectation errors index and
reject the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. Individuals having experienced
deterioration (improvement) have a higher probability o f being financially
pessimistic (optimistic). In terms o f the magnitude o f the effects, the
estimated coefficients on the control for financial optimism in the previous
time period outweigh those for financial pessimism are statistically different
from them at the 15 per cent level. Young individuals are much more
financially optimistic than the old. Financial optimism is negatively associated
with income: a 1 per cent increase in income raises the probability o f being
financially pessimistic by around 3 per cent. Also I find different social groups
have different financial expectations: the married, women, house owners,
individuals living in small sized household or in East Anglia and Wales have
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lower probability of being financial pessimistic; meanwhile smokers, 
individuals with mortgage, the unemployed, individuals living in medium 
sized households or with two children have higher probability of being 
financial optimistic. I interpret the results by characterizing the type o f shocks 
that hit different types of individuals over time. Such a characterization is of 
methodological interest. In particular, using UK panel data, my empirical 
findings help to inform economists not only about the determinants of 
individuals’ expectations, rationality, but also about how expectations vary 
over the life cycle and the business cycle.
Secondly, this thesis explores whether accuracy o f past expectations and 
individual characteristics influence their ability of forecasting in the following 
time period. The results show that individuals significandy overestimate their 
expectation when they realize their financial position has worsened over the 
past year, while those whose financial situation has improved have a larger 
probability o f underestimating future increases than others. The married, 
women, employees, and individuals living in East Anglia are financially over- 
pessimistic; meanwhile smokers, the unemployed, and individuals with one 
child are financially over-optimistic. My findings add to the developing 
literature on expectations formation and contribute to an expanding area of 
research.
Thirdly, my results reject the Rational Expectations Permanent Income 
Hypothesis in the whole sample. This rejection occurs as a result of the 
significance of lagged values of the changes in the financial wellbeing in 
explaining the rate o f growth in non-durable consumption expenditure. In 
other words, current financial expectations do appear to help predict change 
in consumption. This result casts doubt upon the REPIH as it is usually 
applied. Further, one of the most encouraging outcomes obtained from this 
analysis is that the empirical work on the aggregate level is not very effective 
in testing the REPIH. O n a micro level, we find that some respondents 
surveyed form non-durable consumption expenditure decisions in line with 
the REPIH, such as individuals with comparatively lower education levels.
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The others named as the excess sensitivity groups, such as the highly educated, 
employee, and the self-employed, behave against the REPIH. Further analysis, 
by estimating a structural equation relating the change in consumption to 
both anticipated and unanticipated financial situation shocks, suggests that 
asymmetric preference and systematic heterogeneity in expectation errors are 
main possible sources leading to the failure of the REPIH among the highly 
educated and employees. For the self-employed, the combination of liquidity 
constraints and systematic heterogeneity in expectation errors make the 
REPIH fail.
Fourthly, the asymmetric response of agents’ consumption changes to 
expected financial improvement and deterioration exists in all of our 
investigations. This result is in accord with the central assumption of loss- 
aversion, in which loss and disadvantage have greater impact on preferences 
than gain and advantage. This thesis provides an empirical observation of this 
discrepancy.
To conclude, changes in individuals’ expectations/beliefs are an intuitively 
attractive source o f consumption fluctuations. Investigation of their 
importance relative to other alternative sources faces many conceptual, 
theoretical and empirical challenges. Many open research questions remain.
8.3FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Understanding how individuals formulate their expectations and identifying 
those groups prone to financial optimistic or pessimistic is insight for 
policymakers, given the potential role o f consumer confidence in influencing 
economic activity such as consumption and saving. For example, my findings 
serve to inform policymakers about how different groups in the economy 
may react to change in economic policy that influence the financial situation 
faced by individuals and households. This thesis presents an interesting 
connection between household expectations and how they are incorporated 
into household behaviour. The results suggest the individuals prone to 
financial optimistic and display the expected relationship between financial
169
wellbeing expectations and household consumption. They do suggest the 
need for more research to assess the empirical relationship between 
expectations and economic behaviour. The availability of subjective 
expectations information offers an exciting opportunity to validate the 
importance of expectations in decision-making that are an integral part of 
economic theory. Moreover, a marked asymmetry in the responses to 
favourable or unfavourable changes in economic condition will be noted in 
the standard models of decision making. This thesis can be extended in a 
number o f ways. First, given the significance of the cross-sectional 
distribution of individual expectations, new subjective survey questions might 
be created to better incorporate this distribution. Secondly, one can similarly 
examine many other decisions in addition to consumption for which 
expectations matter. Third, durable consumption might be taken into account 
in modelling. Fourth, a decision maker who seeks to maximize the utility of 
outcomes might be well advised to assign greater weight to negative rather 
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Appendix B
Table 1 Efficiency Test
Dependent Variable — Fisite (BHPS: 1991 ~ 2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Pro bit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat.
A ge 44.88 -0.0088* -5.080 44.88 -0.0201* -12.290 43.81 -0.0219* -13.970 48.89 -0.004 -1.400 40.25 -0.010* -4.000
A g e A g e /100 23.63 0.0125* 7.160 23.63 0.0224* 12.710 22.90 0.0241* 14.310 26.08 0.0076* 2.580 20.81 0.0135* 5.610
Dog of Income 71.95 0.1388* 22.040 3.89 0.0761* 14.120 3.64 0.0738* 13.860 4.05 0.1342* 16.330 3.59 0.1741* 15.780
Income Varance - 0.0000* -2.500 - 0.0000* -2.450 - 0.0000 -0.710 - 0.0000 -1.920 - 0.0000 -0.930
N o  married 0.46 - - 0.46 - - 0.52 - - — - - - - -
Married 0.54 0.0838* 6.330 0.54 0.0703* 5.340 0.48 0.1159* 9.040 — — — — - -
Male 0.50 - - 0.50 - - - - - 0.53 - - 0.47 - -
Demale 0.50 0.1180* 12.460 0.50 - - - - - 0.47 0.1539* 11.860 0.53 0.0524* 3.390
N o Smoker 0.71 - - 0.71 - - 0.70 - - 0.75 - - 0.66 - -
Smokers 0.29 -0.0886* -8.540 0.29 -0.1060* -10.490 0.30 -0.1005* -9.760 0.25 -0.0805* -5.840 0.34 -0.0887* -5.380
Housing Owned 0.24 - - 0.24 - - 0.23 - - 0.26 - - 0.21 - -
Housing Mortgage 0.48 -0.0385* -3.070 0.48 -0.0039 -0.310 0.47 -0.0001 0.000 0.55 -0.0406* -2.490 0.40 -0.0321 -1.530
Housing Rented 0.28 -0.0164 -1.220 0.28 -0.0759* -5.540 0.30 -0.0702* -5.200 0.18 -0.0119 -0.620 0.39 -0.0089 -0.450
Secondary Education 0.02 0.0527 1.740 0.02 0.1058* 3.640 0.02 0.0308 0.940 0.02 0.0447 1.160 0.02 0.0810 1.560
Higher Education 0.33 - - 0.33 - - 0.32 - - 0.48 - - 0.48 - -
Others 0.65 -0.0155 -1.510 0.65 0.0054 0.550 0.67 -0.0019 -0.180 0.67 -0.0313* -2.390 0.63 0.0184 1.060
In Paid employed 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.59 - - 0.49 - -
Self employment 0.08 -0.1150* -6.950 0.08 -0.0862* -5.330 0.05 -0.0950* -4.610 0.10 -0.1220* -6.160 0.05 -0.0803* -2.490
Unemployed 0.05 -0.3710* -14.320 0.05 -0.3815* -16.860 0.04 -0.3961* -15.400 0.03 -0.2630* -6.750 0.07 -0.4388* -12.020
Retired 0.21 -0.0611* -3.200 0.21 -0.0558* -2.670 0.21 -0.0478* -2.320 0.22 -0.0734* -3.100 0.21 -0.0002 -0.010
Others 0.13 -0.0224 -1.140 0.13 0.1669* 10.050 0.15 0.1430* 8.700 0.07 -0.0822* -3.060 0.19 0.0759* 2.520
N o  Child 0.74 - - 0.74 - - 0.75 - - 0.62 - - 0.88 - -
1 Child 0.11 -0.0818* -5.560 0.11 -0.0894* -6.000 0.11 -0.0707* -4.810 0.15 -0.0778* -4.240 0.07 -0.0761* -2.480
2  Children 0.11 -0.0738* -4.790 0.11 -0.0973* -6.150 0.10 -0.0897* -5.490 0.16 -0.0848* -4.560 0.04 -0.0681 -1.750
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3 +  Children 0.04 -0.0858* -3.730 0.04 -0.0913* -4.020 0.04 -0.1113* -4.410 0.07 -0.1079* -4.180 0.01 -0.0126 -0.160
Small H H  Si^e 0.17 -0.0259 -1.630 0.17 0.0198 1.220 0.18 0.0212 1.360 0.01 0.0317 0.370 0.36 -0.0209 -1.120
Medium H H  Si^e 0.53 - - 0.53 - - 0.51 - - 0.73 - - 0.30 - -
Big H H  Si^e 0.30 -0.0042 -0.380 0.30 0.0393* 3.620 0.31 0.0289* 2.580 0.26 -0.0460* -3.320 0.34 0.0712* 3.180
London 0.08 0.0103 0.590 0.08 -0.0346 -1.790 0.07 -0.0196 -1.000 0.07 0.0035 0.150 0.09 0.0294 1.060
Southeast 0.20 - - 0.20 - - 0.21 - - 0.16 - - 0.15 - -
Southwest 0.07 0.0104 0.600 0.07 0.0119 0.630 0.06 -0.0247 -1.250 0.08 -0.0224 -1.020 0.07 0.0762* 2.570
L a st Anglia 0.03 0.0607* 2.620 0.03 0.0385 1.490 0.03 0.0407 1.500 0.04 0.0673* 2.360 0.03 0.0840* 2.020
Midlands 0.14 0.0272 1.870 0.14 -0.0089 -0.580 0.13 -0.0208 -1.320 0.14 0.0153 0.840 0.14 0.0592* 2.360
Yorkshires 0.08 0.0462* 2.690 0.08 0.0145 0.760 0.07 0.0010 0.050 0.08 0.0618* 2.860 0.07 0.0352 1.180
Wales 0.11 0.0162 0.760 0.11 -0.0197 -1.210 0.13 -0.0620* -3.790 0.11 -0.0259 -0.940 0.11 0.0936* 2.700
Scotland 0.14 0.0266 1.490 0.14 0.0072 0.470 0.17 -0.0404* -2.700 0.14 0.0066 0.290 0.15 0.0711* 2.430
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0352 1.460 0.03 -0.0287 -1.080 0.03 -0.0211 -0.810 0.03 0.0144 0.460 0.04 0.1055* 2.730
North 0.11 0.0349* 2.240 0.11 -0.0010 -0.060 0.09 0.0037 0.220 0.11 0.0126 0.640 0.10 0.0851* 3.190
L R  chi2(39)= 1837.3 L R ch i2 (38)= 1616.93 1383.88 938.23 928.08
Pseudo R 2 0.012 Pseudo R 2 0.0105 0.0093 0.0101 0.0168
Number of Obs. 60648 60086 58760 37141 21801
Dependent Variable — Fisite (BHPS: 1991 ~2002)
Secondary E du . H igh  Education Others
'Probit M odel M ean C oef T -S ta t. M ean Coef. T -S tat. M ean. Coef. T -S ta t.
A g e 38.04 -0.0087* -2.480 48.17 -0.0053* -2.500 42.32 0.0124 0.750 - - -
A g e A g e / 1 0 0 16.75 0.0098* 2.520 26.99 0.0107* 5.190 19.71 -0.0209 -1.240 - - -
L o g  o f  Income 4.12 0.1794* 16.690 3.67 0.1092* 13.250 4.68 0.2369* 5.440 - - -
Income Variance - 0.0000* -3.140 - 0.0000* -2.630 - 0.0000 1.680 ~ - -
N o  m arried 0.49 - - 0.45 - - 0.40 - - - - -
M arried 0.51 0.1171* 5.130 0.55 0.0560* 3.340 0.60 0.0754 0.820 - - -
M ale 0.57 - - 0.48 - - 0.61 - - - - -
Female 0.43 0.1417* 8.680 0.52 0.1010* 8.380 0.39 -0.0099 -0.150 ~ - -
N o  S m oker 0.76 - - 0.68 - - 0.87 - - - - -
S m okers 0.24 -0.1006* -5.130 0.32 -0.0839* -6.750 0.13 0.0222 0.200 - - -










H ousing R ented 0.21 -0.0941* -3.150 0.32 0.0012 0.080 0.14 -0.3575* -2.700 - - -
Secondary E ducation - - - - - - - - - - - -
H igher Education - - - - - - - - - - - -
O thers — - - - - — - - - - - -
In  P a id  employed 0.66 - - 0.48 - - 0.75 - - - - -
S e lf  employment 0.09 -0.0897* -3.350 0.07 -0.1034* ^t.760 0.09 -0.2659* -2.350 - - -
Unemployed 0.03 -0.4689* -9.400 0.05 -0.3443* -11.060 0.03 -0.0553 -0.220 - - -
Retired 0.09 -0.0697 -1.710 0.27 -0.0873* -3.950 0.08 0.1927 1.090 - - ~
Others 0.13 0.0426 1.170 0.13 -0.0781* -3.250 0.05 0.3375* 2.120 - - -
N o  C h ild 0.71 - - 0.76 - - 0.67 - - — - -
1 C h ild 0.13 -0.0816* -3.390 0.10 -0.0716* -3.690 0.15 -0.2766* -3.060 — - -
2  Children 0.12 -0.1205* -4.880 0.10 -0.0349 -1.680 0.13 -0.1266 -1.300 - — -
3 +  Children 0.04 -0.1192* -2.950 0.04 -0.0460 -1.580 0.04 -0.3319* -2.090 - - -
S m a ll H H  Sioy 0.14 -0.0159 -0.580 0.18 -0.0369 -1.840 0.17 -0.0658 -0.620 — - -
M ediu m  H H  Si%e 0.56 - - 0.51 - - 0.65 - - - - -
Big H H  Si%e 0.30 0.0079 0.400 0.30 -0.0103 -0.740 0.18 0.0677 0.770 - - -
London 0.09 0.0279 0.960 0.07 0.0056 0.240 0.16 -0.0800 -0.810 - - -
Southeast 0.21 - - 0.20 - - 0.24 - - - - -
Southwest 0.06 0.0449 1.390 0.08 0.0053 0.250 0.05 -0.0717 -0.570 - - -
E a s t  A n g lia 0.03 0.0725 1.750 0.03 0.0584* 2.070 0.02 0.1468 0.410 - - ~
M idlan ds 0.13 0.0340 1.310 0.15 0.0205 1.130 0.12 -0.0104 -0.100 - - -
Yorkshires 0.07 0.0811* 2.600 0.08 0.0335 1.580 0.07 -0.1483 -1.340 — — -
W ales 0.10 0.0424 1.180 0.11 0.0128 0.480 0.06 -0.3350 -1.370 — — —
Scotland 0.18 0.0154 0.540 0.12 0.0265 1.120 0.21 -0.0367 -0.340 — — ~
G reater M anchester 0.03 0.0400 0.980 0.03 0.0291 0.960 0.02 0.5027* 1.990 — — —
North 0.09 0.0085 0.310 0.11 0.0497* 2.580 0.06 -0.1636 -1.290 - - -
L R  ch i2(37)~
Pseudo R2 










Sources: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
1) UK CPI for obtaining real income figures in 1991.
2) * = significant at 5%.
3) Year dummies are jointly estimated.
4) Null hypothesis: coefficient corresponding to explanatory variable is equal to zero.
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Table 2 Properties of Financial Expectations
Dependent Variable =  F isitx (BHPS: 1991 ~2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat.
Deteriorated 0.24 -0.2089* -19.460 0.23 -0.0950* -8.910 0.23 -0.0485* -4.520 0.24 -0.2426* -17.960 0.24 -0.1496* -8.410
Same 0.47 - - 0.46 - - 0.48 - - 0.51 - - 0.43 - -
Improved 0.29 0.3612* 32.410 0.31 0.3234* 31.380 0.30 0.3024* 29.210 0.25 0.4062* 28.710 0.33 0.2936* 16.150
A ge 44.88 -0.0413* -24.390 44.88 -0.0324* -20.830 43.81 -0.0347* -23.590 40.25 -0.0365* -12.890 40.25 -0.0509* -21.890
AgeAge/ 100 23.63 0.0250* 14.580 23.63 0.0177* 10.550 22.90 0.0214* 13.640 20.81 0.0189* 6.670 20.81 0.0355* 15.230
Dog of Income 71.95 -0.0311* -5.250 3.89 0.0043 0.910 3.64 0.0044 0.940 3.59 -0.0410* -5.350 3.59 -0.0113 -1.110
Income Variance. - 0.0000* 8.600 - 0.0000* 8.350 - 0.0000* 3.920 - 0.0000* 6.850 - 0.0000* 5.160
N o  married 0.46 - - 0.46 - - 0.52 - - - - - - - -
Married 0.54 -0.0963* -7.290 0.54 -0.1294* -10.360 0.48 -0.1169* -9.680 — — - - - - —
Male 0.50 - - — — — — — ~ 0.47 - - 0.47 - -
Female 0.50 -0.0593* -6.250 — — — — — — 0.53 -0.0623* -4.840 0.53 -0.0748* -4.940
N o  Smoker 0.71 - - 0.71 - - 0.70 - - 0.66 - - 0.66 - -













Housing Rented 0.28 0.0461* 3.460 0.28 0.0752* 5.840 0.30 0.0840* 6.690 0.39 0.0030 0.160 0.39 0.0763* 3.930
Secondary Education 0.02 -0.0133 -0.430 0.02 0.0202 0.720 0.02 0.0607 1.930 0.02 -0.0051 -0.130 0.02 -0.0257 -0.490
Higher Education 0.33 - - 0.33 - - 0.32 - - 0.48 - - 0.48 - -
Others 0.65 -0.0120 -1.160 0.65 -0.0110 -1.180 0.67 0.0199* 2.040 0.63 0.0024 0.190 0.63 -0.0350* -2.050
In Paid employed 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.49 - - 0.49 - -
Self employment 0.08 0.2080* 12.440 0.08 0.1702* 10.800 0.05 0.1593* 8.150 0.05 0.1888* 9.570 0.05 0.2591* 8.100
Unemployed 0.05 0.3618* 14.630 0.05 0.3436* 16.640 0.04 0.3853* 16.920 0.07 0.2106* 5.830 0.07 0.4838* 13.940
Retired 0.21 -0.0919* -4.850 0.21 -0.1168* -5.850 0.21 -0.1716* -8.970 0.21 -0.0455 -1.930 0.21 -0.1551* -4.680
Others 0.13 -0.2015* -11.170 0.13 -0.4362* -28.820 0.15 -0.3945* -27.350 0.19 -0.1064* -4.390 0.19 -0.2973* -10.780
N o  Child 0.74 - - 0.74 - - 0.75 - - 0.88 - - 0.88 - -
1 Child 0.11 -0.0007 -0.050 0.11 -0.0231 -1.620 0.11 -0.0073 -0.520 0.07 -0.0029 -0.160 0.07 -0.0106 -0.360
2  Children 0.11 0.0652* 4.270 0.11 0.0412* 2.710 0.10 0.0875* 5.710 0.04 0.0792* 4.400 0.04 0.0242 0.670
3 +  Children 0.04 0.0092 0.410 0.04 -0.0129 -0.600 0.04 0.0192 0.840 0.01 0.0482 1.930 0.01 -0.1841* -2.820
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Small H H  Si%e 0.17 -0.0379* -2.390 0.17 -0.1013* -6.570 0.18 -0.1243* -8.470 0.36 -0.0098 -0.130 0.36 -0.0806* -4.430
Medium H H  Si^e 0.53 - 0.53 - - 0.51 - - 0.30 - - 0.30 -
Big H H  Si^e 0.30 -0.0096 -0.870 0.30 -0.0427* -4.170 0.31 -0.0302* -2.900 0.34 0.0331* 2.410 0.34 -0.1132* -5.190
London 0.08 -0.0306 -1.760 0.08 0.0174 0.940 0.07 0.0104 0.560 0.09 -0.0600* -2.610 0.09 -0.0107 -0.400
Southeast 0.20 - 0.20 - - 0.21 - - 0.15 - - 0.15 -
Southwest 0.07 -0.0277 -1.590 0.07 -0.0432* -2.390 0.06 0.0069 0.370 0.07 -0.0084 -0.390 0.07 -0.0653* -2.260
LastH nglia 0.03 -0.0829* -3.560 0.03 -0.0650* -2.570 0.03 -0.0469 -1.810 0.03 -0.0691* -2.440 0.03 -0.1150* -2.810
Midlands 0.14 -0.0120 -0.820 0.14 0.0312* 2.130 0.13 0.0272 1.850 0.14 -0.0096 -0.530 0.14 -0.0183 -0.750
Yorkshires 0.08 -0.0481* -2.800 0.08 -0.0408* -2.230 0.07 -0.0206 -1.130 0.07 -0.0430* -2.010 0.07 -0.0644* -2.230
Wales 0.11 -0.0766* -3.640 0.11 -0.0063 -0.420 0.13 0.0089 0.600 0.11 -0.0190 -0.700 0.11 -0.1659* -4.930
Scotland 0.14 0.0084 0.470 0.14 0.0459* 3.290 0.17 0.0643* 4.680 0.15 0.0358 1.570 0.15 -0.0308 -1.080
Greater Manchester 0.03 -0.0302 -1.250 0.03 0.0298 1.150 0.03 0.0085 0.340 0.04 -0.0248 -0.790 0.04 -0.0437 -1.150
North 0.11 -0.0320* -2.050 0.11 -0.0236 -1.470 0.09 -0.0269 -1.660 0.10 -0.0167 -0.850 0.10 -0.0644* -2.470
L R  chi2(42)~ 11468.7 L R cb i2 (4 1 )= 12491.13 11977.78 5958.89 5402.25
Pseudo R 2 0.0854 0.0835 0.0814 0.0724 0.1048
Number of Obs. 72921 79895 80674 45383 27558
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Dependent Variable — F isitx (BHPS: 1991 ~2002)
Secondary Edu. High Education Others
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat.
Deteriorated 0.25 -0.010 -0.510 0.24 -0.3159* -24.150 0.20 0.15 1.82
Same 0.39 - - 0.52 - - 0.40 - -
Improved 0.36 0.337* 18.230 0.25 0.4001* 27.810 0.40 0.3502* 4.920
Age 38.04 -0.0257* -7.380 48.17 -0.0492* -23.850 44.88 -0.0330* -2.030
AgeAge/1 0 0 16.75 0.0103* 2.690 26.99 0.0315* 15.630 23.63 0.0236 1.400
Log of Income 4.12 -0.069* -6.850 3.67 -0.0024 -0.310 3.84 -0.1048* -2.690
Income Variance. - 0.0000* 6.240 - 0.0000* 7.520 - 0.0000 -0.400
No married 0.49 - - 0.45 - - 0.46 - -
Married 0.51 -0.1168* -5.100 0.55 -0.0761* -4.570 0.54 -0.1113 -1.210
Male 0.57 - - 0.48 - - 0.50 - -
Female 0.43 -0.1296* -7.960 0.52 -0.0099 -0.820 0.50 -0.1164 -1.740
No Smoker 0.76 - - 0.68 - - 0.71 - -
Smokers 0.24 0.0870* 4.450 0.32 0.0711* 5.790 0.29 0.1760 1.590
Housing Owned 0.19 - - 0.27 - - 0.24 - -
Housing Mortgage 0.60 0.1015* 4.290 0.42 0.0790* 5.150 0.48 0.3513* 3.480
Housing Rented 0.21 0.1630* 5.520 0.32 0.0167 1.090 0.28 0.4007* 3.060
Secondary Education - - - - - - - - -
Higher Education - - - - - - - - -
Others — — — — — — — - -
In Paid employed 0.66 - - 0.48 - - 0.54 - -
Self employment 0.09 0.1688* 6.250 0.07 0.2123* 9.680 0.08 0.2609* 2.290
Unemployed 0.03 0.5330* 10.760 0.05 0.3313* 11.320 0.05 0.8091* 3.240
Retired 0.09 0.0365 0.890 0.27 -0.0964* -4.380 0.21 -0.1529 -0.860
Others 0.13 -0.3466* -10.080 0.13 -0.1376* -6.320 0.13 -0.0857 -0.550
No Child 0.71 - - 0.76 - - 0.74 - -
1 Child 0.13 -0.0588* -2.430 0.10 0.0298 1.560 0.11 -0.0973 -1.100
2 Children 0.12 0.0377 1.530 0.10 0.0761* 3.730 0.11 -0.0362 -0.360
3+ Children 0.04 0.0256 0.650 0.04 -0.0231 -0.820 0.04 0.2822 1.830
Small H H  Si%e 0.14 -0.0501 -1.800 0.18 -0.0393* -1.970 0.17 0.0234 0.220
Medium H H  Si%e 0.56 - - 0.51 - - 0.53 - -
Big H H  Si%e 0.30 -0.0302 -1.540 0.30 0.0020 0.150 0.30 -0.1798* -2.080
London 0.09 -0.0371 -1.270 0.07 -0.0235 -1.040 0.08 -0.1470 -1.500
Southeast 0.21 - - 0.20 - - 0.20 - -
Southwest 0.06 -0.0671* -2.080 0.08 -0.0131 -0.620 0.07 0.2388 1.870
East Anglia 0.03 -0.1227* -2.950 0.03 -0.0510 -1.790 0.03 0.0727 0.230
Midlands 0.13 -0.0178 -0.690 0.15 0.0061 0.340 0.14 -0.1250 -1.200
Yorkshires 0.07 -0.0971* -3.110 0.08 -0.0099 -0.470 0.08 -0.1389 -1.260
Wales 0.10 -0.0812* -2.250 0.11 -0.0747* -2.840 0.11 0.0881 0.340
Scotland 0.18 0.0016 0.060 0.12 0.0387 1.650 0.14 -0.1085 -1.020
Greater Manchester 0.03 -0.0827* -2.020 0.03 0.0128 0.430 0.03 -0.1327 -0.530
North 0.09 -0.0328 -1.160 0.11 -0.0235 -1.220 0.11 -0.0545 -0.430
L R  chi2(40)= 2700.84 8606.52 219.6
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.099 0.075
Number of Obs. 22719 8606.52 1522
Sources: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
1) UK CPI for obtaining real income figures in 1991.
2) * = significant at 5%.
3) Year dummies are joindy estimated.
4) Null hypothesis: coefficient corresponding to explanatory variable is equal to zero.
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Table 3 Properties of Expectation Errors
Dependent Variable — Fisite (BHPS: 1991 ~2002)
Whole Sample Male Female Married Unmarried
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat.
Deteriorated 0.09 -0.2094* -11.350 0.09 -0.2180* -12.070 0.09 -0.2656* -14.430 0.07 -0.200* -7.690 0.24 -0.234* -8.530
Same 0.27 - - 0.27 - - 0.27 - - 0.26 - - 0.43 - -
Improved 0.64 0.3091* 29.310 0.64 0.3251* 30.890 0.64 0.3187* 29.800 0.68 0.322* 23.370 0.33 0.279* 16.160
A ge 44.88 -0.0032 -1.820 44.88 -0.0141* -8.530 43.81 -0.0153* -9.690 40.25 -0.002 -0.710 40.25 -0.002 -1.020
AgeAge 1100 23.63 0.0075* 4.260 23.63 0.0169* 9.540 22.90 0.0178* 10.510 20.81 0.0063* 2.130 20.81 0.0067* 2.750
Log o f Income 71.95 0.1064* 16.700 3.89 0.0529* 9.740 3.64 0.0555* 10.370 3.59 0.1000* 12.020 3.59 0.1357* 12.120
Income Variance - 0.0000* -3.570 - 0.0000* -3.770 - 0.0000 -1.670 - 0.0000* -2.560 - 0.0000 -1.740
N o  married 0.46 - - 0.46 - - 0.52 - - — - - - - -
Married 0.54 0.0472* 3.550 0.54 0.0533* 4.030 0.48 0.0773* 6.000 — — - - - -
Male 0.50 - - - - - - - - 0.47 - - 0.47 - -
Female 0.50 0.0947* 9.950 - - - - - - 0.53 0.1132* 8.660 0.53 0.0573* 3.700
N o  Smoker 0.71 - - 0.71 - - 0.70 - - 0.66 - - 0.66 - -
Smokers 0.29 -0.0555* -5.320 0.29 -0.0649* -6.380 0.30 -0.0608* -5.870 0.34 -0.0494* -3.560 0.34 -0.0538* -3.240
Housing Owned 0.24 - - 0.24 - - 0.23 - - 0.21 - - 0.21 - -
Housing Mortgage 0.48 -0.0081 -0.640 0.48 0.0204 1.580 0.47 0.0256* 1.960 0.40 -0.0024 -0.140 0.40 -0.0086 -0.410
Housing Rented 0.28 0.0475* 3.500 0.28 -0.0074 -0.530 0.30 0.0055 0.400 0.39 0.0659* 3.410 0.39 0.0392* 1.960
Secondary Education 0.02 0.0495 1.640 0.02 0.0871* 2.990 0.02 0.0156 0.480 0.02 0.0330 0.860 0.02 0.0883 1.700
Higher Education 0.33 - - 0.33 - - 0.32 - - 0.48 - - 0.48 - -
Others 0.65 -0.0024 -0.240 0.65 0.0148 1.510 0.67 0.0093 0.890 0.63 -0.0190 -1.450 0.63 0.0294 1.680
In Paid employed 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.49 - - 0.49 - -
Self employment 0.08 -0.1140* -6.880 0.08 -0.0830* -5.120 0.05 -0.0841* -4.070 0.05 -0.1215* -6.130 0.05 -0.0807* -2.500
Unemployed 0.05 -0.2574* -9.810 0.05 -0.2529* - 11.000 0.04 -0.2699* -10.370 0.07 -0.1625* -4.140 0.07 -0.3249* -8.760
Retired 0.21 -0.0511* -2.670 0.21 -0.0434* -2.070 0.21 -0.0302 -1.470 0.21 -0.0710* -2.990 0.21 0.0094 0.270
Others 0.13 0.0529* 2.680 0.13 0.2244* 13.430 0.15 0.1992* 12.040 0.19 -0.0033 -0.120 0.19 0.1415* 4.650
N o  Child 0.74 - - 0.74 - - 0.75 - - 0.88 - - 0.88 - -
1 Child 0.11 -0.0472* -3.190 0.11 -0.0561* -3.750 0.11 -0.0415* -2.810 0.07 -0.0499* -2.710 0.07 -0.0349 -1.130
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2  Children 0.11 -0.0286 -1.850 0.11 -0.0535* -3.370 0.10 -0.0501* -3.060 0.04 -0.0419* -2.240 0.04 -0.0250 -0.640
3 +  Children 0.04 -0.0209 -0.900 0.04 -0.0309 -1.360 0.04 -0.0526* -2.080 0.01 -0.0489 -1.880 0.01 0.0840 1.060
Small H H  Si^e 0.17 -0.0165 -1.030 0.17 0.0283 1.750 0.18 0.0399* 2.560 0.36 0.0922 1.060 0.36 -0.0110 -0.590
Medium H H  Si^e 0.53 - - 0.53 - - 0.51 - - 0.30 - - 0.30 - -
Big H H  Si%e 0.30 0.0061 0.550 0.30 0.0498* 4.580 0.31 0.0407* 3.630 0.34 -0.0293* -2.110 0.34 0.0790* 3.520
London 0.08 0.0136 0.770 0.08 -0.0260 -1.340 0.07 -0.0188 -0.960 0.09 0.0136 0.580 0.09 0.0284 1.030
Southeast 0.20 - - 0.20 - - 0.21 - - 0.15 - - 0.15 - -
Southwest 0.07 0.0212 1.210 0.07 0.0321 1.690 0.06 -0.0138 -0.700 0.07 -0.0104 -0.470 0.07 0.0859* 2.890
H ast Anglia 0.03 0.0613* 2.650 0.03 0.0444 1.710 0.03 0.0445 1.640 0.03 0.0622* 2.180 0.03 0.0884* 2.120
Midlands 0.14 0.0174 1.200 0.14 -0.0147 -0.960 0.13 -0.0241 -1.520 0.14 0.0041 0.220 0.14 0.0506* 2.020
Yorkshires 0.08 0.0361* 2.100 0.08 0.0099 0.520 0.07 -0.0107 -0.560 0.07 0.0477* 2.200 0.07 0.0311 1.040
Wales 0.11 0.0288 1.360 0.11 -0.0071 -0.430 0.13 -0.0382* -2.320 0.11 -0.0213 -0.770 0.11 0.1104* 3.180
Scotland 0.14 0.0179 1.000 0.14 0.0040 0.260 0.17 -0.0396* -2.630 0.15 -0.0093 -0.400 0.15 0.0704* 2.400
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0268 1.110 0.03 -0.0339 -1.270 0.03 -0.0231 -0.880 0.04 0.0075 0.240 0.04 0.0967* 2.500
North 0.11 0.0195 1.250 0.11 -0.0050 -0.300 0.09 -0.0010 -0.060 0.10 -0.0074 -0.370 0.10 0.0750* 2.800
L R ch i2(41)= 3196.46 LR chi2(40)= 3154.17 2989.96 1739.64 1415.57
Pseudo R 2 0.0209 0.0205 0.0201 0.0188 0.0256
Number of Obs. 60626 60062 58736 37130 21790
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Dependent Variable =  Fisite (BHPS: 1991~2002)
Secondary Edu._______________ High Education________________ Others_________________________ Consistency
Pro bit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.


























AgeAge/1 0 0 16.75 0.0056 1.440 26.99 0.0056* 2.710 23.63 0.0075* 4.300 - - -
Logo/Income 4.12 0.1432* 13.160 3.67 0.0784* 9.410 3.84 0.1073* 17.040 - - -
Income Variance - 0.0000* -3.870 - 0.0000* -3.470 - 0.0000* -3.420 — - -
N o  married 0.49 - - 0.45 - - 0.46 - - — - ~
Married 0.51 0.0733* 3.200 0.55 0.0233 1.380 0.54 0.0464* 3.500 — - -
Male 0.57 - - 0.48 - - 0.50 - - - - -
Female 0.43 0.1163* 7.080 0.52 0.0771* 6.370 0.50 0.0944* 9.950 — — —
N o  Smoker 0.76 - - 0.68 - - 0.71 - - — — -










Housing Rented 0.21 -0.0172 -0.570 0.32 0.0573* 3.680 0.28 0.0485* 3.600 — - -
Secondary Education - - - - - - - - - - - -
Higher Education — — — — — — — — — — — -
Others — — — — — — — — — — — —
In Paid employed 0.66 - - 0.48 - - 0.54 - - - - -
Self employment 0.09 -0.0833* -3.110 0.07 -0.1071* -4.920 0.08 -0.1141* -6.890 — - -
Unemployed 0.03 -0.3289* -6.520 0.05 -0.2445* -7.750 0.05 -0.2576* -9.830 — - -
Retired 0.09 -0.1016* -2.480 0.27 -0.0685* -3.090 0.21 -0.0518* -2.710 — — -
Others 0.13 0.1338* 3.630 0.13 -0.0059 -0.240 0.13 0.0515* 2.620 — — -
N o  Child 0.71 - - 0.76 - - 0.74 - - — — -
1 Child 0.13 -0.0307 -1.270 0.10 -0.0446* -2.290 0.11 -0.0475* -3.220 — — ~
2  Children 0.12 -0.0587* -2.360 0.10 0.0034 0.160 0.11 -0.0288 -1.870 — — -
3 +  Children 0.04 -0.0306 -0.750 0.04 0.0114 0.390 0.04 -0.0190 -0.820 — — -
Small H H  Si%e 0.14 -0.0089 -0.320 0.18 -0.0261 -1.300 0.17 -0.0166 -1.050 - - -
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Medium H H  Si%e 0.56 - - 0.51 - - 0.53 - - - --
Big H H  Si%e 0.30 0.0236 1.200 0.30 -0.0009 -0.060 0.30 0.0067 0.610 - -
London 0.09 0.0431 1.470 0.07 0.0028 0.120 0.08 0.0143 0.820 — —
Southeast 0.21 - - 0.20 - - 0.20 - _ — -
Southwest 0.06 0.0435 1.340 0.08 0.0191 0.900 0.07 0.0231 1.330 — -
L a st Anglia 0.03 0.0848* 2.040 0.03 0.0555* 1.960 0.03 0.0612* 2.640 — -
Midlands 0.13 0.0199 0.770 0.15 0.0114 0.630 0.14 0.0180 1.240 — -
Yorkshires 0.07 0.0889* 2.840 0.08 0.0178 0.840 0.08 0.0367* 2.130 — -
Wales 0.10 0.0486 1.350 0.11 0.0266 1.000 0.11 0.0291 1.370 - -
Scotland 0.18 0.0092 0.320 0.12 0.0139 0.590 0.14 0.0185 1.040 — -
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0186 0.460 0.03 0.0265 0.880 0.03 0.0253 1.050 — -
North 0.09 -0.0002 -0.010 0.11 0.0319 1.650 0.11 0.0210 1.350 - -
L R  chi2(39)~ 1391.93 1785.25 3211.8
Pseudo R 2 0.0271 0.0185 0.021 LR chi2(l)= 107.06
Number of Obs. 19223 39888 60818 70418
Sources: 1991 to 2002 yearly BHPS samples.
1) UK CPI for obtaining real income figures in 1991.
2) * = significant at 5%.
3) Year dummies are jointly estimated.
4) Null hypothesis: coefficient corresponding to explanatory variable is equal to zero.
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Appendix C
Random Effect Ordered Porbit Model
Consider a random effect model:
y*t = x'tp  + uit i - 1,2, ... ,n  andt=1, ..., T
where
= M i+ v it
Var(ui:) = <j\ + a , = 1 +
Corr(uu,uls) = p  =
1 + <t ;
and
y» =
0 i f  y „  ^  5.a >
1 i f  8 .o < y «  ^  <Si
2 i f  8 X <  y lt <  d 2
M
J  i f  8 j_ , <  y u
where y  denotes the unobservable variable, what we observe in our analysis is 
y it = {1,2,3} if { y u < SQ, S0 < y it < S X, Sx < y it} ; y  is the observed outcome; x  is 
observable time varying and time invariant vector of stricdy exogenous characteristics which 
influence y  ; f3 is the vector of coefficients associated with the x, jUi denotes the 
individual specific unobservable effect, which is treated as a random effect and assumed to 
be normally distributed; while the vit is a random error. In the case of probit random effect
models it is also assumed that vit ~  IN(0, <J„) and crv = l 81. The random effect ordered
81 V ar(u„) = a 2M + & 1  =  l  +  & l>  and the cross-period correlation o f Uit is: C o rr(u u ,u is) =  p  =  / ( I  +  cr )^
if t  ^  S . If the random effects exists, Ujt and Uis are correlated within a group, but not correlated 
across groups. If the effects are not significant, <j* =  0 and p  =  c r ^ +  =  0 ,  which indicates
there is no cross-period correlation with respect to Ui t . To test for random effects, we examine the
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probit model is estimated by the log-likelihood function introduced by Buder and Moffitt 
(1982) and the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method deals with the random effects structure 
in the model. In order to marginalize the likelihood we assume that p i ~ IN(0,<J2f )  are
independent o f the xit s and the vit conditional on the Xlt s.
If  we define ait = 8 , -  x'ltJ3 and blt = Sj -  x't/3 if y it = j , where 8_x = -oo and Sj =oo
N
the log-likelihood function is L = 'Z W P iy n  , y i2 5...? y i t )) where, by simply generalizing
/=1
the argument made in Buder and Moffitt (1982), one can show that
bn biT
= J*” Jf  (ua,...,uiT)duiT...dun
a i \  a iT
= }•••} jn /(v« \Mi)f(fJ,)djuidv,T- d v n




in which / ( • )  and F(*) represent the pdf and cdf of the normal distribution function 
respectively. Butler and Moffitt demonstrate that this is amenable to Gaussian quadrature. It 
is sufficient to estimate such a model as one can use numerical approximation of the first 
and second derivatives to compute quasi-Newton steps. However, while this makes each 
step time consuming to compute, even for a relatively small sample. The first derivatives 
can be approximated by Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Using the convention that
f i i  = f ( u j - x 'itP) > F ii =  F i M j - x ' n P )  > L i > and an indicator
function 1 {Statement} which takes the value 1 if the statement is true and 0 otherwise, the 
first derivative with respect to a parameter k is given by
a Y  In L
dL _  _  y  1 dLt
dk dk i Lt dk
2 / 2  2statistical significance o f p , using the W ald  test statistics ( W  =  p  /  S ). I£ W >  %  critical value 
(3.84 for a 95% critical level), we can reject the null o f p  =  0 (Greene, 2000).
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and thus for our parameters of interest
o p  t=1 r  it r  it t=1
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